multilateral institutions
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BAHRAIN: ‘The government uses public relations to mask human rights violations’
CIVICUS speaks withDrewery Dyke of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR) about closed civic and democratic space in Bahrain as the state prepares to host the Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). The IPU Assembly takes place in the capital, Manama,from 11 to 15 March 2023.
Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2012 to undertake research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, and also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.
We last spoke on the eve of the parliamentary election held in November 2022. How has civic space in Bahrain evolved since?
The government of Bahrain held the November 2022 parliamentary election under the same, highly restrictive, 2018 Political Rights Law used in the 2018 elections. It banned scores of people from being able to vote or stand for election on spurious grounds such as affiliation to a banned political party or having a criminal record.
Bahrain’s international partners, United Nations (UN) human rights bodies and civil society all decried the banning of political parties, as it flew in the face of international standards and simply deprived many people of having a voice. The court cases, too, dating from the 2011 unrest, were grossly unfair. In November 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee denounced both the Political Isolation Law and the Law on Associations
And yet there seems to be a small opening for civil society and greater freedoms. The regional mood music appears to be changing, with the governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates normalising relations with Qatar, and the Bahraini government having set out a 2022-2026 National Human Rights Plan.
Bahrain’s government appears to have signalled that it is minded to undertake some reform but civil society remains highly sceptical. Many of us are concerned that the government is once again using public relations initiatives to project an image of the country that masks longstanding, unresolved human rights violations for which there has been no accountability.
Is change possible? Yes, to some degree, it appears so. But civil society needs to remain vigilant and sceptical. Action will speak louder than words. An amendment of existing laws on political and civil society organisations is now a must.
How does Salam DHR manage to work in such a restrictive environment?
Current legislation makes it impossible for our organisation to register and openly carry out any research or advocacy in Bahrain. That has been the case since 2013. And yet at least one woman human rights defender who is linked to Salam DHR and other human rights CSOs has remained active inside Bahrain. She walks a tightrope on a daily basis, taking action to support individuals, notably prisoners of conscience. Lawyers, political and civil society activists and others from all walks of life continue to contact us but we cannot discuss their identities to protect their safety. It is a challenge.
In November 2022, however, the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights obtained accreditation to the UN’s Economic and Social Council, which means it can now formally participate in UN meetings and events. This important step could help prise open the space for civil society just that little bit more. We will see.
Why do you think the Bahraini government offered to host the IPU Assembly?
The Bahraini government invited the IPU to hold its 146th Assembly in order to project an image of a democratic country and boost its international standing. The IPU’s catchphrase on its website is ‘For democracy. For everyone’. The government seeks to own this message in a situation where democracy does not exist.
The theme of the 146th Assembly is ‘Promoting peaceful coexistence and inclusive societies: Fighting intolerance’. Yet by limiting freedoms of association and assembly and the right to peaceful religious expression, Bahrain’s government promotes exclusion and intolerance.
Possibly to foster its mission, the IPU accepted the Bahraini government’s offer to hold its meeting in Manama. Is that problematic? In some ways, yes. But it is upon us to promote – peacefully – democratic change that advances adherence to international human rights standards. And parliamentarians from around the world attending the IPU Assembly could help chip away at deeply rooted discrimination and the fact that so many in civil society are deprived of having a voice or are afraid to use it.
Links between Bahraini parliamentarians and civil society are uneven. Some have few if any links while others have better connections and communication with their electorate, including civil society. Some seek to hold government action to account, albeit timidly.
The IPU Assembly may be an opportunity for Bahraini members of parliament to learn how their counterparts in other parts of the world engage with their electors and effectively represent their concerns. Parliamentarians are a building block of a free civil society. We need them to step up during the Assembly to make that a reality in Bahrain.
How could this whitewashing attempt become an advocacy opportunity?
The IPU Assembly will be a pivotal opportunity for advocacy. Visiting parliamentarians must make it so. They must reject baseless hype and propaganda depicting Bahrain as a land of freedom and democracy.
In a recently published brief, Salam DHR is urging attending parliamentarians to join with other parliamentarians from across the globe to call on the government of Bahrain to rescind all provisions that restrict parliamentary life and freedom of expression and association of Bahraini members of parliament. We want them to call for the government to resolve two outstanding cases the IPU’s Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarianshas lodged with the government of Bahrain, and examine the cases of 15 former parliamentarians targeted with arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trial and imprisonment and arbitrary stripping of citizenship. We’re also asking parliamentarians to urge the government to implement all recommendations arising from human rights treaty obligations and as many as possible of those made by UN Special Procedures and arising from Bahrain’s 2022 UN Universal Periodic Review.
We urge visiting parliamentarians to inform themselves of other widely shared human rights concerns in relation to Bahrain, including the denial of political rights and women’s rights, the use of the death penalty and the tactic of revoking citizenship as punishment, and to meet with human rights activists and others in civil society while in Bahrain.
How can the international community better support Bahraini civil society and activism for democracy?
Civil society in and engaged with Bahrain needs the international community to listen and speak with us, to hear our experiences and work with us. There is a narrative and experience that differs from the public relations whitewashing by the government.
We are saying that there are longstanding problems that need to be addressed, in terms of law, practice and accountability. But we are also saying that we believe that Bahrain’s international partners – from varying states, including European Union member states, the UK and USA, and the UN and its human rights bodies – and now parliamentarians can all work together, in unison, to erode the climate of repression that denies respect for human dignity, in order to empower Bahraini civil society and gradually build a more open and rights-respecting country.
Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Salam DHR through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@drewerydyke on Twitter.
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GERMANY: ‘The rise of the far right will make things more difficult, but the EU will remain functional – for now’
CIVICUS speaks with Andreas Müller, Executive Director of Democracy International, about the European Parliament elections and his expectations for the results in Germany.
Democracy International is a German civil society organisation working to strengthen civic participation and direct democracy. Its goals are to give people a direct say in political decision-making and to make governments more accountable.
What’s at stake in the European Parliament elections?
In 2024, more people around the world will participate in elections than ever before, setting the political course for years to come. At the same time, we are experiencing the biggest global crisis of security and democracy in decades. The number of democracies worldwide has reached a new low since 1985 and authoritarian regimes are on the rise. The human rights situation in many countries is appalling. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and China’s threats against Taiwan also threaten global peace and security.
In this context, the 2024 European Parliamentelections are of particular importance. The European Union (EU) is facing immense challenges as a peace project. The security challenge of Russia’s war on Ukraine influences the thematic focus of the elections. The rise of nationalist, right-wing parties in many European countries and accusations that the EU is too bureaucratic, undemocratic and out of touch with people are putting the EU under great pressure.
Right-wing nationalist parties are exploiting these challenges by offering populist, seemingly simple solutions to these complex crises and fuelling the narrative that the EU is the cause of these problems. Debates aboutrising inflation and economic insecurity, globalisation, immigration and asylum policy are deliberately confused through disinformation in all channels, leading to uncertainty about the EU’s ability to act. As a result, right-wing parties that are critical and hostile of the EU are likely to secure close to a quarter of European Parliament seats.
This is paradoxical, given that these challenges can only be met with a functioning EU. Strong, progressive legislation is needed to address climate, security and democracy crises. However, the expected rise of right-wing, nationalist parties is likely to lead to more blockages and delays, threatening the functioning of European democracy and the rule of law.
The main task of all democratic parties in the European Parliament in the next legislative period will be to counter this development. Large civil society alliances and parties are urging people to vote against this trend. Following the reversal of the negative trend in voter turnout in 2019, efforts are being made to achieve at least 50 per cent turnout across the EU.
What are the likely outcomes in Germany?
In Germany, voter turnout has risen from a low of just 43 per cent in 2004 to 61.4 per cent in 2019, back to 1994 levels. This trend is expected to continue, particularly given that, for the first time, people between 16 and 18 will be able to vote, and two-thirds of them have said they intend to do so.
However, higher turnout alone will not prevent the rise of right-wing parties. Predictions are that the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) could come second or third in Germany. Only the conservative Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria are far ahead in the polls. The governing parties of thetraffic-light coalition – the Social Democratic Party, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party – are expected to lose votes compared to the previous European Parliament election in 2019.
Still, there is reason for hope: since the beginning of the year, the AfD has lost significant support in the polls. While it received 23 per cent in January 2024, it is now getting only 15 per cent. The reasons for this include a series ofscandals involving the party’s top candidate and other officials, which led to the party’sexclusion from the right-wing Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament.
Overall, the democratic centre in Germany remains clearly in the majority in this EU election, albeit with a loss of votes compared to the AfD.
What are the main issues likely to influence the outcome?
The main issues in this election are Germany’s role in relation to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the question of arms supplies. The threat to security and peace is at the centre of most political debates. The second most important issue is social and economic security, often discussed in connection with immigration and asylum policy, a theme particularly fuelled by the AfD. These two issues regularly alternate in first and second place in the polls. Climate and environmental issues have lost prominence compared to 2019.
The expected increase in voter turnout suggests a growing interest among German voters. Overall, voters’ understanding of global issues and crises and of the role of the EU has increased. However, domestic issues and opinions on national government policies remain the decisive factors accounting for voting decisions. In Germany, the outcome of the EU election is a mood indicator for national politics. Specific European issues tend to play a subordinate role.
Are there significant differences between young and older voters, and between men and women?
Like German society as a whole, the younger generation is not homogeneous. However, young people tend to be more supportive of the EU than older generations. Around 78 per cent of young people support the continuation of the European project, compared with 65 per cent of older people. But, according to the latest polls, young people are not expected to vote in higher numbers than older people.
Young voters differ from older ones on several issues. While both age groups share concerns about peace and security and the impact of Russian aggression, young people are more likely to be concerned about human and civil rights and climate change. On social and economic issues, young people are particularly concerned about affordable housing, equal opportunities and protection against poverty in old age. Migration and asylum issues are less important to them.
When it comes to gender, there is a noticeable gap in voting decisions. In Germany, women generally vote more left-progressive, while men tend to vote more conservative. This trend has intensified in recent years. The gender gap is most significant among young people. According topolls, 18 per cent of young men intend to vote for the AfD, compared to eight per cent of young women.
What would be the consequences of the rise of the far right in the European Parliament?
A rise of right-wing, nationalist parties in the European Parliament means the legislative body would have to deal with obstructionism and anti-EU behaviour. However, all polls predict a continued strong democratic majority for the political centre. So while the growth of the right wing will make political work more difficult and uncomfortable, the EU will remain functional, at least for the time being. Whether mainstream parties can counter the nationalist narrative remains to be seen. It will be crucial to tackle the security crises of coming years and ensure social and economic security.
For Germany, the election is a bellwether for upcoming national elections, particularly next year’s parliamentary election. The AfD’s decline in the polls is also noticeable at the national and state levels, although less so than in the EU elections, and the reasons for this are mainly attributable to the AfD itself. At the moment, all democratic parties have ruled out cooperation with the AfD, so the risk of right-wing populists entering government remains low.
Examples fromHungary,Italy andthe Netherlands show this is a European trend that’s been going on for a long time. All these examples have already had consequences for the rule of law, democratic freedoms, human rights and overall societal interaction.
Germany is not immune to this, and the pressure from right-wing populist and nationalist parties and opinions is very real here as well. Political discourse is increasingly shifting towards the right. If the AfD keeps gaining ground, it will get worse.
Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Democracy International through itswebsite orFacebook andYouTube pages, and follow@democracy_intl and@AndreasM_CGN on Twitter.
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SUMMIT OF THE FUTURE: ‘The UN Secretary-General underestimated the difficulty of reaching consensus’
CIVICUS discusses the upcoming Summit of the Future with Renzo Pomi, who represents Amnesty International at the United Nations (UN) in New York.
In September, world leaders will gather at the UN World Summit of the Future to adopt the Pact for the Future. Ahead of the summit, civil society, academia and the private sector have contributed to the pact’s zero draft. Civil society sees the process as an opportunity to strengthen commitments on the environment, human rights and social justice, and CIVICUS advocates for the inclusion of language on the protection and expansion of civic space. But much work remains to be done before, during and after the summit to ensure ambitious commitments are adopted and then realised.
How did the Summit of the Future come about?
In September 2021, the UN Secretary-General released a report, ‘Our Common Agenda’, outlining global challenges and proposing a summit for world leaders to address them. Originally scheduled for September 2023, the summit was postponed due to a lack of consensus and will now take place in September 2024. Just before the opening of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, world leaders will gather in New York to discuss the future and adopt by consensus an action-oriented document, the Pact for the Future.
The pact and its two annexes – the Global Digital Compact and the Declaration on Future Generations – will be the summit’s main outcome. It aims to address our global challenges through commitments in five thematic areas: sustainable development and financing for development, international peace and security, science, technology and innovation, youth and future generations, and transforming global governance. The pact will address a wide range of challenges facing humanity and the international system, and will seek to make intergovernmental institutions such as the UN more fit for the purpose they were created for.
What has the process towards the draft pact been like, and what role has civil society played in it?
The drafting process has been largely a state-owned and state-exclusive process. Germany and Namibia have co-facilitated the negotiations and presented the zero draft in January and subsequent revisions in May and July 2024.
Civil society participation has been very limited. We rely mostly on friendly states for information, as we are not in the room when negotiations take place. After each draft was released, we were invited to submit our recommendations and participate in virtual consultations to discuss the content. But, while we value these opportunities, nothing replaces the chance to be actively involved in negotiations. When you hold a virtual meeting like this, what you get is a series of hasty statements, not a real dialogue. As a result, we’ve had to lobby states to champion our issues, and it’s unclear whether our views will be reflected in the pact.
While the co-facilitators are often blamed for this, the truth is that the process was agreed by all states. The UN Charter recognises civil society as an important stakeholder, as does the Secretary-General, but many states believe the UN should be exclusively state-run and civil society shouldn’t have a place in discussing important issues.
Further, relations between civil society and the UN in New York are particularly strained compared to Geneva, where there is a more established tradition of including civil society in discussions. And the UN’s financial crisis means there’s no investment in hybrid meetings, which allow civil society organisations (CSOs) that can’t afford to travel to have a voice in meetings.
What did you advocate should be including in the pact?
We made two submissions, one before the zero draft was circulated and the other commenting on it. We analysed the whole document and focused on ensuring that a human rights perspective was adopted in every measure. Our proposals covered issues from Security Council reform to increased civil society participation in the UN.
We have long argued that Security Council permanent members should refrain from vetoing or blocking credible resolutions on serious violations such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Unfortunately, this proposal is not accurately reflected on the draft. States may at the end agree to expand the Security Council, but otherwise most of the language simply reaffirms existing commitments, such as Article 27.3 of the Charter, which prevents states involved in conflicts voting on related resolutions but is currently ignored.
We also highlighted that CSOs face several barriers to engaging with the UN. The Economic and Social Council’s NGO Committee, which reviews applications for consultative status, often acts as a gatekeeper, unfairly denying access to CSOs that challenge the positions of particular states. We have proposed dismantling this committee and setting up an independent expert mechanism to assess applications on the basis of merit rather than political considerations. However, this proposal is unlikely to be included in the pact’s final draft.
How much real impact do you think the pact will have?
We hope some of our recommendations will be included in the pact, but the geopolitical climate suggests many will not. The Secretary-General has correctly identified the challenges, but he has underestimated the difficulty of reaching consensus on meaningful commitments. International cooperation is now almost non-existent. Today’s context resembles the Cold War, where there was no room for agreement on even basic issues. In the current circumstances, it was unrealistic for the Secretary-General to think he could launch such a massive undertaking and get an action-oriented document with real commitments for reform adopted.
It is said that even in the worst moments you have to push for the best. We may not get actionable commitments, but we may still get some good language and a minimum common denominator every country can agree on.
For the pact to have a real impact, global civil society needs to push for the strongest possible commitments and their implementation. In 2005, a similar summit ended with a decision to create the Human Rights Council in place of the discredited Commission on Human Rights. Now it’s very difficult to foresee getting commitments this specific, and as we approach the summit, proposals are being watered down. Civil society will have to be very creative in finding ways to use the watered-down language to demand change.
What’s next for civil society ahead of the summit?
In the days leading up to the summit, Summit of the Future Action Days will allow civil society, states and UN bodies to propose side events. Getting selected is very difficult, as requirements include sponsorship by two member states and one UN entity, and support by a coalition or network of CSOs. As a result, only a few side events will be approved.
As the summit approaches, civil society should focus on reviewing the second revision of the pact and identifying advocacy opportunities. Chances to advance our agenda will become more limited as September approaches. States will struggle to reach consensus on a final document and there will be no space to reopen closed discussions.
Once the pact is adopted, civil society will need to continue to push for critical issues and stay vigilant in monitoring its implementation.
Get in touch with Amnesty International through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@amnesty on Twitter.
This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.