fraud
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DRC: ‘Civil society is targeted by politicians who see it as an obstacle to their power’
CIVICUS speaks with journalist and human rights activist Jonathan Magoma about recent elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).Jonathan Magoma is Country Programme Director and interim Executive Director of Partnership for Integral Protection (PPI), a civil society organisation that works for peace and the protection of human rights defenders in the DRC and the region.
How free and fair were recent elections in the DRC?
The presidential election of 20 December 2023 was held so as to show the world that the government conducted it within the constitutional deadline, but it was marred by fraud and irregularities.
The electoral process was neither free nor fair. In several districts, rebel groups imposed their choices. In the province of Ituri, in the northeast of the DRC, the Chini ya Tuna armed group forced people to vote for a candidate from their community. The militias even took away two voting machines so they could enter the votes themselves.
Towards the centre of the country, in Sankuru province, the brother of a Congolese dignitary set up a militia to disrupt the election and commit violence against agents of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), simply because he couldn’t line up as a national deputy candidate when his party failed to reach the required threshold. His armed men quietly took away election kits as observers looked on helplessly.
Candidates also distributed gifts in polling centres to influence voters in their favour. Some candidates or their representatives were caught distributing money to voters on election day, which is illegal. In some centres some were arrested by the police, while others were not apprehended.
In the Kabare district of South Kivu, for instance, electoral materials were transported to polling centres in the vehicles of a political party that was a member of the presidium of Sacred Union of the Nation (USN), the coalition backing the candidacy of President Félix Tshisekedi. Observers and voters at the centre cried foul.
What were the basis of the opposition’s fraud allegations?
The allegations of fraud made by the opposition are legitimate. They are based on the fact that a number of politicians close to the government kept full electoral kits in their homes in order to vote fraudulently. Voting machines were discovered in private homes containing ballot papers already signed and filled out. As a result, in most polling centres there was a shortage of voting machines, leading people in some districts to revolt.
On 31 December, CENI published the provisional results of the presidential election, proclaiming Tshisekedi, the incumbent seeking a second term, as the winner. But five days after this, on 5 January, CENI invalidated the votes received by deputy candidates who had run in the national and provincial legislative elections and the municipal vote held on 20 December. Their candidacies were voided following numerous accusations of illegal possession of voting machines, fraud, destruction of electoral material, ballot box stuffing and incitement to commit acts of violence against CENI agents. The excluded candidates include three serving ministers, four provincial governors, six senators and a member of the bureau of the National Assembly. Almost all were USN members.
At the same time, the electoral commission announced the annulment of the election results in the districts of Masimanimba in Kwilu province and Yakoma in North Ubangi province on the grounds of ‘massive and exaggerated fraud’. Unfortunately, the decision had nothing to say about the highly contested presidential election. But how could such irregularities have occurred at all other voting levels and not at the presidential election that was held on the same day and with the same ballot papers?
This question gave rise to debate within civil society and, within the political opposition, it prompted several demonstrations to contest this ‘sham’ election and demand its annulment. But it was in vain: on 20 January, Tshisekedi was sworn in by ‘his’ Constitutional Court as president of the DRC.
How did civil society, and PPI in particular, try to make the election free, fair and peaceful?
In the run-up to the election, we launched awareness campaigns to promote a peaceful vote. We held advocacy actions with election stakeholders, getting them to adhere to democratic values guaranteeing fair, free, transparent and inclusive elections and to the need to guarantee civic space before, during and after the elections. We also trained civil society groups and journalists in election observation and media coverage.
We observed the polls and contributed to the resulting civil society report. However, this report was not taken into account by the relevant bodies.
I personally carried out observation in a village about 35km north of the town of Bukavu, where what are viewed as ‘observers in waistcoats’ are more or less respected and most CENI agents knew me. But for no reason, I was forbidden to spend more than 15 minutes in a polling station. In neighbouring centres, people complained about lack of access to polling stations. Some observers also complained. In my polling station, the voting machine was supposed to start at 6am but was not put into operation until after noon, which made voters angry.
We continue to monitor the situation closely and assist human rights defenders, journalists and others who have been threatened or prosecuted for playing important roles or exposing irregularities during the elections. PPI is currently supporting two journalists and a civil society activist who are being prosecuted by the prosecutor general’s office in South Kivu province for denouncing electoral fraud perpetrated by a politician close to the government. PPI provides activists under threat with legal and judicial assistance, along with psychosocial support and advice on physical and digital security. Where necessary, medical or financial assistance, or even support for relocation, is offered to activists at risk.
It must be noted that we are still in an election period, as elections for senators and governors have not yet taken place. Originally scheduled for February, CENI has postponed them and they will now take place in late March and early April. Meanwhile, civil society continues to be targeted by politicians who see it as an obstacle to their power.
What were the demands of protesters on election day, and how did the government respond?
On 20 December, some people in Beni and Goma could not stand the wait. When they arrived at polling stations early in the morning, they could not find their names on the lists posted outside. What’s more, some polling stations were not yet open. In some centres, only two polling stations out of 10 were open, or one out of eight. Rumours circulated about some candidates’ illegal possession of voting machines. All this led to spontaneous demonstrations, particularly in Beni, where one centre was vandalised.
In several districts, voting continued beyond closing time. The government acknowledged ‘logistical difficulties’ but praised CENI for the ‘successful’ organisation of the elections. Obviously, CENI was not up to the task of managing the logistics of the elections. It was then announced that voters would be allowed to cast their ballots the following day, and voting resumed in almost every centre in the DRC. In Bas Uélé province, voting lasted three days, from 20 to 22 December.
What are your expectations for the post-election period?
I remain pessimistic because I am convinced that the elections were not transparent, free, credible or independent. What’s more, less than half of potential voters turned out. This is a strong message for a president who has supposedly been elected with more than 73 per cent of the vote among those who are said to have voted.
In such a context, the legitimacy of the government will inevitably be called into question. Moreover, in December, former CENI president Corneille Nanga initiated a political-military movement allied with the M23 terrorist movement, which is supported by the Rwandan government and waging war in the east of the country.
In the post-electoral period, serious human rights violations are likely to occur, as was documented during Tshisekedi’s first five-year term, even though he had promised to make respect for human rights and democracy his priority.
Now that the ruling coalition has claimed an absolute majority in parliament, it is quite possible that it will start changing laws for its benefit, and even constitutional articles that were considered untouchable. This would create chaos and torpedo our hard-won democracy.
What should be done to strengthen democracy in the DRC?
At present, civic space in the DRC is repressed to the extent that it is virtually closed. Political rhetoric contradicts developments on the ground. Opponents are prosecuted and imprisoned for their opinions. Protesters are put down in a bloody way. Journalists such as Stanis Bujakera, Blaise Mabala, Philémon Mutula and Rubenga Shasha and many activists are persecuted and imprisoned for doing their job. We are intimidated, sometimes threatened and people are murdered.
If we are to have any hope of strengthening democracy in the DRC, we will have to hold the government to account for its internal and external commitments. The fourth cycle of the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, due later this year, is a great opportunity for Congolese leaders to renew their commitment to democracy and respect for fundamental rights.
Global civil society and the human rights community must stand shoulder to shoulder with Congolese activists in the quest for democracy. This can be achieved through joint advocacy and lobbying activities, as well as capacity development and exchanges of experience.
Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Contact PPI through itswebsite and follow@PPIREGIONALE and@JonathanMagoma on Twitter.
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GUATEMALA: ‘Disregard for the will of the people expressed at the ballot box is the greatest possible insult to democracy’
CIVICUS speaks with Jorge Santos, General Coordinator of the Guatemalan Human Rights Defenders Protection Unit (UDEFEGUA), about the imminent inauguration of a new president, which comes after 100 days of mobilisation to demand respect for the election results.Founded in 2000, UDEFEGUA is a civil society organisation dedicated to documenting, verifying and recording attacks against human rights defenders in Guatemala.
What was the significance of the election of Bernardo Arévalo as president, and what’s the reason for the enormous resistance he has faced?
29 December 2023 marked 27 years since the signing of the peace accords that put an end to 36 years of internal armed conflict in Guatemala. That conflict claimed more than 200,000 direct victims and left deep scars on Guatemalan society. The peace accords established a structural transformation agenda to tackle the root causes of the conflict. Instead, the last three governments – and particularly that of current president Alejandro Giammattei – have done nothing but produce a severe authoritarian regression.
The presidential elections held in June and August 2023 were meant to consolidate this authoritarian regression and to finish burying the peace and democracy-building agenda.
More than 20 parties competed in the first round of the presidential election, most of them located on the right and far right and identified with the groups that have captured the state, closely linked to economic, political and military elites and organised crime.
The mere fact that the election took place was a milestone. That the winning candidate had clear democratic and progressive views made it all the more remarkable. Bernardo Arévalo’s victory represents society’s repudiation of the corrupt political elite. We were at a historic crossroads, between an authoritarian past and a possible future in which we could build a democratic state.
This explains the enormous resistance the president-elect has faced. Bernardo is the son of former president Juan José Arévalo, the first popularly elected president following the October 1944 revolution and the architect of what was called the democratic spring of those years. His legacy is still very much alive: it was then that the right to vote was extended to women, the labour code was passed and the Guatemalan Social Security Institute was established. In other words, it led to the transformation of the state.
It’s been 79 years that we have been dominated by particular groups interested in maintaining the privileges of a small segment of the population. They would obviously resist a government like Arévalo’s coming to power. However, although very powerful, these groups are in the minority and at last it seems that they are beginning to lose the privileges they have always enjoyed.
How has democracy in Guatemala been at risk?
Recent governments have completely bypassed legality. The outgoing government practically broke the rule of law. One indicator of this, which we have identified as part of the overall context of aggression against human rights defenders, is the violation of the republican principle of the separation of powers. The three branches of the Guatemalan state – executive, legislative and judicial – have been captured by mafia elites.
Repeated attempts to violate the popular will expressed at the ballot box only aggravated the situation. The Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office have pressured the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to reverse the election results, carrying out four illegal and arbitrary raids against the Tribunal.
It is important to note that national and international election observation missions, including from the Organization of American States and the European Union, corroborated the transparency of the process and stated that the allegations of fraud were unfounded.
Disregard for the will of the people expressed at the ballot box is the greatest possible insult to democracy. In the face of this, people have mobilised. Starting on 2 October, a national strike was called for an indefinite period of time to demand respect for the will of the people. 9 January marked the 100th day of peaceful resistance, led by Indigenous peoples, in defence of democracy.
What was new about these protests?
The protests called by the ancestral authorities of Indigenous peoples have been joined by numerous spontaneous expressions of citizen mobilisation. In the past, the urban and mestizo – mixed ancestry – middle classes opposed mobilisation by Indigenous peoples. This time, however, the protests led by Indigenous peoples have been supported and legitimised by broad segments of society. This broke with a long tradition of prejudice and racial discrimination by urban and mestizo society towards Indigenous peoples, and resulted in massive and widespread demonstrations throughout the country.
The protests succeeded in bringing together the 23 peoples that make up Guatemala. Broad segments of society carried out road blockades at the country’s main transit points. Passage of vehicles transporting food or providing medical services was not obstructed, as protesters cleared the way for them.
The blockades were an unprecedented demonstration of citizen joy. People rediscovered and recovered public spaces, danced on blocked streets and organised football games, yoga and chess classes on occupied spaces.
A key characteristic of the protests was their peaceful character. In the face of provocations by external forces and the national police, people responded with non-violent actions. For 100 days they held a rally in front of the headquarters of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The protesters did not leave their place and continued to demand the resignation of the attorney general, Consuelo Porras Argueta, for her repeated attempts to annul Bernardo Arévalo’s presidential victory.
What should be the new government’s priorities?
The Seed Movement – Arévalo’s party – faces important challenges. Although it will control the executive branch, the legislative branch remains highly captured by mafias. Out of 160 parliamentarians, around 130 belong to groups that make up what is popularly known in Guatemala as the ‘corrupt pact‘. The same is true of the justice system.
Bernardo Arévalo faces the enormous challenge of rebuilding public institutions. Corruption and impunity have reached such levels that services as essential as obtaining an identity card have become an ordeal. Infrastructure must be rebuilt so that people can access essential services such as health and education free of charge. The long list of human rights violations experienced by the Guatemalan people must stop.
Another major challenge is to generate a systematic and permanent process of dialogue with civil society. In particular, Indigenous peoples, historically excluded, their rights violated by the Guatemalan state, must be recognised as key political subjects.
The government of the Seed Movement will have only four years to address these challenges. We hope that its mandate will be part of a transition that will usher in a long period of governments that respond to the interests of the majority of the population.
What improvements in the situation of human rights defenders can be expected following the change of government?
In 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in the case Human Rights Defender against the State of Guatemala, initiated following the murder of a human rights defender in 2004. Our request to the Court was to include as a reparation measure the introduction of a public policy for the protection of human rights defenders. The Court accepted this request and included it in its ruling, imposing five parameters for the design of such a policy.
But efforts to develop this policy were truncated and there is only a draft document to date. It will therefore be a key responsibility of the new government to complete this process and commit itself to approving the policy and providing the resources required for its implementation.
Another of its responsibilities in this area will be to push forward a legislative agenda to dismantle all the criminalising legislation passed in recent years. This process must go hand in hand with an activation of the institutions in charge of ensuring the state’s compliance with its human rights obligations.
How can the international community support the strengthening of democracy in Guatemala?
The risk of a break with the constitution remains. The new government will have to confront one of the continent’s most conservative and backward oligarchies, responsible for the crime of genocide. Stripping these groups of their privileges will be no easy task.
Continued support and vigilance by the international community will be extremely necessary. Crucial forms of support would include the sharing of information and best practices, denouncing of human rights violations and provision of technical assistance.
On 14 January, the date of the presidential inauguration, a period of democratic transition begins that promises to leave corruption and lawlessness behind. Both the new government and Guatemalan civil society will need all the support they can get in order to achieve this.
Civic space in Guatemala is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with UDEFEGUA through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@UDEFEGUA and@JorgeASantos197 on Twitter.
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MOZAMBIQUE: ‘The next president must listen to a younger generation that’s increasingly vocal about its democratic aspirations’
CIVICUS discusses post-election violence in Mozambique with Zenaida Machado, senior researcher and human rights defender at Human Rights Watch.
Protests against alleged fraud in Mozambique’s 9 October election erupted when early results gave victory to the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) party, in power since 1975. In response, opposition presidential candidate Venancio Mondlane called for nationwide protests. Mondlane also accused security forces of ambushing and killing his lawyer as he prepared to challenge the results. The European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission reported numerous irregularities that favoured FRELIMO, including ballot stuffing and inflated voter numbers. Police used teargas and live ammunition to disperse protesters in the capital, Maputo.
