Serbia
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Alarming trends facing protest movements
40th Session of the Human Rights Council
Statement delivered during General Debate (Monday 11 March)CIVICUS is deeply alarmed that protest movements find themselves on the frontlines of a global attack on democracy and human rights. Across the world, protest movements are being met by campaigns of violence and aggression from states that are increasingly brazen about defying global human rights commitments.
At a time when many hard-won gains are being directly threatened by state and non-state actors, we urge the states present here today to recall that it was people organising in protest and civil disobedience who rolled back slavery, overturned colonial and racist systems of governance, and fought for women’s rights.
Today, these struggles persist. Yet governments are increasingly responding to legitimate demands of protesters and their movements with absolute intolerance, including extra-judicial killings and torture.
CIVICUS echoes the concerns raised by the High Commissioner regarding the brutal crackdown on protests in Zimbabwe, where scores of unarmed civilians have been killed and children as young as 12 arrested, as well as the systemic campaign of brutality deployed against peaceful protesters in Sudan.
We ask all states present here today: what measures will you take to ensure that emerging protest movements from Serbia to Algeria to Malawi are nurtured rather than repressed?
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Attacks on Media in the Balkans Sound Alarm Bells for Democracy
By Susan Wilding, Head of Geneva, CIVICUS
This article is part of a series on the current state of civil society organisations (CSOs), which is the focus of International Civil Society Week (ICSW)Anti-government protesters invading Serbia’s state-owned television station, demanding that their voices be heard. Journalism bodies writing to the Albanian prime minister over plans to censor online media outlets. A Belgrade corruption-busting reporter forced to flee his house that had been torched; a Montenegrin investigative journalist shot in the leg outside her home.Read on: Inter Press Service -
BALKANS: ‘The emergence of white supremacism adds another layer of vulnerability for migrants and refugees’
CIVICUS speaks with Myriam Correa, director of Collective Aid, about the situation of migrants across the Balkan migration route.
Initially under the name BelgrAid, Collective Aid was established in 2017 in response to the changing needs of migrants and refugees in Serbia. It currently has offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina, France and Serbia. It provides services to cover aid gaps and improve the lives of people on the move.
What effects have recent policy changes had on migration along the Balkan route?
In early 2023, we witnessed an increase in migration along the Balkan route, particularly in Bosnia and Serbia, even though migrants were staying for a shorter time. This posed challenges for organisations like ours in locating and assisting people. Increased movement and rapid turnover made migrants harder to reach and rendered the phenomenon less visible – just as the authorities wanted. However, from a humanitarian standpoint, this only heightened risks.
On 25 October, Serbia initiated a military operation along its border with Hungary, targeting areas with high levels of border crossings. This led to the closure of refugee camps in the north and the forced relocation of migrants to centres in the south. Military presence escalated tensions, making access to migrants even more challenging. Arms proliferated and we observed instances of violence, including mistreatment of our personnel by the police.
The subsequent absence of migrants in previously bustling areas indicated that the authorities had achieved their aim. However, some traces of migration still lingered, albeit in reduced numbers, with Bosnian camps experiencing a notable influx.
The exact forms of migration are now unclear. Recent actions by the Serbian government, such as the temporary closure of southern camps, add to the uncertainty surrounding future migration patterns. As we continue to navigate these challenges, it is imperative for humanitarian efforts to remain adaptable and responsive to the evolving dynamics along the Balkan route.
What routes are migrants taking to reach western Europe?
Migrants travel from Turkey to the Aegean Islands or Evros and then enter Greece. After Greece, there are various routes. Some people take flights, but others cannot afford air travel. Some take shortcuts. Some enter Bulgaria directly from Turkey, while others enter the country from Greece. As a result needs are increasingly high in Bulgaria.
Several organisations currently focus on Bulgaria. We recently conducted a location assessment covering the border between Serbia and Bulgaria, the capital, Sofia, and the border between Bulgaria and Turkey. Significant numbers of people are crossing and have a pressing need for basic humanitarian services such as food, water, sanitation and hygiene services.
Local organisations lack government support to advocate against human rights violations. This means there is a crucial advocacy need in Bulgaria. One notable town is Harmali, near the border with Turkey, which has camps for asylum seekers and is heavily militarised. Sofia also has a significant migrant population, expected to increase due to Romania’s inclusion in the Schengen area. This makes Sofia a potential hotspot.
Further along the border with Serbia, Ragueman serves as a major crossing point. This region hosts several camps, primarily in southern Serbia near the Bulgarian border. The journey continues through Bosnia and Croatia into the European Union (EU). However, there are challenges in crossing the Bosnia-Croatia border, particularly at Hajj, due to reported pushbacks. Our organisation monitors border violence, mostly reported from the Croatian side, with Sarajevo serving as a refuge for those pushed back, particularly during harsh winters.
Bulgaria has become a gateway to the rest of Europe. But specific points like Seredets and road 79 pose dangers, with smugglers providing stimulants to keep migrants awake during crossings, leading to fatal consequences. Both Bulgaria and Serbia have seen severe instances of violence, with reports of brutal treatment by border authorities, including mutilation and burning. Such atrocities are alarming and demand immediate attention.
In contrast, Bosnia is emerging as a relatively safe passage, providing temporary respite for migrants. The living conditions in Bosnian camps have improved, though challenges persist during winters due to inadequate insulation, a lack of essential items and low maintenance standards.
Overall, the journey is perilous, with varying experiences based on financial resources and geographical factors. But despite the hardships, migrants persevere, hoping for a better life in Europe.
What’s the situation of migrants from conflict-affected regions travelling along the Balkan route?
The short answer is that these migrants experience an unbearable amount of traumatisation. Most people who traverse this route are fleeing conflict – including genocide, ethnic oppression, religious persecution and collapsing regimes. They come from countries such as Afghanistan, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Syria. They are not economic migrants. They are seeking safety in Europe. It is shocking that they have to endure such trials, particularly considering that while Bosnia and Serbia are not EU countries, they are still in Europe. And the fact that Bulgaria and Croatia are part of the EU raises thorny questions about why such hardships persist.
The initial reaction is often shock, followed by a profound sense of hopelessness. It is disheartening to realise that safety remains a distant dream and the journey ahead is bleak. People are aware that their lives remain at risk but have limited knowledge about the challenges they will face. Misinformation and reluctance to share the full extent of their suffering with loved ones exacerbate the situation.
Regardless of migrants’ origins, the challenges they face are consistent. They endure rough living conditions, sleeping in tents, bushes, forests or abandoned buildings. The emergence of white supremacist sentiments in Europe adds another layer of vulnerability, making them easy targets for violence.
It is important to note that most people crossing the Balkan route are single men, with few women and families. While there are some families on the road and a family camp in Sarajevo, most migrants are single men. This is a reflection of the perilous conditions along the route, which are unsuitable for women and children.
Smuggling gangs are streamlining the process, making crossings more efficient, but at the cost of safety. Migrants are left at the mercy of criminals who view them as a mere source of income and are indifferent to their wellbeing. Many disappear without a trace.
Survivors face immense psychological trauma. They endure sexual, physical and psychological violence, compounded by environmental hardships and homelessness. The perpetual threat triggers a constant fight-or-flight response, hindering cognitive functions and deteriorating mental health. Chronic stress, reflected in elevated cortisol levels, poses severe health risks.
Hygiene-related issues, such as scabies, exacerbate the already dire situation. Lack of access to proper sanitation and healthcare amplifies the suffering, turning minor ailments into life-threatening conditions. The lack of awareness of and attention to these issues perpetuates the cycle of suffering, highlighting the urgent need for comprehensive solutions and compassionate action.
In sum, the refugee experience in Europe is a harrowing journey marked by trauma, violence and despair. It is imperative to address the underlying issues and provide adequate support to those in need, ensuring that every person is treated with dignity and compassion.
What support do civil society organisations working along the Balkan route need for their work?
The most obvious, yet the truest, answer is funding. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, attention and empathy have understandably shifted towards Ukraine and its people. However, grassroots organisations working on the frontlines with other migrant groups continue to face significant challenges in fundraising. For instance, Collective Aid used to easily raise €15,000 to €30,000 (approx. US$16,200 to US$32,400) twice a year, but now struggles to raise as little as €5,000 (approx. US$ 5,400). This has taken a massive toll on these organisations.
The redirection of donor funding to other areas, such as Lebanon and the Middle East, has further compounded the issue. The recent crises in Gaza, Sudan, Syria and Turkey have also diverted attention and resources away from the ongoing migrant crisis within European borders.
Lack of financial support is the biggest obstacle faced by grassroots organisations, pushing them to their limits as they struggle to support migrants on the ground.
Get in touch with Collective Aid through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @collective_aid onTwitter andInstagram.
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CIVICUS Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Submissions on Civil Society Space
CIVICUS and its partners have submitted joint and stand-alone UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) submissions on 5 countries in advance of the 29th UPR session in January 2018. The submissions examine the state of civil society in each country, including the promotion and protection of the rights to freedom of association, assembly and expression and the environment for human rights defenders. We further provide an assessment of the States’ domestic implementation of civic space recommendations received during the 2nd UPR cycle over 4 years ago and provide a number of targeted follow-up recommendations.
Countries Examined: Burundi, France, Israel, Serbia, and the UAE
Burundi: CIVICUS, APRODH, LigueITEKA, DefendDefenders and FIDH examine the failure of the Government of Burundi to implement the vast majority of recommendations it accepted and noted during Burundi’s previous UPR cycle. In the submission, we highlight the restrictions on fundamental freedoms, the targeting of human rights defenders and Burundi’s refusal to cooperate with international human rights institutions and mechanisms. We further examine the high levels of impunity enjoyed by government officials, members of the security forces and the armed wing of the ruling CNDD-FDD party, the Imbonerakure.
France: While France has faced serious terrorist threats since its last UPR review, measures taken to protect the public from attacks have had negative consequences for the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression. In its submission to Frances third UPR review, CIVICUS outlines a series of concerns related to France’s decision to repeatedly extend its state of emergency, which has expanded powers of arrest, detention and surveillance of security forces without adequate judicial oversight and without due regard for the proportionality of measures taken to restrict fundamental freedoms.
Israel: CIVICUS, PNGO and ANND raise concern over ongoing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law committed in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory since Israel’s previous UPR examination. Worryingly, the authorities continue to subvert the right to freedom of expression through the criminalization of dissent online. Human rights defenders and peaceful protesters also routinely face arbitrary arrest and are held in administrative detention to suppress their legitimate work.
Serbia: CIVICUS, the Human Rights House Belgrade (Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Civic Initiatives, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights) and Human Rights House Foundation document the continued intimidation, attacks and harassment of human rights defenders and journalists who report on sensitive issues, such as transitional justice, corruption or government accountability. Additionally, we assess how vilification of and smear campaigns against human right defenders, CSOs, and independent media outlets is undermining the work of civil society.
United Arab Emirates: In its joint UPR submission, CIVICUS, the Gulf Centre for Human Rights and the International Service for Human Rights examine the continued suppression of fundamental democratic freedoms in the United Arab Emirates. This report explores the ongoing systematic campaign to persecute human rights defenders through arbitrary arrests, torture, deportation and the continued use of draconian legislation to restrict freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.
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El poder de la unión durante la ICSW 2019
Para aquellos de nosotros que estuvimos en Belgrado hace unas semanas es difícil pensar en el mes de abril y no recordarlo como la culminación de meses de preparación para la Semana Internacional de la Sociedad Civil. Bajo el lema El poder de la unión, la ICSW reunió a más de 700 delegados internacionales de 92 países del 8 al 12 de abril para que participaran en coloquios y acciones organizadas por los 42 socios del evento. Las actividades sobre el terreno se vieron acompañados por un torrente de comentarios en los medios de comunicación y en Internet, para así promover ciertos temas fuera del evento y en todo el mundo.
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Five countries added to watchlist of countries where civic freedoms are under serious threat
- Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sudan, and Venezuela join global watchlist
- Escalating rights violations include killings, attacks on protesters, media restrictions and arbitrary detentions of human rights defenders
- International community must pressure governments to end repression
Five countries from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and Latin America have been added to a watchlist of countries which have seen a rapid decline in fundamental freedoms in recent weeks and months. The new watchlist released by the CIVICUS Monitor, an online platform that tracks threats to civil society across the globe, identifies growing concerns in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sudan, and Venezuela.
Activists and civil society organisations in these countries are experiencing an infringement of their civic freedoms as protected by international law. These violations include the use of excessive force by security forces during peaceful protests and journalists being arbitrarily detained and harrassed in both Sudan and Venezuela. In Serbia, space for independent media is under concerted attack while massive anti-government demonstrations are taking place. In Saudi Arabia, authorities continue the crackdown on women human rights defenders, who are being subject to arbitrary detentions and ill treatment for their activism on gender issues. While, in Afghanistan, there has been a record high number of civilian casualties (3,800 in 2018). The upcoming July presidential elections pose additional security risks and a threat to shrinking civic space, as over 400 civilians and voters were killed or injured (including eight candidates), during last October’s parliamentary elections.
“It is deeply concerning to see escalated threats to basic rights in these countries,” said Ms. Barreto, CIVICUS Civic Space Research Lead. “It is critical that these five governments wake up to their failure to respect international law and take swift action to respect their citizens’ most basic freedoms in a democratic society and create an enabling environment for civil society organisations” Belalba said. “We also call upon neighbouring states and international bodies to put pressure on these countries to end the repression and ensure positive steps are taken to guarantee the safe space for civil society to continue their legitimate work”
Large-scale anti-government demonstrations have been ongoing across Sudan since 19th December 2018 calling for President Omar Al-Bashir to step down in the context of a growing frustration over the harsh economic and social situation. In response, the authorities have launched a violent campaign targeting protesters, including doctors, teachers, journalists, women activists and opposition political leaders. With the declaration of a state of emergency, civic space restrictions continue to increase with hundreds of protesters on trial and dozens sentenced in summary trials on charges of participating in demonstrations.
Serbia has witnessed sustained protest since December 2018. Protests started after an opposition politician was assaulted by unknown assailants wielding metal rods. For the most part, authorities in Serbia have largely ignored or attempted to downplay the scale of the protests. However on 17th March 2019 after 14 consecutive weeks of demonstrations, police in Belgrade used excessive force to disperse protesters that were calling for greater press freedom and fair elections. After encircling the Presidential building, clashes between protesters and police broke out, leading to the use of tear gas by Serbian authorities. Ten people were arrested in the confrontation. The government has also orchestrated a smear campaign against protesters labelling opponents of the government as “paid” activists working against Serbian interests.
Despite claims that the Saudi Arabian government is leading reforms to improve the situation of women in the country, Saudi authorities continue to persecute women activists. Since the crackdown began in May 2018, at least 22 women human rights defenders have been arrested and subjected to human rights violations because of their activism on gender issues. Reports indicate that several detained rights defenders have been subjected to torture including sexual assault and harassment.
In Venezuela, since January 2019, massive anti-government protests have continued to take place in the country. The government has responded by using excessive force against demonstrators, arbitrarily detaining protestors, including teenagers, as well as detaining and harassing human rights defenders and journalists. Just between 21 and 25 January, at least 41 people died in circumstances linked to the protests,and more than 900 people were arbitrarily detained. For years, protesters in Venezuela have been met with excessive force by authorities, as people take to the streets to demand a change in government, the pattern of repression will likely intensify. Human rights organisations working to deliver humanitarian aid are especially targeted with harassment, and in some cases, their offices have been raided. It is estimated that more than three million venezuelans have fled the country due to the humanitarian crisis and denial of basic rights such as health and food.
Since the beginning of 2019, at least three journalists have been killed in Afghanistan. The country was the world's deadliest for journalists in 2018 with 13 reporters and 2 other media professionals killed. Citizens risk being killed and attacked for participating in government elections and civil society is currently excluded from peace negotiations between the Taliban and the United States (U.S.), and parallel peace talks in Moscow. Women’s groups and persecuted communities are campaigning to have their voices heard in the peace process, and to ensure that any agreement guarantees human rights and democratic freedoms.
In the coming weeks, the CIVICUS Monitor will closely track developments in each of these countries as part of efforts to ensure greater pressure is brought to bear on governments. CIVICUS calls upon these governments to do everything in their power to immediately end the ongoing crackdowns and ensure that perpetrators are held to account.
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ICSW 2019, New Board, Opportunities: Updates from Lysa John, CIVICUS SG
For those of us who were in Belgrade a few weeks ago, it is hard to think of April as anything but the culmination of months of preparation towards the International Civil Society Week (ICSW). Themed around the ‘Power of Togetherness’, the ICSW brought together over 700 international delegates from 92 countries to engage with dialogues and actions organised by 42 event partners across 8-12 April. Events on the ground were accompanied a stream of media and online commentary aimed at profiling relevant issues beyond the event.
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International Civil Society Week closes with #FreedomRunner launch
Belgrade, Serbia –More than 200 civil society leaders and human rights activists from some 100 countries were seen running through the streets of Serbia today – literally.
The #FreedomRunner event, held at the close of International Civil Society Week (ICSW) 2019, a week-long global civil society gathering, kicked off a global campaign calling on people around the world to run in the name of human rights defenders who are currently jailed, being persecuted, or at risk for their work.
Throughout the ICSW 2019forum, it was evident that individuals and organisations are increasingly under attack in many countries. Activists, journalists and people who speak out against growing restrictions are often persecuted, and a historic, unprecedented rise of populist leaders continues to erode fundamental freedoms and sow division in many countries.
But brave women and men across the globe are refusing to be silenced.
#FreedomRunner happening now on #ICSW2019 supporting @MarijaLukic36
— FreedomRunner (@FreedomRunner2) April 11, 2019
Sign up to run your cause:https://t.co/4s9HCLWWgD@CIVICUSalliance @gradjanske pic.twitter.com/oVtkYuxYt6“In every country, and often in the face of serious risks, people are standing up for their rights. Those of us with the freedom to do so need to stand - or even run - alongside them,” said Lysa John, CIVICUS Secretary General.
The Freedom Runner campaign will be launched together with the Belgrade Marathon, a major annual event on the city’s calendar, on Sunday, April, 14.
“We are dedicating the first run within this global movement to the Marija Lukic, a Serbian survivor of sexual violence, who is still fighting her struggle for her rights on behalf of all of us,” said Maja Stojanovic, Executive Director of ICSW co-host Civic Initiatives, an association of Serbian civil society organisations.
“The connections that will be made among freedom runners all around the world is a powerful tool for creating more just, inclusive societies,” said Stojanovic.
Over the coming year, runners will sign up to an online platform to track their collective runs, until they have run around the world – with some 40,075 km of running logged in the name of freedom - to arrive “back” in Belgrade.
“Running today is our way of showing how powerful we can be when we work together,” said John.
“We hope that people around the world will join us by running in their own cities and countries, so that we keep the spotlight shining on those whose basic freedoms are at risk.”
Co-hosted by the global civil society alliance, CIVICUS and Serbian civil society association, Civic Initiatives, with support of the Balkans Civil Society Development Network, ICSW brought together more than 900 delegates. This was the first time in almost a quarter century of international convening, that CIVICUS hosted its flagship event in the Balkans – a region of 11 countries and 55 million people.
This year’s theme, “The Power of Togetherness”, set out to explore how people and organisations around the world can, and are, working together to enable and defend spaces for civic action in a world where global transformations are reshaping how civil society functions.
Sign up here to become a #FreedomRunner.
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NOTES FOR EDITORS
Based on data from the CIVICUS Monitor - a global research collaboration - just 4% of the world’s population live in countries where governments are properly respecting the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression.
Find an album of photographs of the #FreedomRunner event here. They are free to publish. However please credit CIVICUS.
CONTACT
For more information, or to arrange interviews, please email: or contact:
Grant Clark, Senior Media Advisor, CIVICUS
Mobile/Whatsapp: +27 63 567 9719
Teodora Zahirovic, PR Manager, Civic Initiatives
Mobile/Whatsapp: +381 60 3624 001
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KOSOVO: ‘Civil society has done most of the effort when it comes to dealing with our recent history’
CIVICUS speaks about intensifying inter-ethnic violence in north Kosovo and civil society’s ongoing peacebuilding efforts withBjeshkë Guri, coordinator of the ‘Dealing with the Past’ programme atYouth Initiative for Human Rights Kosovo (YIHR-KS). Founded in 2004, YIHR-KS is a civil society organisation (CSO) workingto protect and promote human rights and democratic values with a focus on transitional justice and strengthening the role of young people at the local and regional levels.
What’s the current security and human rights situation in Kosovo?
The security and human rights situation in Kosovo is complex and multi-faceted. While Kosovo’s Constitution ensures robust human rights protection and incorporates several international human rights mechanisms into its legal framework, inconsistent law implementation creates a fertile ground for rights violations to flourish. Unfortunately, violations persist across many domains, with discrimination and violence against women, LGBTQI+ people, children and non-majority communities being prevalent issues.
In recent years, ethnic violence has increased in north Kosovo, triggered by the implementation of ID and licence plate regulations in 2022. These policies increased tension and ultimately led to Kosovo-Serbs resigning from public institutions and boycotting local elections. Violent clashes were reported in north Kosovo between Kosovo-Albanian police factions and peacekeeping soldiers on one side and Kosovar Serbs on the other. On 24 September, an attack unfolded at Banjska Monastery involving around 30 armed people from Serbia and the Kosovo-Serb community. The incident resulted in a fatal shootout that killed one Kosovar police officer and three attackers. This has heightened tensions further and created a fragile political and diplomatic situation between Kosovo and Serbia.
Political leaders, driven by nationalist propaganda, foster social divisions between two ethnic groups. The risk of secession in north Kosovo, if not properly addressed, would pose a precedent for other separatist conflicts and cause destabilisation in the whole Balkan region. Russia’s war against Ukraine has changed the geopolitical landscape and the stability paradigm in Europe. This created an even greater need to extinguish local conflicts and prevent their recurrence, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia.
What should be done to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia?
Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence since 2008 has created obstacles against normalising relations between the two states and induced an economic blockade as well as presenting international diplomatic challenges. The normalisation of relations requires a process of social change alongside the implementation of agreements and resolution of underlying problems, such as the establishment of an association of Serb-majority municipalities and the enhancement of institutional functionality in north Kosovo as well as the recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty by Serbia.
Civil society on both sides constantly works to improve the situation through a range of initiatives, including continuous support in the negotiation process. However, deteriorating political relations are exacerbating public tensions. As a result, CSOs in Kosovo have difficulties in engaging with communities that are predominantly Kosovo-Serbian.
What are relations between the Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serbian communities like?
The war in Kosovo claimed thousands of lives and destroyed the social fabric, replacing it with hatred and isolation. The rupture in communication between most Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs has made the two communities closed and isolated, seeing each other as enemies. Children are often brought up in fear and unaware of the wider context and problems shared by all communities in Kosovo. The influence of media, nationalist organisations and an aggressive environment pressure young people to take sides and view ‘the other’ as the cause of all problems. Ignorance about each other is the source of the prejudices and hostility that persist to this day.
An important factor lies with the education system. Various nationalist narratives are perpetuated through history books, as evidenced by an analysis we conducted in 2017. Kosovo-Serb young people learn from history books produced by the Serbian government, which barely mention the Kosovo War and portray Serbian people as the main victims. Xenophobic language has created isolation, prejudice, lack of trust and a feeling of insecurity in both communities.
How is YIHR-KS working toward reconciliation and peacebuilding in Kosovo?
Compared to political institutions, Kosovar CSOs have done most of the effort when it comes to dealing with our recent history. Over the years, the Kosovo government initiated efforts related to transitional justice, including the establishment of an inter-ministerial working group to develop a national strategy on transitional justice, a preparatory team for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a War Crimes Institute. Unfortunately, these initiatives became politicised and to this day Kosovo hasn’t been able to implement a comprehensive transitional justice strategy.
To address the current polarised situation, YIHR-KS launched the ‘Dealing with the Past’ programme, aimed at building a collective memory and lasting peace in Kosovo and the Balkan region. We conduct workshops and memory initiatives aimed at educating young people about the Kosovo War and providing them with opportunities to connect with peers from ‘the other side’.
One notable initiative is the Virtual Museum of Refugees, a digital archive featuring stories of forcibly displaced people. By collecting and sharing refugee interviews, this archive helps preserve memory and provides a basis for the understanding of Kosovo’s past through personal stories. It’s also a platform for refugees to connect with others who may have undergone similar experiences and thus foster a better understanding among survivors of what happened in the war. The museum challenges ethno-nationalistic narratives and builds a shared vision for reconciliation.
We facilitate residential and regional exchanges for young people from Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serbian communities so they can share experiences, ideas and opinions and learn about transitional justice, intercultural dialogue and negotiation skills. We also organise visits to sites where war crimes occurred against both Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs for them to hear stories from victims’ family members. This experience is transformative because it bridges gaps created by propaganda, which is based on concealing crimes committed against the ‘other’ group.
Every year we conduct street actions to commemorate the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances and the National Day of Missing People. We use these to demand greater commitment and engagement from the government of Kosovo to seek truth and establish justice for over 1,600 missing people of all ethnicities.
We closely cooperate with all YIHR offices in the region, and particularly with Serbia’s due to our shared and troubled past. Together with YIHR Serbia, we issue joint statements and are vocal about the human rights violations committed in the 1990s Balkan wars and the present political and social tensions.
What further international support does Kosovar civil society need?
Civil society activities in Kosovo have significantly expanded over recent years, creating space for policy advocacy and the promotion of transparency and democratic ideals. However, despite the large number of CSOs addressing pressing issues, there is a lack of funding for activities.
We need further support in facilitating the European Union (EU) integration agenda, aligning Kosovo’s legal system with the Community acquis – the accumulated legislation, legal acts and court decisions issued since 1993 that make up EU law, strengthening democratic values and promoting a safe and equal environment for everyone living in Kosovo.
Kosovo would also significantly benefit from joining the Council of Europe. This would enable access to expertise and resources to advance the transitional justice agenda and encourage a victim-led approach.
Civic space in Kosovo is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with YIHR-KS through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@YIHRKosovo on Twitter.
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KOSOVO: ‘Civil society plays a crucial role in maintaining communication in difficult times’
CIVICUS speaks with Milica Andric Rakic, project manager at New Social Initiative (NSI), about intensifying inter-ethnic violence and deteriorating civic space in Kosovo.
NSI is a civil society organisation (CSO) that seeks to empower non-majority communities to participate in Kosovo’s social and institutional life and increase trust among communities by helping people to deal with past events and promoting the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
What’s the current human rights and security situation in Kosovo?
The situation in Kosovo is highly volatile. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, but to this day Serbia doesn’t recognise Kosovo as an independent state and continues to claim it as an autonomous province of Serbia. The longstanding impasse in negotiations is straining inter-ethnic relations within Kosovo, between Kosovar Serbian and Albanian communities. Unlike past tensions that eventually subsided, the security situation has steadily worsened over the past two years.
Human rights are generally upheld in Kosovo, although rather selectively. For example, successive governments have refused to implement constitutional court decisions regarding the ownership of an Orthodox monastery’s extensive land and the establishment of an association of Serbian-majority municipalities, two longstanding demands of the Kosovo Serb community. There have been break-ins at Orthodox churches and police arrests of Kosovar Serbs without a prosecutor’s order. While the overall human rights situation isn’t bad, there are specific areas where the government fails to respect the law and court orders.
What was the significance ofviolence in Banjska on 24 September?
The attack occurred in the context of increased tensions in north Kosovo, which included the resignations of thousands of Kosovar Serbs working in the public sector, including the mayors of four municipalities. On 24 September 2023, Serb militants carried out an attack against the Kosovo police in the village of Banjska, in north Kosovo.
North Kosovo’s population is 90 per cent Serbian but its police force is mainly Albanian, which leads to a level of mistrust and tensions that pose a threat of violence. Those involved in the attack had a secessionist political agenda. While secession isn’t an imminent threat, it’s definitely a motivating factor, and many on-the-ground processes have had a disintegrative effect.
What role is civil society playing in normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo?
It seems that civil society has been the only healthy player in Serbian-Albanian relations. It has played a crucial role in maintaining communication in difficult times. We’ve acted as mediators between the international community and Kosovar and Serbian governments, trying to understand the perspectives of all sides.
From 2011 to 2017, effective dialogue and integrative processes were underway, albeit with slow implementation and numerous challenges. The European Union (EU) played a special facilitating role in the negotiations, motivating both sides through the promise of potential EU membership.
But now the only trend we are witnessing is towards disintegration. The lack of proper dialogue over the past two years indicates a need for a political change on at least one side to move the process forward.
How is NSI working towards peacebuilding in Kosovo?
As an umbrella organisation, we engage Kosovars in inter-community dialogue through various projects. One initiative promotes reconciliation by creating connections and fostering cooperation among young Kosovar Serbs and Albanians. As there are limited organic opportunities for them to meet, the responsibility for creating personal inter-ethnic ties lies largely on the shoulders of local CSOs. If a Kosovar Serbian and an Albanian know each other, there’s an 80 per cent probability that they’ve met at a civil society activity.
Another programme focuses on multiculturalism and bilingualism. Albanian and Serbian are both official languages in Kosovo, and our goal is to increase social acceptance and promote the learning of both. For almost 40 years we haven’t been taught each other’s language in school, which has led to a significant linguistic gap. It should be noted that Albanian and Serbian are very different languages and can both be challenging to learn.
We have a transitional justice programme, where we collaborate with associations that represent various categories of war victims, including families of missing people and internally displaced people. This regional project involves Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia. We support these associations to expand their work from truth-seeking to regional reconciliation, simultaneously enhancing their financial sustainability by securing funding for new projects. We have also participated and proposed policies in the Ministry of Justice’s working group to draft a national strategy for transitional justice.
Moreover, we’ve organised diverse artistic activities, including a joint photo exhibition, ‘All Our Tears’, in which photographers captured images of war victims in Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia. The exhibition was showcased in cities including Kosovo’s capital Prishtina, Serbia’s capital Belgrade and at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Additionally, we have supported regional theatre projects that raise transitional justice issues through performance.
What challenges do you face in doing your work, and what further support do you need?
There has been a significant narrowing of civic space in Kosovo, marked by delegitimising campaigns targeting CSOs, political opponents and critics of the government, mainly through online harassment. Our organisation, along with some staff, has faced such attacks.
Engaging with the government on policy matters has been challenging, as our recommendations regarding the Kosovar Serb community are often ignored or poorly implemented. It’s evident that the government’s outreach to the Kosovar Serb community is influenced more by international pressure than a genuine willingness to engage. The contacts we maintain with government representatives are often facilitated by outside parties, either from embassies or European think tanks that hold roundtable discussions where we can directly discuss issues of the local Serb community with the government.
Kosovar civil society has sufficient funding opportunities. What we really need is support to maintain our relevance, especially when governments attempt to exclude CSOs from political decision-making processes. Whenever there’s an attempt to narrow civic space, the international community should demonstrate that it’s willing to support local CSOs, signalling their importance and thereby putting pressure on the government to take them into consideration.
Civic space in Kosovo is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with New Social Initiative through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@NSIMitrovica and@AndricRakic on Twitter.
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La sociedad civil internacional se reunirá en los Balcanes con el objetivo de fortalecer «el poder de la unión».
- La Semana Internacional de la Sociedad Civil 2019 –ICSW, por sus siglas en inglés– reunirá en Belgrado, Serbia, a más de setecientos líderes de la sociedad civil, activistas y ciudadanos interesados de diferentes sectores y regiones en torno a varios temas con el fin abordar los desafíos mundiales más acuciantes en el ámbito de los derechos humanos, la democracia y el desarrollo internacional.
- Por primera vez en casi un cuarto de siglo de ediciones internacionales, este evento se realizará en los Balcanes, una región idónea para explorar la necesidad de unidad y el poder de la acción colectiva.
- La ICSW contará con al menos treinta sesiones clave y eventos asociados que abordarán una serie de cuestiones decisivas: desde la ayuda de emergencia a las ONG objeto de ataques, pasando por la reducción de las libertades de los medios de comunicación, hasta una mayor rendición de cuentas en el seno de la sociedad civil.
Belgrado, Serbia — En todo el mundo las organizaciones de derechos humanos sufren cada vez más los ataques de los gobiernos. Los activistas, periodistas y demás personas que se pronuncian contra las crecientes restricciones son perseguidos. Un auge histórico de líderes populistas continúa erosionando las libertades fundamentales, intensificando la polarización política y sembrando la división.
Estamos inmersos en un mar de amenazas internacionales sin precedentes a las cuales la sociedad civil y los ciudadanos de todo el mundo ya han empezado a responder con una renovada determinación.
En este contexto se han abierto las inscripciones para la Semana Internacional de la Sociedad Civil 2019 –ICSW, por sus siglas en inglés–, un evento internacional que se desarrollará del 8 al 12 de abril en Belgrado, Serbia, en el que participarán más de setecientos líderes de la sociedad civil de diferentes sectores y regiones, y que abordará distintos temas. Los delegados compartirán ideas y propondrán soluciones comunes para algunos de los desafíos más acuciantes en el ámbito de los derechos humanos, la democracia y el desarrollo internacional, y explorarán cómo liberar el poder de la acción colectiva para defender las libertades democráticas en todo el mundo.
La organización de este evento es fruto de trabajo conjunto de la alianza mundial de la sociedad civil, CIVICUS, y de la asociación serbia de la sociedad civil, Civic Initiatives, y cuenta con el apoyo de la Balkans Civil Society Development Network. El programa de la ICSW cuenta con al menos treinta sesiones que abordarán temas que van desde la represión de la libertad de los medios de comunicación y las ayudas de emergencia a las ONG objeto de ataques, hasta la rendición de cuentas dentro de la sociedad civil. Esta sesiones estarán acompañadas por una gran variedad de actividades organizadas por nuestros socios y de discursos clave a cargo de oradores de alto nivel. Gracias a la fuerza de su alianza compuesta por más de 7 000 miembros de 175 países y a su presencia regional, CIVICUS y Civic Initiatives han logrado la implicación de más de treinta socios para la organización del evento, así como la participación una serie de oradores inspiradores de alto nivel que compartirán sus experiencias y conocimientos con los delegados.
En un país tras otro, la democracia está siendo objeto de ataques y los movimientos populistas y de derecha siguen ganando terreno; incluso en países considerados históricamente como bastiones de la democracia se observa una regresión democrática.
Según CIVICUS Monitor, una plataforma en línea que rastrea las amenazas que pesan sobre la sociedad civil en todos los países, solo el 4 % de la población mundial vive en lugares donde se respetan y protegen adecuadamente sus derechos a la libertad de expresión, asociación y reunión.
«Pese a esto, la sociedad civil está luchando y buscando formas nuevas e innovadoras para organizarse y actuar. Vemos como se forjan nuevas alianzas, así como una creciente apertura a la construcción de coaliciones: activistas que trabajan por diferentes causas y en distintas comunidades se unen para luchar por cuestiones comunes», afirmó Lysa John, secretaria general de CIVICUS.
«El evento de este año en Serbia se produce en un momento crucial y oportuno para que la sociedad civil y los ciudadanos del mundo se den cuenta del poder de las acciones conjuntas y colectivas para desafiar una tendencia mundial que amenaza nuestras libertades fundamentales», declaró John.
El tema de este año, El poder de la unión, explora cómo las personas y las organizaciones de todo el mundo pueden trabajar juntas y cómo están ya haciéndolo con el fin de favorecer y defender espacios para la acción cívica en un mundo en el que las transformaciones globales están reconfigurando el funcionamiento de la sociedad civil.
Por primera vez en casi un cuarto de siglo de ediciones internacionales, el evento estrella de CIVICUS se desarrollará en los Balcanes, una región compuesta por once países y hogar de 55 millones de personas. La ciudad anfitriona será Belgrado, una de las más antiguas de Europa con sus 7 000 años historia. En ella se refleja su complejo pasado nacional y regional haciendo de esta urbe un lugar idóneo para explorar la necesidad de unidad y el poder de la acción colectiva.
«A lo largo de su historia, Serbia ha alternado entre regímenes autoritarios y democracios», indicó Maja Stojanovic de Civic Initiatives.
«Durante los años noventa se produjeron conflictos, graves violaciones de los derechos humanos y el genocidio. Hoy, a medida que nos acercamos a la adhesión a la Unión Europea, los mecanismos de supervisión independientes nacionales e internacionales muestran una reducción de las libertades de los medios de comunicación, una falta de separación de poderes, el menoscabo del estado de derecho y un deterioro de la libertad de voto», expresó Stojanovic.
«Esta región, y Serbia en particular, demuestra que el cambio de leyes, estrategias o gobiernos no ofrece garantías: la democracia no existe sin un trabajo de construcción constante. El evento de este año lo celebraremos en Belgrado con el objetivo de reunirnos, de enviar mensajes arraigados en el contexto local y de reflejar plenamente los desafíos mundiales».
El evento comenzará con una Asamblea de la Juventud de dos días en la ciudad serbia de Novi Sad, Capital Europea de la Juventud 2019 y acogerá a más de cien jóvenes activistas de todo el mundo. Esta asamblea ofrecerá a los delegados la oportunidad de relacionarse con sus pares internacionales, examinar y tomar medidas respecto a algunos de los principales desafíos a los que enfrentan los jóvenes de la sociedad civil en la actualidad.
Entre los oradores de ediciones pasadas de la ICSW se hallan reconocidos e influyentes pensadores, como los ganadores del Premio Nobel de la Paz Jimmy Carter, Desmond Tutu y Ali Zeddini; así como los ex primeros ministros de Nueva Zelanda y Grecia, Helen Clark y George Papandreou.
FIN
NOTAS PARA EDITORES
Para más información, escríbanos a .
INFORMACIÓN SOBRE LOS ORGANIZADORES
Los organizadores de la ICSW 2019 son CIVICUS y Civic Initiatives (CI).
CIVICUS es una alianza mundial de organizaciones de la sociedad civil y de activistas dedicados a fortalecer la acción ciudadana y la sociedad civil en todo el mundo. Desde su fundación en 1993, CIVICUS se esfuerza por hacer oír la voz de grupos marginados, en especial la de aquellos pertenecientes al hemisferio sur, y hoy cuenta con miembros en más de 145 países de todo el mundo.
Civic Initiatives fue fundada en mayo de 1996 por un grupo de destacados activistas pertenecientes a ONG que habían participado en el movimiento contra la guerra y en la oposición democrática no nacionalista desde 1990. Desde entonces, Civic Initiatives ha respondido a la necesidad de crear una base cívica que sostenga los valores democráticos apoyando el activismo ciudadano y abogando por un mejor marco jurídico para la participación cívica.
Preguntas frecuentes sobre la ICSW 2019
¿Qué es la Semana Internacional de la Sociedad Civil 2019?
La Semana Internacional de la Sociedad Civil (ICSW), que se celebrará del 8 al 12 de abril de 2019, es una reunión mundial clave para que la sociedad civil y otras partes interesadas participen de manera constructiva en la búsqueda de soluciones comunes para los desafíos globales. Por primera vez en más de veinte años de ediciones internacionales, CIVICUS, en asociación con Civic Initiatives (CI), celebrará su evento estrella en la región de los Balcanes.
¿Cuáles son los temas clave para 2019?
El programa de la ICSW 2019 se centrará en tres temas interrelacionados con el fin de que los delegados puedan trabajar juntos para:
- entender y conectar con los ciudadanos y los movimientos populares que se están produciendo en las calles y en todo el mundo (tema STREETS);
- construir puentes que fortalezcan alianzas, creen solidaridad y faciliten la acción colectiva en todas las cuestiones (tema BRIDGES);
- e identificar los pasos necesarios para construir y mantener el impacto colectivo, y conectar los esfuerzos locales a los internacionales (tema STAIRS).
¿Quién asistirá?
Más de setecientos delegados de todo el mundo participarán en la ICSW 2019. Entre ellos figurarán dirigentes de la sociedad civil, activistas, representantes de órganos intergubernamentales, de gobiernos y de los medios de comunicación.
¿Por qué se celebra en Serbia?
Serbia y los Balcanes Occidentales tienen marcos jurídicos sólidos que han de garantizar los derechos básicos de sus ciudadanos. Sin embargo, desde los años noventa los regímenes dictatoriales y la reducción de los derechos básicos han hecho que estas garantías solo lo sean en el papel. De hecho, esa misma década fue testigo de conflictos, de graves violaciones de los derechos humanos y del genocidio. Hoy los mecanismos de supervisión independientes nacionales e internacionales muestran una reducción de las libertades de los medios de comunicación, una falta de separación de poderes, el menoscabo del estado de derecho y un deterioro de la libertad de voto. Decidimos organizar la ICSW 2019 en Serbia con el objetivo de poner en relieve el trabajo de la comunidad de la sociedad civil de los Balcanes para abordar los desafíos actuales a los que se enfrenta la región y para encontrar formas de colaborar y apoyar su trabajo mediante la construcción de alianzas entre la sociedad civil local y la sociedad civil internacional.
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Resilience in times of shrinking civic space: How Resilient Roots organisations are attempting to strengthen their roots through primary constituent accountability
Soulayma Mardam Bey (CIVICUS) and Isabelle Büchner (Accountable Now)
The systematic crackdown on peaceful protests and demonstrations across the world has shaped our understanding of repression against civil society organisations (CSOs). Yet, less-spectacular restrictions such as increased bureaucratic requirements imposed by governments are not necessarily less threatening to CSO resilience.
While those tactics significantly hamper CSOs’ ability to operate and can reduce primary constituents' trust in CSOs' ability to represent them legitimately, we also need to acknowledge that these symptoms can stem from our own inappropriate approaches to accountability. When CSOs are not accountable to their roots, this can serve as a breeding ground for governments’ and other non-state actors’ anti-CSOs strategies and rhetoric.
The Resilient Roots initiative is aiming to test whether CSOs who are more accountable and responsive to their primary constituents are more resilient against threats to their civic space. 15 organisations from diverse countries and contexts have partnered with us to design and rollout innovative accountability experiments over a 12 month period. These experiments will explore how public support and trust in CSOs can be improved through practising what we call primary constituent accountability, which aims to establish a meaningful dialogue with those groups that organisations exist to support, and increase their engagement in CSO decision-making.
Accountability and resilience are both highly context-specific and vary not just from country to country but also along an organisation’s thematic focus, size and approach. This means that we need to explore the relationship between accountability and resilience on a case by case basis and across a variety of very different contexts. Keeping this in mind - and without further adieu - read on to meet the some of Resilient Roots Accountability Pilot Project organisations:
One of these organisations is the Poverty Reduction Forum Trust (PRFT) from Zimbabwe. In the rural area of Dora, in the district of Mutare, they aim to systematically validate actions and strategies through constituent-led monitoring of programme progress. As a platform for civil society that aims to address the root-causes and diverse manifestations of poverty in Zimbabwe, they may face very different challenges from an organisation that works on more politically polarising topics.
For example, Russian CSO OVD-Info is an independent human rights media project that monitors detentions and other cases of politically motivated harassment, informs media and human rights organisations on the state of political repression in Russia, and provides legal assistance to activists. For the Resilient Roots initiative, OVD-Info seeks to set up a dashboard to serve as a data visualisation tool, which will help evaluate the efficiency of its projects and motivate their constituents to play a stronger role in the organisation’s decision-making.
In contrast to the technology and data-driven approach of OVD-Info, FemPLatz is a women’s rights organisation from Serbia that seeks a more direct and personal approach. They plan to gather feedback from their constituents through focus group discussions, interviews and workshops while also improving their communication with their constituents through the publication of a regular newsletter. This will allow their constituents to monitor their work and get in contact with them to provide feedback.
A newsletter can also contribute to closing the feedback loop. Projet Jeune Leader (PJL) from Madagascar, for example, will engage young adolescents, their parents and school administrations to establish a coordinated and systematic means to collect feedback. They will collect feedback through participatory scorecards, stories from primary constituents around the changes triggered by the project, and an updated youth magazine to get closer to their constituents. PJL works on a comprehensive sexual-reproductive health education and leadership development program integrated into public middle schools.
A particularly creative approach comes from Solidarity Now. Through multimedia productions, their primary constituents will express their daily perceptions, challenges, and dreams through the making and sharing of interactive material like video clips. Solidarity Now consists of a network of organisations and people whose goal is to assist and support the populations affected by the economic and humanitarian crises in Greece. Through the provision of services to both local Greeks and migrant populations, it seeks to restore the vision of a strong Europe based on solidarity and open values.
In Asia, Climate Watch Thailand (CWT) is an organisation working to drive changes in attitudes towards climate change, and trigger action on the topic. As part of the initiative, CWT is going to strengthen how they formulate policy asks, by continuously testing their relevance to their constituents and this gaining wider support.
Unfortunately, not all the organisations we work with in this initiative feel comfortable enough to publicly associate themselves to Resilient Roots, without the fear of inciting further anti-CSO responses in their local context. Such is the case of our Ugandan partner, a reminder of how delicate civic spaces are and how important it is for our sector to better understand how to strengthen CSO resilience in recent times.
These diverse organisations are using a variety of approaches to work on CSO accountability, and we are incredibly excited to be exploring with them how different accountability practices fare in different regional and thematic contexts. What factors will make them successful and where will they need to adjust? In what circumstances does increased accountability actually lead to increased resilience? We are looking forward to sharing this journey with you: how they progress with their projects, the things they are learning, and what you can draw from their experiences to inform the work of your own organisation.
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Serbia at UN Human Rights Council: Adoption of Universal Periodic Review Report
38th Session of UN Human Rights Council
Adoption of the UPR report of the Republic of SerbiaThe Human Rights House Belgrade (Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights, Belgrade Center for Human Rights, Civic Initiatives, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and Policy Center), the Human Rights House Foundation and CIVICUS welcome the Government of Serbia's engagement with the UPR process. We also welcome the agreement signed between the Prosecutor’s office, the State Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and journalists’ and media associations in December 2016 on cooperation and measures to improve the security of journalists.
However, in our joint UPR Submission, we also documented that since its last review, the Republic of Serbia has only fully implemented one recommendation of a total of 18 recommendations relating to civic space.
We are particularly alarmed by the intimidation, attacks and harassment of human rights defenders and journalists who report on sensitive issues, such as transitional justice, corruption or government accountability. According to a national media watchdog group, there were at least 231 assaults (physical attacks, attacks on property, threats, pressure and verbal attacks) on journalists since 2013, with at least 42 recorded physical attacks.
We are furthermore concerned about the vilification of and smear campaigns against human right defenders, CSOs, and independent media outlets, which has undermined their work.
Mr President, the Human Rights House, the Human Rights House Foundation and CIVICUS call on the Government of Serbia to take proactive measures to address these concerns and implement recommendations to create and maintain, in law and in practice, an enabling environment for civil society.
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SERBIA: ‘People are concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable is being taken away’
CIVICUS speaks about the results of Serbia’s recent elections and subsequent protests with Raša Nedeljkov, Programme Director of the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).
Founded in 2002, CRTA is a Serbian civil society organisation that works to develop a democratic culture and promote civic activism through civic education campaigns, electoral observation and the development of public policy proposals.
What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?
The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.
Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.
Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.
The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.
How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?
On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.
Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.
Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.
How have people reacted to election irregularities?
Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.
Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.
How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?
The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.
The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.
Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.
What should the international community do?
We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.
Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship
What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?
The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.
Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.
Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.
The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.
How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?
On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.
Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.
Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.
How have people reacted to election irregularities?
Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.
Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.
How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?
The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.
The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.
Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.
What should the international community do?
We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.
Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship.
Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CRTArs and@rasaned onTwitter.
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SERBIA: ‘The government is allergic to pluralism and keeps discrediting dissenting voices’
CIVICUS speaks about Serbia’s upcoming parliamentary elections and civic space conditions withVukosava Crnjanski, founder and director of the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).
Founded in 2002, CRTA is a Serbian civil society organisation (CSO) working to promote civic activism and develop a democratic culture through advocacy, civic education campaigns, electoral observation and the production of public policy proposals.
What are the conditions for civil society in Serbia?
The quality of civic space is worsening. In essence, the government is allergic to pluralism and keeps discrediting dissenting voices. Serbian CSOs face great pressure from pro-government media, particularly popular newspapers, which brand them as ‘mercenaries’ and ‘traitors’.
On top of this chronic situation, the situation has at times greatly escalated. In acute phases, the oppression of civil society intensifies because the government seeks to divert public attention from pressing issues that it wants to conceal. For instance, in the summer of 2020 the Ministry of Finance initiated a campaign against several CSOs, independent journalists’ associations and activists. Harassment took the form of financial scrutiny, imposed under unfounded allegations of their involvement in money laundering and connections with terrorism. A year later, the targeted people and organisations asked that the ministry disclose the results of this inquiry to dispel those accusations – but of course, the results were never made public.
What prompted the decision to call early elections?
President Aleksandar Vučić has called early parliamentary elections, to be held on 17 December. He attempted to present this as a response to the opposition’s call for snap elections, a demand that arose when none of the requests of protests held under the motto ‘Serbia Against the Violence‘ were addressed. This movement has been going on for months throughout the country, following two mass shootings in early May that left 17 people dead and 21 injured.
Vučić thrives in the campaigning phase of politics and in a political environment in which the normal functioning of institutions remains on hold. This has often happened following elections: in the past 11 years, a total of two years, four months and four days have been wasted between calls for elections and the approval of new governments. The president systematically benefits from situations of instability in which he is perceived as the sole stabilising factor.
What are the main campaign issues?
The ruling party’s key campaign message is that ‘Serbia Must Not Stop’, implying that any change would halt the country’s development. For over a decade, Vučić’s propaganda has pushed a narrative of Serbia’s alleged economic growth. It’s supported by an enormous media machinery that uses manipulative tactics and constantly calls Serbia ‘the Balkans’ tiger’, repeatedly mentioning ‘new jobs’, ‘foreign investments’ and having the ‘biggest’ infrastructure projects. This blurs the vision of some people, although most can definitely see the emptiness of their wallets.
The pro-European opposition aims to articulate the rejection of structural violence into an electoral agenda, pledging to free the state from the dominance of a single party. Meanwhile, right-wing nationalist parties commit to ‘save Kosovo’ and strengthen ties with Russia. The new slogan of the Serbian Radical Party, of which Vučić was a prominent official in the 1990s, is ‘Our Fatherland Is Serbia, Our Mother Is Russia’.
Relations with Kosovo and the imposition of sanctions on Russia stand out as critical issues and their significance is likely to grow. Yet there’s no substantive debate on these matters, which is confusing. The government tries to monopolise these topics, strictly controlling their discussion in the public sphere and labelling anyone else raising them as traitors. It aims to keep these matters opaque to the public, treating them as exclusive realms of backroom politics.
I assume that the ideologically diverse pro-European opposition will try to avoid these topics out of fear that discussing them will make them an easy target. This decision may also be influenced by opinion polls that indicate that voters are a lot more interested in other topics, namely the economy and corruption.
How is Serbian civil society, including CRTA, involved in the electoral process?
As usual, CRTA is actively engaged in the electoral process. Our observation mission is already active across Serbia, monitoring media reporting and campaign activities on the ground and reviewing the work of the electoral institution. We are paying special attention to the problem of pressure on voters. As research we have been conducting for over a year now shows, a large number of people are captured in a network of clientelism and electoral corruption. People from socially vulnerable groups and public sector employees are continuously pressured to give their support to a political party.
In addition to monitoring the snap parliamentary elections, we are also observing the municipal elections in the capital, Belgrade.
The quality of Serbian electoral processes has been deteriorating for years and there is little reason to believe that issues such as biased media, the abuse of public resources and the misuse of public office will magically disappear. However, we are actively working to motivate citizens to vote, and many other CSOs are also about to launch their ‘Get Out the Vote’ campaigns. Whatever problems the electoral process has, increased participation will make things better.
We hope that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights will deploy an election observation mission in a full capacity, as recommended by a prior needs assessment mission. This kind of international support is crucial not only on election day but also to boost our advocacy to achieve improvements in the electoral process.
Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@CRTArs andVukosava Crnjanski onTwitter.
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SERBIA: ‘The political crisis will deepen as a large number of people lack representation’
CIVICUS speaks with Ivana Teofilović about the causes of recent protests and the government’s reaction to them, as well as about the elections held in Serbia under the COVID-19 pandemic. Ivana is public policy programme coordinator at Civic Initiatives, a Serbian citizens’ association aimed at strengthening civil society through civic education, the promotion of democractic values and practices and the creation of opportunities for people’s participation.
Why did protests erupt in Serbia during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how did the government react?
The immediate reason for the mass and spontaneous gathering of citizens in July 2020 was the announcement of the introduction of a new curfew, that is, another 72-hour ban on movement. After the president’s press conference ended, dissatisfied people began to gather in front of the National Assembly in the capital, Belgrade. Although the immediate reason was dissatisfaction with the management of the COVID-19 crisis, people also wanted to express their unhappiness about numerous other government measures and their impacts, and particularly with the conditions in which the recent parliamentary elections were held.
In response, the security forces used unjustified force in dozens of cases and exceeded the powers entrusted to them by law. Their violent response to spontaneous peaceful assemblies was a gross violation of the right to the freedom of peaceful assembly and an unwarranted threat to the physical integrity of a large number of protesters. The protests were marked by the use of a huge amount of teargas, which was indiscriminately thrown into the masses of peaceful demonstrators. As a result, many protesters had health issues for days afterwards. Apart from the fact that unjustifiably large quantities of teargas were used, the public's attention was captured by the fact that the teargas fired was past its expiry date.
The media and citizens also reported and documented many cases of police brutality, including that of three young men who were sitting quietly on a bench and were repeatedly beaten by a gendarmerie officer with a baton. In another incident, a young man was knocked to the ground and hit with batons by 19 officers, even though two members of the Ombudsman’s Office were on duty near the scene, precisely to control the conduct of the police. Additional disturbances and acts of violence were perpetrated by a large number of individuals in civilian clothes. At the time it could not be determined whether they were police in civilian clothes, or members of parapolice forces or criminal groups, but many clues point to them being members of hooligan groups connected with the authorities and working on their orders.
Media representatives also played a very important role in the protests. In this context, many media workers behaved professionally and reported objectively on the protests, often becoming victims of police brutality or attacks by members of hooligan groups infiltrated among protesters to incite rioting. According to the Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS), as many as 28 journalists were attacked while covering protests, and 14 suffered bodily injuries, which in six cases required urgent medical attention. According to a statement issued by NUNS, the most seriously injured was Zikica Stevanovic, a reporter of the Beta news agency.
However, media outlets that are close to the government either ignored or distorted the real picture of the protests by disseminating lies about who organised, funded and participated in them and by ignoring or denying cases of obvious police brutality. Journalists, analysts and civil society activists who publicly supported the protests and spoke critically about the government and the president were often the target of tabloid campaigns, and were smeared by the holders of high political office in an attempt to discredit their work.
Bureaucratic measures were also used against them, for example through their inclusion on a list compiled by the Ministry of Finance’s Directorate for Prevention of Money Laundering, which required banks to look into all the financial transactions they made over the past year. The associations and individuals who were targeted published a joint statement with over 270 signatures to call on the authorities to urgently make public the reasons for any suspicion that these organisations and individuals were involved in money laundering or terrorist financing. They also made clear that these pressures would not deter them from fighting for a democratic and free Serbia.
Violent police reaction, indiscriminate brutality, non-objective reporting and government retaliation further motivated people to protest. As a result, people took to the streets in even greater numbers in the following days. Protests also began to take place in several other Serbian cities besides Belgrade, including Kragujevac, Nis, Novi Sad and Smederevo.
Has civil society experienced additional challenges to continue doing its work under the pandemic?
Under the state of emergency imposed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but also after the state of emergency was lifted, civil society organisations (CSOs) faced numerous difficulties that greatly hindered their work. During the first weeks of the state of emergency, some CSOs that provide services to vulnerable people were unable to perform their activities due to the ban on movement, a difficulty that was only gradually and partly overcome over time as special permits were issued to certain categories of people.
Another challenge was posed by the Regulation on Fiscal Benefits and Direct Benefits, adopted in response to the economic impacts of the pandemic. This regulation did not extend exemption from value-added tax (VAT) to food, consumer goods and services donated to the non-profit and humanitarian sector to support socially vulnerable groups. For this reason, a group of CSOs sent the Ministry of Finance a proposal to extend the VAT exemption.
The biggest challenge for CSOs was financial sustainability, which was especially endangered by the suspension of the competition for co-financing projects of public importance, both at the national and local levels. In addition, while the provisions of the Regulation on Fiscal Benefits and Direct Benefits were insufficiently clear when it came to CSOs, they unequivocally excluded informal citizens’ initiatives, and thus jeopardised their survival.
In addition, the right to the freedom of expression was especially endangered during the pandemic. Challenges included restrictions faced by the press to attend and ask questions at Crisis Staff press conferences, the disregard of media representatives by officials in government bodies and institutions, and the persecution of media outlets that pointed to negative consequences during the pandemic. These restrictions opened up opportunities for the dissemination of unverified information. The lack of timely and factual information led to the further spread of panic and it became clear that in addition to the pandemic, Serbia also faced an ‘infodemic’.
What are the views of civil society about the government response to the pandemic, including the conditions under whichthe recent elections were held?
Despite the very unfavourable position they found themselves in, CSOs played a significant role during the COVID-19 crisis. CSOs had a significant role to play in correcting government failings, as they put forward numerous quality proposals for overcoming the crisis. In many situations it was CSOs, due to better training, that took over the roles of certain civil services. The general impression is that the state was not ready for the crisis, and therefore did not have enough capacity to provide a better response.
Due to its closed nature, the government used the need of urgency and efficiency as a pretext to bypass dialogue. In adopting some measures, there were frequent violations of laws and the constitution, and of people’s rights, particularly the right of journalists to do their work. Economic measures were not adopted in a timely and effective manner, which endangered many CSOs and their activists, ultimately having their greatest impact on people as users of CSO services.
Regarding the parliamentary elections, which were held on 21 June after being postponed from their original date of 26 April, there is still an unanswered question regarding the government’s responsibility for conducting an election process under the pandemic. There is suspicion that the decision to hold the election was politically motivated and irresponsible. This was reinforced by the fact that in the weeks following the election, the number of COVID-19 infections and deaths drastically increased. It seems that the efforts made by some CSOs to create conditions for free and democratic elections have not yielded the desired results.
What were the main issues that got in the way of a free and fair election?
Beyond the pandemic, the major concern about the elections was that they were dominated by the ruling party, including through pressure on critical journalists and media outlets and control of mainstream media, which lack a diversity of opinions and balanced coverage and are used for campaign purposes.
Media coverage during the election campaign was slightly more balanced than in previous elections, because the government wanted to prove that complaints from the public and the political opposition regarding poor election conditions and the captivity of the media were baseless. In principle, candidates were treated equally by public media, although public officials campaigning on a daily basis also received a lot of additional coverage. On top of this, members of the opposition who had decided to boycott the elections and therefore did not present candidates did not have room to present their arguments on national television.
The unequal treatment of candidates was especially visible in national commercial television channels, which provided logistical support to the ruling party and its coalition partners. This problem was exacerbated by the passive stance adopted by the Electronic Media Regulatory Body (REM), which played an almost imperceptible role during the election campaign. In May 2020, REM changed its methodology of monitoring the media representation of political actors, counting every mention of a political option as proof of media representation. This led to the conclusion that the opposition Alliance for Serbia was the most represented party. But in reality, the Alliance for Serbia, which boycotted the elections, did not receive any media coverage on national television; rather it was the most frequent target of attacks by the ruling party and its allied media. In this area, another problem is the uneven normative framework: REM’s regulations relating to public media services are legally binding, but those relating to commercial broadcasters are drafted in the form of recommendations and have no binding effect, and there are no effective safeguards against violations.
What are the implications of the election results for human rights and democracy in Serbia?
The ruling Serbian Progressive Party, truly a right-wing party, won over 60 per cent of the vote, claiming approximately 190 seats in the 250-seat parliament. Their coalition partner, the Socialist Party of Serbia, came second with about 10 per cent of the vote, adding approximately 30 seats to the coalition. As a result, the National Assembly was left without opposition representatives, opening additional space for unlimited and legally unhindered exercise of power by the ruling party. The past four years are proof that the mere presence of the opposition in parliament is not a sufficient barrier to arbitrariness, as the government has perfected mechanisms to make parliamentary procedures meaningless and restrict the freedom of speech of opposition representatives. But some opposition legislators, through their initiatives, public appearances and proposals, managed to draw attention to numerous scandals and violations of the law by state officials.
The protests that came after the elections seem to point towards further political polarisation and a deepening of the political crisis, as a large number of people lack representation and feel deprived of the right to elect their representatives without fear through free and democratic elections. The latest attempts to deal with civil society, journalists and prominent critical individuals by promoting investigations of money laundering or terrorist financing speak about deepening polarisation. The development of human rights requires coordination and cooperation of CSOs and state bodies as well as social consensus and political will, so this is certainly not contributing to an improvement of the human rights situation in Serbia. On the contrary, it is leading to an increasingly serious crisis, the aggravation of inequalities and injustices and more frequent protests.
Civic space in Serbia is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Civic Initiatives through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@gradjanske on Twitter. -
SERBIA: ‘We live in a system that’s allergic to pluralism, with a government hostile to critical voices’
CIVICUS discusses recent local elections in Serbia with Tamara Branković, deputy program director at the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA). CRTA is an independent, non-partisan civil society organisation working to develop democratic culture and civic activism in Serbia.
In Serbia’s 2 June local elections, the coalition led by President AleksandarVučić’snationalistSerbian Progressive Party won in the two largest cities, including the capital, Belgrade, where the polls were a rerun of a December election found by international observers to have serious irregularities, and which sparked months of protests. In Belgrade’s rerun, a new centre-right group came second and the left-wing greens third. This time, the elections appeared to be cleaner, but competitiveness was limited as the ruling party misused state resources to favour its candidates.
Why did the ruling coalition win in the local elections?
We only observed the elections for the Assembly of the City of Belgrade, but I believe our conclusion also applies to other local elections that took place on 2 June.
It should be noted that the election in Belgrade was a rerun of last December’s election, which, as CRTA proved, was severely compromised by illegal and illegitimate electoral engineering, mainly through organised voter migration. The June election was the second, less bad half of an extremely dirty match.
The campaign didn’t feel like a campaign for local elections but rather for national elections. The dominant political force, with President Aleksandar Vučić at its head, placed what it called issues of ‘national survival’ at the top of the agenda, charging the atmosphere with hardcore nationalist sentiments.
This was further fuelled by a vote just a few days before the election in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on a resolution on genocide in Srebrenica. It drove an unparalleled propaganda surge, presented as a dignified national defence against a hostile west allegedly attempting to put a label of collective guilt on Serbian people.
When I refer to the dominant political force, I mean not only the ruling Serbian Progressive Party but also state officials, because the line between the ruling party and the state has increasingly blurred, which is a key explanation of the election results. Political clientelism and pressures on voters contributed significantly to the ruling party’s victory.
What role did civil society play in the elections, and what challenges did you face?
Our role was to try to rescue what could be saved of the integrity of the electoral process. We tried to inform and educate citizens about their electoral rights and the ways those rights were being manipulated and abused. We sought to mobilise citizens to report any violations they saw to our observation mission. And most importantly, we tried to recruit and train enough citizen observers so we could get a full picture of the quality of elections. It was a large operation that lasted from April to June, involving 1,500 people.
But we live in a system that’s allergic to pluralism. Our government is hostile to critical voices, so the space for civil society is constantly shrinking. We need our international friends to be aware of this and spread the word that democracy in Serbia is in danger.
What other concerning trends did you see?
Unfortunately, we’ve seen a growth of several negative trends. We witnessed a record number of cases of vote buying and numerous tense situations that approached or crossed the line into violence. All the chronic problems that have devalued elections for many years continued to grow, from people’s distrust of the voters’ register and extremely unequal media access for candidates, to abuse of state institutions and public resources, unscrupulous pressure on voters and deteriorating conditions for election observation.
Since the December 2023 elections, a number of international voices have spoken out about the situation in Serbia. The UN Human Rights Committee issued a strong rebuke, criticising the Serbian authorities for their opaque handling of election violations. Various UN human rights experts reported serious state attacks on election observers, civil society and the media and asked for clarifications from the Serbian government, but barely received a response.
These problems remain unresolved because of state capture. State institutions are subordinated to party interests, and the party in power shows no political will to change this situation.
Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite, and follow@CRTArs and@nemaperspektive on Twitter.
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SERBIA: “La crisis política se profundizará porque una gran porción de la ciudadanía carece de representación”
CIVICUS conversa con Ivana Teofilović acerca de las causas de las recientes protestas y la reacción del gobierno frente a ellas, así como sobre las elecciones celebradas en Serbia durante la pandemia de COVID-19. Ivana es coordinadora de programas de políticas públicas en Civic Initiatives, una asociación ciudadana serbia que persigue el objetivo de fortalecer la sociedad civil a través de la educación cívica, la promoción de valores y prácticas democráticos y la creación de oportunidades para la participación ciudadana.
¿Por qué estallaron en Serbia protestas durante la pandemia de COVID-19, y cómo reaccionó el gobierno?
La causa inmediata de la reunión masiva y espontánea de ciudadanos en julio de 2020 fue el anuncio de la introducción de un nuevo toque de queda, es decir, una nueva prohibición de todo movimiento durante 72 horas. En cuanto terminó la conferencia de prensa del presidente, la gente descontenta comenzó a reunirse frente a la Asamblea Nacional en la capital, Belgrado. Si bien el motivo inmediato fue el descontento ante el manejo de la crisis del COVID-19, la ciudadanía también quiso manifestar su insatisfacción con muchas otras medidas gubernamentales y sus impactos, y en particular con las condiciones en que se habían desarrollado las recientes elecciones parlamentarias.
En respuesta, las fuerzas de seguridad utilizaron la violencia de forma injustificada en decenas de casos y se extralimitaron en el uso de sus facultades legales. Su respuesta violenta frente a reuniones pacíficas espontáneas fue una grave violación del derecho a la libertad de reunión pacífica y una amenaza injustificada para la integridad física de un gran número de manifestantes. Las protestas estuvieron marcadas por el empleo de una gran cantidad de gas lacrimógeno, que fue arrojado indiscriminadamente contra las masas de manifestantes pacíficos. En consecuencia, en los días posteriores muchos manifestantes experimentaron problemas de salud. Aparte del hecho de que se utilizaron cantidades injustificadamente grandes, la atención pública se centró en el hecho de que el gas lacrimógeno utilizado estaba vencido.
Los medios de comunicación y la propia ciudadanía también informaron y documentaron muchos casos de abuso policial, incluido el de tres jóvenes que estaban tranquilamente sentados en un banco y fueron golpeados repetidamente con una porra por un agente de gendarmería. En otro incidente, un joven fue derribado al suelo y golpeado con porras por 19 agentes, pese a que había dos miembros de la Defensoría del Pueblo de guardia en la cercanías, precisamente para monitorear la conducta de la policía. Un gran número de individuos de civil provocaron más disturbios y actos de violencia. En su momento no se pudo determinar si se trataba de policías de civil o de miembros de fuerzas parapoliciales o de bandas criminales, pero luego numerosas pistas parecieron indicar que eran bandas delictivas vinculadas con las autoridades y que operaban bajo sus órdenes.
Los medios también desempeñaron un rol muy importante en las protestas. En este contexto, muchos trabajadores de los medios de comunicación se comportaron profesionalmente e informaron objetivamente sobre las protestas, convirtiéndose a menudo en víctimas de la brutalidad policial o de ataques de personas infiltradas entre los manifestantes para incitar disturbios. Según la Asociación de Periodistas de Serbia (NUNS), por lo menos 28 periodistas fueron agredidos mientras cubrían las protestas y 14 sufrieron lesiones físicas, que en seis casos requirieron atención médica urgente. Según un comunicado de NUNS, el herido más grave fue Zikica Stevanovic, periodista de la agencia de noticias Beta.
Sin embargo, los medios de comunicación cercanos al gobierno ignoraron o distorsionaron la imagen real de la protesta, difundiendo mentiras sobre quién la había organizado o financiado y quiénes habían participado en ella e ignorando o negando casos evidentes de abuso policial. Los periodistas, analistas y activistas de la sociedad civil que apoyaron públicamente las protestas y hablaron críticamente sobre el gobierno y el presidente fueron a menudo el blanco de campañas sensacionalistas y fueron difamados por los ocupantes de altos cargos políticos en un intento de desacreditar su trabajo.
También se utilizaron en su contra medidas burocráticas, por ejemplo mediante su inclusión en una lista compilada por la Dirección de Prevención del Blanqueo de Capitales del Ministerio de Finanzas para exigir a los bancos que examinen todas las transacciones financieras realizadas por ellos durante el año pasado. Las asociaciones e individuos afectados publicaron un comunicado conjunto con más de 270 firmas para pedir a las autoridades que hicieran públicas urgentemente las razones de la sospecha de que estas organizaciones e individuos podían estar involucrados en acciones de lavado de activos o financiamiento del terrorismo. También dejaron claro que estas presiones no los disuadirían de seguir luchando por una Serbia libre y democrática.
La reacción violenta de la policía, el uso indiscriminado de la fuerza, la cobertura sesgada y las represalias gubernamentales motivaron aún más a la ciudadanía a protestar. En consecuencia, la gente salió a las calles en cantidades aún mayores en los días siguientes. Las protestas también comenzaron a tener lugar en otras ciudades serbias además de Belgrado, tales como Kragujevac, Nis, Novi Sad y Smederevo.
¿Ha experimentado la sociedad civil desafíos adicionales para continuar haciendo su trabajo bajo la pandemia?
Bajo el estado de emergencia impuesto en respuesta a la pandemia de COVID-19, pero también después de levantado el estado de emergencia, las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (OSC) enfrentaron numerosas dificultades que obstaculizaron enormemente su trabajo. Durante las primeras semanas del estado de emergencia, algunas OSC que brindan servicios a grupos vulnerables no pudieron realizar sus actividades debido a la prohibición de circular, dificultad que solo se superó de manera gradual y parcial a medida que se fueron otorgando permisos especiales a ciertas categorías de personas.
Otro desafío fue el planteado por el Reglamento sobre Beneficios Fiscales y Beneficios Directos, adoptado en respuesta a los impactos económicos de la pandemia. Este reglamento no extendía la exención del impuesto al valor agregado (IVA) a los alimentos, bienes de consumo y servicios donados al sector humanitario y sin fines de lucro para apoyar a grupos socialmente vulnerables. Por este motivo, un grupo de OSC envió al Ministerio de Hacienda una propuesta para ampliar la exención del IVA.
El mayor desafío para las OSC fue la sostenibilidad financiera, que se vio especialmente amenazada por la suspensión del concurso para proyectos co-financiados de importancia pública, a nivel tanto nacional como local. Además, si bien no eran suficientemente claras en lo que respecta a las OSC, las disposiciones del Reglamento sobre Beneficios Fiscales y Beneficios Directos excluían inequívocamente las iniciativas ciudadanas informales y, por lo tanto, ponían en peligro su supervivencia.
Además, el derecho a la libertad de expresión estuvo especialmente en peligro durante la pandemia. Los desafíos incluyeron restricciones enfrentadas por la prensa para asistir a las conferencias de prensa del Gabinete de Crisis y hacer preguntas, el desprecio expesado por funcionarios de órganos e instituciones gubernamentales hacia los representantes de los medios y la persecución de los medios de comunicación que expresaron críticas durante la pandemia. Estas restricciones abrieron las puertas a la difusión de información no verificada. La falta de información oportuna y objetiva resultó en una mayor propagación del pánico y dejó en evidencia que, además de una pandemia, Serbia enfrentaba una “infodemia”.
¿Qué opina la sociedad civil de la respuesta del gobierno a la pandemia y las condiciones en que se celebraron las últimas elecciones?
A pesar de la posición muy desfavorable en que se encontraron, las OSC desempeñaron un rol significativo durante la crisis del COVID-19. Las OSC también jugaron un importante rol correctivo de las acciones de gobierno, ya que presentaron numerosas propuestas de calidad para superar la crisis. En muchas situaciones fueron las OSC, debido a su mejor capacitación, las que asumieron las funciones de determinados servicios gubernamentales. La impresión predominante es que el Estado no estaba preparado para la crisis y, por lo tanto, no tenía capacidad suficiente para responder adecuadamente.
Por su carácter cerrado, el gobierno esgrimió la necesidad de actuar con velocidad y eficiencia como pretexto para eludir el diálogo. En la adopción de determinadas medidas se produjeron frecuentes violaciones de las leyes, la constitución y los derechos de la ciudadanía, y en particular del derecho de los periodistas a hacer su trabajo. Las medidas económicas no fueron adoptadas de manera oportuna y efectiva, lo cual puso en peligro a muchas OSC y a sus activistas, y en última instancia tuvo su mayor impacto sobre la ciudadanía en tanto que usuaria de los servicios de las OSC.
En cuanto a las elecciones parlamentarias, que se celebraron el 21 de junio tras ser aplazadas de su fecha original del 26 de abril, aún queda sin respuesta la pregunta acerca de la responsabilidad del gobierno para conducir un proceso electoral bajo la pandemia. Se sospecha que la decisión de realizar las elecciones fue motivada políticamente e irresponsable. Esta impresión se vio reforzada por el hecho de que, en las semanas posteriores a las elecciones, el número de infecciones y muertes por COVID-19 aumentó drásticamente. Daría la impresión de que los esfuerzos realizados por algunas OSC para crear las condiciones para el desarrollo de elecciones libres y democráticas no dieron los resultados deseados.
¿Cuáles fueron los principales obtáculos que impidieron que las elecciones fueran libres y justas?
Más allá de la pandemia, la principal preocupación respecto de las elecciones fue que estuvieron dominadas por el partido gobernante, a través de la presión sobre el periodismo y los medios de comunicación críticos y el control de los principales medios de comunicación, que carecen de diversidad de opiniones y cobertura equilibrada y son utilizados con fines de campaña.
La cobertura de los medios durante la campaña electoral fue un poco más equilibrada que en las elecciones anteriores, ya que el gobierno quería demostrar el carácter infundado de los reclamos de la ciudadanía y la oposición política respecto de las malas condiciones para la competencia electoral y la captura de los medios de comunicación. En principio, los candidatos recibieron igual trato por parte de los medios públicos, aunque los funcionarios públicos que hacían campaña a diario recibieron mucha cobertura adicional. Además, los miembros de la oposición que habían decidido boicotear las elecciones, y por lo tanto no presentaron candidatos, carecieron de espacio para presentar sus argumentos en la televisión nacional.
El trato desigual hacia los candidatos fue especialmente visible en los canales de televisión comerciales de alcance nacional, que brindaron apoyo logístico al partido gobernante y a sus socios de coalición. Este problema se vio agravado por la actitud pasiva del Organismo Regulador de Medios Electrónicos (REM), que jugó un papel casi imperceptible durante la campaña electoral. En mayo de 2020, el REM cambió su metodología de seguimiento de la representación mediática de los actores políticos, contando cada mención de una opción política como prueba de representación mediática. De ahí la conclusión de que la opositora Alianza por Serbia era el partido más representado. Pero en verdad la Alianza por Serbia, que boicoteó las elecciones, no recibió ninguna cobertura en la televisión nacional; en realidad, fue el blanco más frecuente de los ataques del partido gobernante y sus medios aliados. En ese sentido, otro problema de fondo es el marco normativo desigual: las regulaciones del REM relativas a los servicios de medios públicos son legalmente vinculantes, pero las relativas a las emisoras comerciales están redactadas bajo la forma de recomendaciones y no tienen efectos vinculantes, y no existen salvaguardas efectivas contra las violaciones.
¿Qué implicancias tienen los resultados de las elecciones para el futuro de la democracia y los derechos humanos en Serbia?
El gobernante Partido Progresista Serbio, que en verdad es un partido de derechas, obtuvo más del 60% de los votos y se quedó con unos 190 escaños parlamentarios, sobre un total de 250. Su socio de coalición, el Partido Socialista de Serbia, quedó en segundo lugar, con aproximadamente 10% de los votos, sumando unos 30 escaños a la coalición. En consecuencia, la Asamblea Nacional se quedó sin representantes de la oposición, abriendo un espacio adicional para el ejercicio de un poder ilimitado y sin obstáculos legales por parte del partido gobernante. Los últimos cuatro años son prueba de que la mera presencia de la oposición en el parlamento no es una barrera suficiente contra la arbitrariedad, ya que el gobierno ha perfeccionado mecanismos que le permiten vaciar de sentido a los procedimientos parlamentarios y restringir la libertad de expresión de los representantes de la oposición. Sin embargo, algunos legisladores de la oposición, a través de sus iniciativas, apariciones públicas y propuestas, habían logrado llamar la atención sobre los numerosos escándalos y las violaciones de la ley cometidas por los funcionarios.
Las protestas que siguieron a las elecciones parecen señalar en dirección de una mayor polarización y una profundización de la crisis política, ya que una gran porción de la ciudadanía carece de representación y se siente privada del derecho a elegir a sus representantes sin temor mediante elecciones libres y democráticas. Los más recientes intentos de lidiar con la sociedad civil, el periodismo y destacadas personalidades críticas mediante la promoción de investigaciones sobre lavado de dinero o financiamiento del terrorismo hablan de una polarización cada vez más profunda. El desarrollo de los derechos humanos requiere de coordinación y cooperación entre las OSC y los órganos gubernamentales, así como de consenso social y voluntad política, por lo que ciertamente esto no está contribuyendo a mejorar la situación de los derechos humanos en Serbia. Por el contrario, está provocando una crisis cada vez más grave, el agravamiento de las desigualdades e injusticias y protestas más frecuentes.
El espacio cívico en Serbia es clasificado como “obstruido” por elCIVICUS Monitor.
Contáctese con Civic Initiatives a través de susitio web o su página deFacebook, y siga a@gradjanske en Twitter. -
Serbia: CIVICUS calls on Serbian authorities to stop attacks against peaceful protesters
CIVICUS urges Serbian authorities to stop using force to disperse protesters demonstrating against the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. CIVICUS calls for an independent investigation into violent attacks on protesters by police and condemns police violence against journalists covering the protests.
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