China

  • TAIWAN: ‘China has tried to intimidate voters and pressure Taiwanese civil society organisations’

    brian-hioe.pngCIVICUS discusses Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election with Brian Hioe, one of the founders of New Bloom Magazine.

    New Bloom is an online magazine that covers activism and youth politics in Taiwan and Asia and the Pacific. A former fellow at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Brian is currently a non-resident fellow at the University of Nottingham’s Taiwan Research Hub.

    What’s at stake in the 2024 election?

    Taiwan’s elections consistently capture global attention due to the anticipation surrounding China’s response. Typically, elections feature two candidates representing the two major parties. One of them, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), is historically pro-independence and the other, Kuomintang (KMT), is historically pro-unification. This pattern persists in the current election, although there are other parties in the race.

    Traditionally, Taiwanese voters opt for what they perceive as the safest choice in terms of safeguarding their hard-earned democratic freedoms. The overarching concern is to avoid actions that might trigger backlash from China.

    Now it looks like the centre-left candidate of the ruling DPP is going to win because the pro-unification camp is very divided. But with multiple candidates running, fragmentation is to be expected, potentially affecting the outcome.

    What are the most relevant domestic campaign issues?

    There is a lot of dissatisfaction with the current government’s inability to address pressing economic issues. Young people’s salaries are very low, working hours are among the world’s longest and most people cannot afford to buy a house. We also have a declining birthrate and a growing older population.

    Dissatisfaction has translated into some support for the pro-China party. The KMT is the historic Chinese nationalist party and was the ruling party during Taiwan’s authoritarian era, from 1949 to 1987. Its campaign centres on deepening economic relations with China, promising to bring back the good old days of economic success.

    Environmental issues, and particularly air pollution, also weigh heavily on voters. The question of Taiwan’s future energy needs is key, as a balance is sought between maintaining a stable energy supply and minimising pollution. There is heated debate around nuclear energy. Taiwan’s environmental movement is anti-nuclear, as is the DPP, unlike the KMT. There are concerns about what to do with nuclear waste. People are worried that the frequent earthquakes that hit Taiwan could cause a potential catastrophe, as happened in Fukushima, Japan in 2011.

    Past elections also featured debate on culture-war issues such as same-sex marriage, which the DPP pushed for but the KMT opposed. But these have now taken a back seat to economic and environmental issues.

    However, the defining matter remains the cross-strait issue – the question of what kind of relations Taiwan will maintain with China.

    What are the positions of the main candidates?

    DPP candidate Lai Ching-te, the current vice president and expected winner, previously served as mayor of Taiwan’s historical capital Tainan and Taiwan’s premier. He is perceived as more conservative than the incumbent and is strongly pro-independence, although as he has climbed in the polls he has tempered his position in fear that strong rhetoric could provoke a reaction from the military or China. Despite his comparatively conservative background, he has signalled openness to progressive ideas, notably by becoming the first presidential candidate to participate in the Pride parade this October.

    KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih is the current mayor of New Taipei and a former police chief with a record of involvement in the arrest of political dissidents during the authoritarian period. He is more moderate than other KMT candidates on unification issues, which is perceived to improve the KMT’s chances. However, his choice of running mate signalled a potential shift towards a more dogmatic position on unification.

    The third candidate is former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, the leader of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a new party leaning towards unification. He has gained some support from young people, who tend not to support the KMT. He has a populist style, often making gaffes or misspeaking. He has faced criticism for making misogynistic and homophobic comments, but this hasn’t affected his popularity.

    How do young people feel about this election?

    There seems to be a notable decrease in enthusiasm and engagement with the election process. The 2020 election came around the same time of the protest wave in Hong Kong, which gave many young people a glimpse of what the future could look like for Taiwan if it were to become part of China.

    Now the context is different and what prevails among people is dissatisfaction with the DPP due to challenging circumstances, which has resulted in the rise of the third-party anti-establishment candidate. Ko Wen-je is, ironically, a candidate opposed to progressive causes such as LGBTQI+ rights, but many young people are still attracted by his anti-establishment message.

    In contrast, the DPP is perceived as the status quo and despite its recent progressivism under the Tsai administration has not managed to win over young people. Broadly, while millennials may still support it, Gen Z does not.

    What role are foreign powers playing in the election process?

    China’s persistent efforts to interfere in Taiwan’s political processes have resulted in recent arrests of people accused of operating in favour of China to influence the election, with efforts made to stiffen sentences for espionage. Ten military officials have, for example, been arrested in connection with these interference attempts.

    A tactic employed to influence the election is paint the DPP as overly provocative towards China or overly reliant on the USA, suggesting that this may lead to adverse consequences. The DPP has indeed strengthened relations with the USA, while the KMT, once the US-backed authoritarian ruling party, has shifted its position. The KMT now argues that growing too close to the USA might provoke China, questions arms sales and civic exchanges and disseminates conspiracy theories regarding fictional US plans to destroy Taiwan in the event of a war.

    The other side of the political aisle attacks the KMT for being too close to China and criticises its attempts to revive trade agreements such as the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), opposition to which led to the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

    Have there been any concerns about the integrity of civic space?

    Taiwan is the only country in Asia rated by the CIVICUS Monitor as having open civic space. There are questions about how civil society engages with both major political parties and concerns about potential co-optation. Civil society faces the challenge of balancing relations with political parties and maintaining a critical position without being perceived as partisan. Civil society is often closer to the DPP, because it is more centre-left and suspicious of China.

    But there haven’t been government attempts to restrict civic space. The government does take actions to curb Chinese influence but to date has not infringed on civil society rights.

    China in contrast has tried to pressure Taiwanese civil society organisations (CSOs), particularly those focusing on cross-strait issues. Five years ago, a Taiwanese CSO worker was arrested in China on vague national security charges, in what seemed aimed at sending a warning to Taiwanese civil society not to meddle with China.

    China has also tried to intimidate voters. In a recent example, a person who purchased a book on the possibility of a Chinese invasion received a suspicious phone call from someone impersonating a customer service representative asking them about it.

    What are your expectations for the post-election period?

    Unless something unexpected happens, a DPP victory is the likeliest outcome. China is unlikely to take any drastic actions before the election, as such moves might inadvertently strengthen support for the DPP.

    Following the election, however, China is expected to respond with intimidation tactics, possibly through military exercises, to signal its opposition to a new DPP administration. The intensity of these exercises may be influenced by China’s relations with the USA at the time.

    In terms of civic space, should the DPP continue in power, civil society may need to broaden its outreach, both regionally and internationally, to build resilience and avoiding being sucked in by the two-party dynamics.

    However, were the KMT to win, civil society would likely refocus on domestic concerns. It may regroup to resist, particularly in the face of potential attempts to reintroduce trade agreements such as the CSSTA.

    If the status quo is maintained, Taiwan will continue strengthening ties with the USA and the west while actively reaching out to southeast Asian countries, a strategy aimed at reducing economic reliance on China and diversifying political ties.

    The geopolitical landscape will play a crucial role in shaping Taiwan’s future, and the actions and reactions of both China and Taiwan will be closely watched on the international stage.

     


    Civic space in Taiwan is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with New Bloom Magazine through itswebsite, contact Brian Hioe through hisFacebook page and follow @brianhioe onTwitter orInstagram.

    The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

  • TAIWAN: ‘China will do to us what it did to Hong Kong, and what it has long done to Tibetans and Uighurs’

    MinHsuanWuCIVICUS speaks about the situation in Taiwan withMin-Hsuan Wu, known as ttcat,a social movement activist and campaigner and co-founder and CEO of a Doublethink Lab.

    Founded in 2019, Doublethink Lab is a civil society organisation (CSO) focused on researching malign Chinese influence operations and disinformation campaigns and their impacts, bridging the gap between the democracy movement, tech communities and China experts, and facilitating a global civil society network to strengthen democratic resilience against digital authoritarianism.

    What is the story behind Doublethink Lab?

    Doublethink Lab was founded three years ago, in September 2019. Four years ago, we experienced a tremendous amount of disinformation influencing our 2018 local elections. After these elections, there were lots of signals and leads of information-related, mostly disinformation campaigns – all affiliated with or supported by China.

    We realised that to tackle the challenge of strengthening and safeguarding our democracy we needed people to combine their talents and diverse professional backgrounds into a project focused on digital defence.

    Our main mandate is to produce a better understanding of how Chinese external propaganda functions and effectively influences political processes and public opinion elsewhere, including in Taiwan.

    Our strategy to combat disinformation differs from the usual fact-checking initiatives. Our work isn’t published in fact-checking reports. Instead, we follow the disinformation to try to understand who is spreading it and whether it is being spread by our citizens dynamically or by other kinds of actors funded by the Chinese state. Often, when analysing social media posts, it is possible to see the huge structure made up of Chinese bots liking, sharing and retweeting disinformation.

    What is the likely outcome of rising Chinese aggression toward Taiwan?

    It’s not news that tensions between Taiwan and China are increasing. China is increasingly using ‘grey zone’ tactics to push boundaries, increasing pressure and influencing people. Through various means, China is threatening Taiwanese people. This clearly increases the chance of the whole situation leading to China invading Taiwan.

    Most military experts would agree that this won’t happen right now, with Xi Jinping having just secured his third term as chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and awaiting confirmation of a third term as president of China. Some say an invasion could occur in 2025 or 2027, but I think it will depend on how strongly the Taiwanese people can defend themselves from now on: if our resistance increases, the costs of an invasion for China increase accordingly. Our resistance might therefore postpone the crystallisation of China’s wishes for a bit longer.

    On the other hand, China’s tactics may be backfiring: as China escalates militarily against us, the Chinese narrative is becoming less and less popular in Taiwan. More and more people have realised China is not a good neighbour. It is no longer thought of as a business opportunity for us but as a potent threat to our ways of life, our livelihoods and our lives. China’s aggressive attitude is pushing Taiwanese people towards embracing defence tactics to protect our country, which is a positive thing for us. We are much more aware of the need to build strong national and civil defence now.

    Did the recent visit by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi make any difference, for better or worse?

    Pelosi’s visit didn’t complicate the situation, but whether we see it as helpful or not depends on the perspective we look at it from. Her visit in August 2022 was meant as a show of support to Taiwan, and happened despite China’s threats of retaliation. It was the first visit by a US House Speaker in a quarter of a century. From a democracy or human rights perspective, it was quite beneficial. Pelosi spoke up against China’s human rights violations and the challenges posed by totalitarian regimes. Her presence brought visibility to our country’s situation regarding China. It put a spotlight on it, and now people see how China treats us and what a destabilising factor it is for the region. It clearly bothered China, judging by the way it reacted to it on the international stage.

    From a geopolitical and military perspective, Pelosi’s visit didn’t produce any benefit. It didn’t – couldn’t – bring any kind of peaceful dialogue. China’s vision and military exercises won’t change. But Pelosi’s visit didn’t complicate the situation; it just brought it under the spotlight so more Western media are paying attention to Taiwan. This kind of attention is somehow opening up many windows of opportunity for Taiwan to collaborate with other countries and agencies. No one knows what will come out of this, but from what I’ve seen so far, increased opportunities of international collaboration may improve our chances of safety.

    What would it take to bring peace and stability to the region?

    That’s a huge question. For me, the ultimate solution would be the opening up of civic space and the democratisation of China, Russia and other totalitarian regimes in Southeast Asia. However, we know this is too big a hope and it’s not really up to us.

    There used to be a civil society in China, but under Xi’s rule civic space has been continuously shrinking for 10 years. More and more activists are getting arrested. We all saw what happened recently in Hong Kong: China cracked down hard on civic movements and arrested people for even having a podcast –regular citizens were sent to jail just in case. China shut down all forms of civic expression, including news agencies. China will do to Taiwan what it did to Hong Kong, and what it has long done to Tibetans and Uighurs within China.

    If you ask me, I would say peace would require the demise of the Chinese Communist Party, but people think I am crazy when I put it this way. But from our perspective, this is the only forever solution. If you have an aggressive, expansionist neighbour trying to invade you, attaining peace is quite hard because it is not up to you. There can’t be peace unless your neighbour changes.

    Without justice there won’t be any peace. I’m not sure which kind of peace people wish to see: I think they are wrong if they define peace as just the absence of war. It that’s what they want, they can move to Hong Kong. Hong Kong is peaceful now – there are no mobilisations, no protests, no disorder. But is this really peace? It’s just an illusion: people are quiet because they lost their rights and freedoms. This is not the kind of peace we want for Taiwan.

    We need to find a way to open up civic space and bring democracy to the region – that is the only way forward.

    How is Taiwanese civil society working to make this happen?

    Lots of Taiwanese CSOs are working to limit China’s influence in the region, especially in Taiwan. There is an organisation called Economic Democracy Union that conducts serious research about Chinese influence on our economy; their work show how Chinese collaborators pretend to be Taiwanese companies and penetrate very sensitive industries such as electronics or e-commerce – industries that capture lots of personal data. Economy Democracy Union brings these issues to the surface with the aim of promoting new regulations to protect us from these influence-seeking tactics.

    There are also many CSOs working to strengthen civic defence, which isn’t just war-related, but rather focused on preparedness for disaster or any kind of military operation; their goal is to teach citizens how to react in these cases.

    Right now, Doublethink Lab is doing an investigation on China’s information operations. We do election monitoring and try to disclose disinformation campaigns or far-fetched narratives flooding into Taiwanese media. We are building a global network to bridge the gap between academia and civil society on a global scale. We want people to know what Chinese influence looks like in different countries, the channels it travels through, its tactics and its final goals.

    Doublethink Lab isn’t the only organisation advocating for digital defence. There are several others focusing on Chinese media influence, disinformation campaigns, fact-checking processes and civic education to identify fake news, among other related issues.

    What support does Taiwanese civil society need from the international community?

    We need resources. Most Taiwanese CSOs are small grassroots organisations. People tend to view Taiwan as a rich country with a very prosperous economy, but the truth is that civil society movements struggle a lot. Human rights CSOs and those working to counter Chinese influence usually have fewer resources than a regular charity. CSOs need more resources to be able to recruit new talent.

    Right now is the perfect time to ask ourselves what we really need. I always ask my fellow activists what they need, and answers resemble a lot those of activists in Hong Kong or Ukraine. Something the international community can also help with is by exposing Taiwan’s struggle. We don’t want people to think our issues are disconnected from those of the rest of the world – we want to become closer and we want to be understood. We need more connections with CSOs in the rest of the world. We need all forms of help to prepare and get ready for what’s coming.


    Civic space in Taiwan is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with Doublethink Lab through itswebsite and follow @doublethinklab and@TTCATz on Twitter.

  • Tibetan activist jailed for advocating cultural rights

    A Chinese court has sentenced a Tibetan activist to five years’ imprisonment under a national security law, for peacefully advocating cultural rights in Tibet.

  • TUVALU: ‘We share Taiwan’s democratic principles, values and struggles for sovereignty’

    KialiMoluCIVICUS speaks about the prospects following the inauguration of a new government in Tuvalu with Kiali Molu, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Affairs at the University of Bergen in Norway and at the University of the South Pacific.

    Kiali is a native Tuvaluan and his research, currently funded by the government of Norway, focuses on Tuvalu’s strategies to maintain its statehood and sovereignty as its territory is threatened by sea-level rise.

  • UN resolution needed to protect peaceful protests during the pandemic and beyond

    Joint statement at the 44th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

    Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on freedom of association and peaceful assembly


    Madame President, Special Rapporteur,

    We thank the Special Rapporteur for his report, and for the work the mandate has done to protect freedom of assembly and association worldwide. These fundamental rights underpin the very existence of civil society.

    The report highlights that there have been multiple examples of civil society and social movements across the world galvanizing positive change, defending hard-won democratic values and developing innovative practices to address issues of injustice. People coming together to speak out have won better working conditions, furthered equality, ended forms of oppression.

    The benefits of a vibrant civil society, and of human rights defenders who are free to do their work, are tangible. In the past months, we have seen that society is central to crisis response and will continue to be central in building back better. There are so many gains still to come.

    States who suppress individuals and groups simply for speaking out willfully deny such enrichment.

    In Hong Kong, a sweeping security law imposed by China last week risks destroying its free and open civil society. Protesters have already been criminalized by the law. In India, suppression of peaceful protests against a discriminatory citizenship and arrests of human rights defenders who took part in these meetings represent efforts to silence voices against inequality and injustice. In the USA, Black lives Matter protests against systemic racism and police brutality have been met with state-sanctioned violence, including the deliberate targeting of journalists. In Egypt a systematic crack-down on civil society, human rights defenders and independent journalists has accelerated in the last several months.

    The current pandemic has accelerated and exacerbated existing challenges and there are numerous cases of States weaponizing the COVID-19 pandemic against civil society, from Hungary to Algeria to the Philippines.

    The rights to freedom of association and peaceful assembly are simply the right to organize and mobilise for a fairer, more just world. This session, the Council members have the opportunity to better protect these rights. We urge all States to support the resolution on peaceful protests, and to commit to ensuring space and voice for those who come together to speak out.

    Thank you.

    CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
    International Service for Human Rights
    East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project
    Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
    FORUM-ASIA
    The African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
    Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies


    Current council members:

    Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Eritrea, Fiji, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, SomaliaSudan, Spain, Togo, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela

    Civic space ratings from the CIVICUS Monitor

    OPEN NARROWED OBSTRUCTED  REPRESSED CLOSED

     

  • Uyghur Violations a Litmus Test for Global Governance and Rules-Based International Order

    By Mandeep Tiwana, Head of Programs and United Nations Representative at CIVICUS

    This week is a momentous one for the world’s premier human rights body. At stake is a resolution to decide whether the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva can hold a debate on a recently released UN report. The report concludes that rights violations by China’s government in its Xinjiang region ‘may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity’.Unsurprisingly, China’s government is doing everything in its power to scotch plans for a debate on the report’s contents. Its tactics include intimidating smaller states, spreading disinformation and politicising genuine human rights concerns – the very thing the Human Rights Council was set up to overcome.

    The historic report, which affirms that the rights of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslim population are being violated through an industrial-level programme of mass incarceration, systemic torture and sexual violence, attracted huge controversy before it was released on 31 August 2022, minutes before the end of the term of the outgoing High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet.

    Read on Inter Press Service

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