political violence
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ECUADOR: ‘Democracy has allowed room for organised crime and narco-politics to grow’
CIVICUS speaks with Mauricio Alarcón Salvador, executive director of Fundación Ciudadanía y Desarrollo (Citizenship and Development Foundation, FCD), about the elections that will be held in Ecuador on 20 August, the eruption of political violence and organised crime and the implications for civil society and the future of the country.FCD is an Ecuadorian civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes and defends the rule of law, democratic principles and individual freedoms and encourages citizen participation, social control, transparency, open government and public innovation.
Why is Ecuador facing general elections only two years after the inauguration of a new president?
We will have new elections because the current president resorted to the mechanism known as ‘mutual death’, established in the constitution since 2008. This allows the president to dissolve the National Assembly on various grounds. It is known colloquially as ‘mutual death’ because ‘killing’ the legislature also causes the ‘death’ of the executive. In May this year, President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the National Assembly because, in his opinion, it had caused a serious political crisis, in the context of an impeachment trial against him based on accusations of corruption in his close entourage. The use of this mechanism allows the president to continue governing briefly without Congress but requires both legislative and presidential elections to be called within a short period of time to elect those who will complete the ongoing term. That is why the National Electoral Council called for presidential and legislative elections to be held on 20 August. Those elected in this vote will stay in power for approximately 18 months, the length of the current term remaining, which will end in May 2025.
How has civic space evolved under this government, and what are the prospects for the future?
For the little more than two years that this government has been in office, the situation of civic space has not changed much from the previous period. While it is true that the Organic Law on Communications was reformed to provide greater guarantees for freedom of expression and press freedom, the hostile environment against the media and journalists remains unchanged. The main aggressor may no longer be the president, but the notion persists that some people have the right to silence others just because they think differently. The climate of censorship and self-censorship hasn’t changed.
Nor have the regulatory conditions under which CSOs operate. Although the authorities no longer persecute or intimidate them, the regulations that enable them to do so remain in place. No progress has been made towards the adoption of an NGO law fully guaranteeing freedom of association.
Finally, as regards freedom of peaceful assembly, protests in June 2022 highlighted the weak character of the procedures available to authorities for guaranteeing it. There is still much work to be done in this regard and the challenge ahead is enormous.
CIVICUS, an organisation of which we are members, has been key in making the situation of civic space in Ecuador and its evolution visible in recent years.
Are the conditions for clean and transparent elections in place?
At FCD we believe that general conditions exist for a clean and transparent electoral process. The National Electoral Council that is in charge of this process is the same that organised the presidential vote in 2021 and local elections a few months ago. These were processes that, generally speaking, have been commended by electoral observation missions. There are some pending issues to be resolved, mainly regarding the financing of politics, but in terms of the organisation of the process we are confident that everything will go well.
As civil society, we would have liked to collaborate much more in supporting these elections, but this process came about unexpectedly and the organisations that usually take part have not been in a position to implement all our initiatives. Nevertheless, national election observation will be carried out and we have conducted campaigns to promote informed voting: we have published background information about the candidates and their government plans, and we have even monitored, albeit in a limited way, issues related to political financing. The challenge is enormous, but we are confident that we are doing our part to strengthen an extraordinary electoral process that we never saw coming.
What are the key campaign issues?
What we’ve seen these past few weeks is an apathetic campaign, very weak on proposals. Candidates seem to be fully aware that what is being elected is a transitional government that will last a few months, and they are not giving it due importance. Little has been said about fundamental rights and freedoms in a context where security is the main focus of public attention. This is of great concern to us, because in the face of the critical situation of insecurity at the national level, people demand quick solutions regardless of whether their implementation violates rights and freedoms. Regarding security, for example, several candidates have referred to the use of force outside of what is established by basic rights and international standards in force in Ecuador and the region.
Unfortunately, it is difficult for a situation as serious as the one Ecuador is going through to be resolved in such a short period of time as the one that will be afforded to the future president. The main concerns of Ecuadorians are centred on insecurity, the economic crisis and corruption. It is hoped that the new government will act on these issues by listening to people and putting an end to the arrogance that has characterised the outgoing government. Although time is short, the transitional government should establish basic lines of action, either for continuity through the next period or so that whoever comes to power in 2025 will have a basis for doing so.
How does the assassination of Fernando Villavicencio change the political scenario?
Political violence is nothing new in Ecuador: in recent elections there have been candidates who experienced threats and attacks, which in some cases have cost them their lives.
However, this is the first instance in a long time that a presidential candidate has been the victim of an assassination. The conditions under which the attack on Fernando Villavicencio occurred are revealing. He was a candidate with a risk assessment of over 95 per cent, who had police protection and had been denouncing constant threats against him.
This affects not only the electoral landscape but also Ecuador’s democracy itself, which has allowed room for organised crime and narco-politics to grow. If the proper institutions act in a timely manner and not only prevent events like this from happening again, but also manage to put an end to the prevailing impunity, we will end up strengthening a weak democracy that has been crying out for help. For this to happen, there is much work ahead, focused on coordinating efforts between public institutions, civil society, the private sector and political actors in ways that put the country ahead of any particular interest.
What international support does Ecuadorian civil society need to continue doing its work?
After what has happened in recent years, the starting point would be to ensure that international cooperation does not abandon Ecuadorian civil society. Cooperation institutions must also understand that although it is more profitable – at least in terms of communication – to save the environment, protect species or support community development, it is key to maintain support for organisations and initiatives working for democracy and civic space, because no other initiative would be viable without these.
The international community must keep its eyes on Ecuador and look for local allies to fight back against the democratic setbacks we are experiencing. A joint effort is needed to strengthen civil society as a fundamental pillar of democracy.
Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with FCD through itswebsite orFacebook account, subscribe to itsYouTube channel and followfcd_ecuador on Instagram and@FCD_Ecuador and@aiarconsalvador on Twitter.
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SLOVAKIA: ‘We hope the government’s attempts to stifle activism will ultimately fail’
CIVICUS discusses democracy, civic space and media freedoms in Slovakia with Rasto Kužel, Executive Director of MEMO 98, a leading media monitoring organisation with 25 years of experience. MEMO 98’s mission is to provide people with fair and comprehensive information on public affairs, empowering them to engage in their communities and hold authorities accountable.The Slovak government recently proposed major changes to public television and radio, sparking condemnation from civil society, journalists’ organisations, the political opposition, international media organisations and regional institutions. Media freedoms have been in the spotlight since the 2018 murder of journalist Jan Kuciak, which led to the resignation of pro-Russian populist Prime Minister Robert Fico and the election of a short-lived anti-corruption government. However, Fico and his Smer partyreturned to power in 2023, and an ally of the prime minister was elected president in April 2024. In a polarised political environment, Fico was the target of an assassination attempt on 15 May.
How is the government proposing to change the media system and why is this controversial?
The new government proposes significant changes to the public television and radio system. These changes include restructuring the management of the public broadcaster RTVS, which currently generally enjoys editorial independence.
Initial criticism, particularly from the European Union and Slovak journalists and civil society, led to some revisions of the draft law, which, if passed, would mean the end of RTVS. However, the aim remains the same – to designate a government-friendly director and increase government control over the public broadcaster. This would effectively turn public television and radio into state-controlled entities.
While never fully free from political pressure, RTVS has performed its public service duties generally well, in line with the existing legislation. The media regulator didn’t find its news and current affairs programmes breached impartiality or objectivity rules. There’s no need to replace the current management. This is just a politically motivated move to replace RTVS’s independent director with someone loyal to the government.
This pattern of media capture mirrors developments in neighbouring countries such as Hungary and Poland, where it’s been used to control state institutions and democratic processes. Critics argue that proposed changes in Slovakia are part of a wider strategy to undermine democratic institutions, including an independent judiciary, free media and civil society.
What other concerns have been raised by civil society and the opposition?
Since this government took office, democratic institutions and the rule of law have been seriously threatened. The government is actively trying to obstruct legal proceedings against its members, including Fico and his defence minister, who are accused of involvement in criminal activities. Legal and parliamentary manoeuvres have been used to block corruption charges. The General Prosecutor has invoked special provisions in the Penal Code to stop legal charges against people close to the ruling coalition, and parliament failed to strip Fico of his immunity when he was a regular member of the previous parliament. This sparked widespread protests, particularly against the dismantling of the special prosecutor’s office investigating corruption.
This year, the focus has shifted to concerns about civic space and media freedom. The government is pushing through a law requiring organisations that receive over €5,000 (approx. US$5,400) in foreign funding to disclose their sources. This is reminiscent of tactics used by authoritarian regimes such as Russia to stifle dissent.
Public and private broadcasters involved in critical reporting have been targeted. A big protest is being planned at a major private TV station, where it has emerged that the owners are pressuring the station to tone down its coverage critical of the government. This channel, known for its critical and objective journalism, faces threats against its ability to fulfil this role.
The government’s pro-Russian stance is particularly worrying given Slovakia’s proximity to the conflict in Ukraine. This shift towards Russia has already damaged Slovakia’s standing in the European Union (EU) and NATO, particularly after Fico revealed sensitive information to please pro-Russian groups at home. There’s wider concern that Slovakia’s security will be compromised if Russia isn’t stopped in Ukraine. Despite strong public support for the EU and NATO, the government is undermining efforts to support Ukraine and uphold democratic values. Its vague talk of peace suggests a reluctance to provide military support and puts Slovakia’s credibility and security at risk.
How have foreign policy disputes exacerbated political polarisation, and with what consequences?
Slovakia’s 2024 presidential election exacerbated existing divisions, driven by tactics to mobilise voters through fear and disinformation. The ruling parties targeted the opposition candidate, an independent and former foreign minister known for his strong pro-European and pro-Atlantic stance, by falsely portraying him as pro-war. They claimed that a vote for him would drag Slovakia into the Ukraine conflict, suggesting that Slovak people would be drafted and sent to war. This narrative was misleading and manipulative.
The campaign was marked by negativity and fuelled polarisation, a strategy that has become a hallmark of the current government. Smear campaigns targeted not only political opponents but also the media. Fico has frequently used derogatory language, referring to his opponents as ‘pigs’ and ‘prostitutes’, further inflaming tensions.
This toxic political environment culminated in a shocking event: an assassination attempt on Fico. The government had adopted a tactic of holding meetings with supporters outside the capital. During one of these meetings, in the small town of Handlová, a 71-year-old pensioner with controversial affiliations opened fire on Fico, hitting him four times. This violent incident underlines the dangerous consequences of embracing such a divisive and aggressive rhetoric.
What was the public reaction to the assassination attempt, and what are its implications?
The assassination attempt was a deplorable event and was condemned by many sectors of Slovak society. MEMO 98 and many other civil society groups immediately condemned the violence, describing it as an attack on democracy. Despite our political disagreements with Fico’s pro-Russian policies, we strongly believe violence has no place in a democracy. The government was democratically elected and its authority should not be undermined by such violent attacks. We called for a moment of reflection and urged society and politicians not to exploit this incident for political gain.
But this wasn’t an isolated incident. It followed a series of tragic, violent events, including the murder of journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée in 2018 and the murder of two LGBTQI+ people. These crimes shocked the nation and highlighted the dangerous levels of polarisation and hatred that political rhetoric has fuelled.
The attempt on Fico’s life has already led to heightened tensions and a blame game between political factions. Members of the ruling coalition have accused the opposition and media of creating a climate of hatred despite their own history of using inflammatory, derogatory and divisive language.
It’s also contributing to the further deterioration of democratic institutions. We are already seeing increased attacks on independent media and civil society. The government is using the incident to justify further crackdowns on dissent. Journalists are being accused of escalating tensions simply for asking probing and critical questions.
There’s urgent need for a return to civil discourse and a renewed commitment to democratic principles. It’s vital for society to promote healing and rebuild trust in our democratic institutions.
What is civil society doing to protect democracy, and how can the international community support its efforts?
Civil society working to protect democracy is astonished at the speed with which the government has been dismantling institutions and targeting its critics. While we saw this coming, we were still surprised by these attempts to dismantle democratic institutions and have been forced to hold the line and engage in activism. But we are committed to upholding the rule of law and maintaining democratic institutions, and we hope the government’s attempts to stifle activism will ultimately fail.
The international community’s support and attention will be crucial. Current illiberal, populist and authoritarian trends transcend borders and require a global response. The challenges posed by the growing influence of social media and the decline of independent media require collective action. There’s a great need for solidarity and effective sharing and coordination, particularly at the regional level. International allies can support our efforts by raising awareness, providing platforms for our voices and fostering a network of solidarity and shared strategies.
Civic space in Slovakia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with MEMO 98 through itswebsite orInstagram page, and follow@memo98slovakia and@rastokuzel on Twitter.
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SUDAN: ‘The only way out of this mess is through civilian rule’
CIVICUS speaks about thewar in Sudan and its repercussions for women and civil society with Reem Abbas, a Sudanese feminist activist, writer and fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP).Founded in 2013, TIMEP is a civil society organisation that works to centre advocates and experts from and in the Middle East and North Africa in policy discourse to foster more fair and democratic societies.
What’s the current humanitarian situation in Sudan?
Active conflict persists in around 60 per cent of Sudan’s territory. The continuous fighting entails targeting of civilians and mass displacement. In some states, much of the civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, markets, schools and universities, has been damaged. In Khartoum and West Darfur states, about 70 per cent of hospitals have been damaged or partially destroyed.
Civilians and civil society activists are unsafe. The situation greatly restricts people’s freedom of movement, their ability to sustain a livelihood and their capacity to express their opinions freely. There are pockets of relative security in Eastern and Northern Sudan, but even in areas deemed secure displacement persists and schools remain closed because internally displaced people are living in them and other public buildings.
Many livelihoods have totally collapsed, leaving people increasingly dependent on aid. We are already witnessing cases of famine, particularly affecting children, resulting in deaths.
How has the conflict impacted on women and girls?
Women have always been targeted in conflicts in Sudan. Political violence, rife in Sudan given its volatile political history, has also often taken aim at women. There’s rarely any accountability for sexual and gender-based violence. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the militias that are fighting against the army – are abducting women and selling them as sexual slaves in markets or holding them captive for extended periods. Families are left in distress, unsure of the whereabouts of their daughters, and are sometimes embezzled for money.
This is a war on women. Part of it stems from structural factors that place women in subordinate positions, but there’s also a punitive element directed at women for their pivotal role in the 2019 revolution that overthrew dictator Omar al-Bashir. During the revolution, women were out there, highly visible on the frontlines, and now it feels like they’re being punished for it.
The targeting of women is tearing the social fabric apart. As public spaces become unsafe for women, fewer women are participating in public life, including in economic activities and activism. This will have long-term consequences.
What roles is civil society playing in this context, and what challenges does it face?
It’s important to recognise that civil society in Sudan isn’t a monolithic entity, but rather a complex mix of different layers. Some were heavily involved during the transitional period that followed the revolution, getting deeply integrated with government structures at the time. Then there are women’s groups, each with their own focus and agenda. Alongside them, there are more formal organisations such as non-governmental organisations and trade unions. And let’s not overlook the revolutionary elements, such as the resistance committees and emergency responserooms, decentralised and horizontal structures working to shelter displaced people, support hospitals and secure food and water supplies.
The more formal parts of civil society are currently heavily involved in politics, while its revolutionary segments are deeply engaged in grassroots humanitarian efforts. They’re essentially functioning as local governments in areas where official governance structures are absent.
Despite its crucial role, civil society faces numerous challenges. The organic growth of grassroots movements is stunted by conflict and dictatorship. The polarising effects of war have led to divisions along political, ethnic and regional lines, further fragmenting civil society. Activists are increasingly targeted by the RSF or the army, threatening their ability to operate.
In an environment where conformity to mainstream opinions is increasingly enforced, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain dissenting voices. This situation underscores the urgent need to safeguard the diversity and autonomy of civil society in Sudan.
However, attention and funding often gravitate towards already well-funded organisations, leaving grassroots initiatives to rely solely on community support. While funding alone doesn’t create a functional organisation, it’s important for organisations and groups to grow in an organic way and be able to garner support from the community.
How is civil society advocating for peace and democracy?
Right now, the conversation is all about security and getting things back to normal. People are doubting whether we can even think about democracy after all this chaos. The situation’s tough, with militarisation and conflict everywhere. But the only way out of this mess is through civilian rule. We need to figure out how to link the peace process to a long-term political solution that puts us back on track for democracy.
Unfortunately, the focus of the political elite appears to be more on preserving its positions rather than addressing urgent issues. There are concerns that the largest political coalition has developed close ties with the militia, causing unease among those involved in the revolution. Without a bigger political group that really listens to people and leads responsibly, we’re going to be stuck with military rule for ages. Right now, it should be all about finding common ground and putting the focus on the people who’ve suffered most from this war – not about politicians trying to claw back power or siding with the military.
There’s a lot of talk about how the transitional government messed up and led to the coup and the war. People are sceptical about civilian rule and whether it can fix things. It’s easier to sell the idea of a military-run government when people are feeling scared and vulnerable. Even though it’s militarisation that got us into this mess in the first place, it’s understandable because people just want to feel safe again.
What should the international community do to address Sudan’s dire security and humanitarian situation?
It’s time for the international community to stop sticking to one side of the story and start listening to everyone involved. They’re pumping all their funds into one camp and ignoring a whole bunch of other perspectives. We need more humanitarian aid, particularly considering the famine situation. Millions of people are at risk, with nowhere to turn and nothing to support themselves with.
Investment in basic infrastructure like hospitals and water plants is crucial too. People need services, and they need them now. Some areas haven’t had clean water for months because water plants are getting caught in the crossfire.
The international community must also demonstrate political determination. People’s lives are on the line. We need clear plans and urgent action to stop this war.
I want to emphasise the significance of civil society solidarity. This is crucial when our governments show ambivalence towards our concerns. In such situations, we must become each other’s voices and amplify our collective message. We must seek ways to connect, demonstrate solidarity and collaborate effectively.
It’s important to learn from one another and work together towards shared objectives. Collaboration with civil society groups and networks across the world is greatly appreciated. It’s through such partnerships that we can make a meaningful impact and bring about positive change.
Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with TIMEP through itswebsite or itsFacebook andLinkedIn pages, and follow@TimepDC and@ReemWrites on Twitter.
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VENEZUELA: ‘The government wants a civil society aligned with its interests, tamed and silent’
CIVICUS discusses the ‘anti-NGO law’ recently passed in Venezuela with Alí Daniels, Co-Director of Acceso a la Justicia, a civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to monitoring justice administration and the rule of law in Venezuela.On 15 August, Venezuela’s National Assemblyapproved a bill known as the ‘anti-NGO law’, which severely restricts freedom of association. The law requires CSOs to declare the origin of their funding, imposes strict reporting obligations, including a requirement to provide sensitive information, and bans organisations deemed to promote ‘fascism, intolerance and hatred’. The measure, proposed some time ago, was finally adopted after the28 July presidential election, which the opposition won by a large margin. The government has ignored the results, violently suppressed democracy protests and sought to stifle all sources of dissent.
What’s the anti-NGO law, and what’s its place within the ruling regime’s repressive machinery?
This new law has been presented as an instrument to regulate the exercise of freedoms of association and expression, when in fact it seeks to hinder it. One third of its 39 articles contain severe sanctions such as fines, deregistration, expulsion of foreigners and the dissolution of organisations. Although it claims to seek greater transparency and accountability, it contains only two articles on this issue, which was already regulated by the Civil Code.
One of the most worrying aspects of the new law is that it obliges CSOs to reregister within 180 days and could leave them in legal limbo if they don’t receive a response from the authorities. It also imposes annual reviews, creating an unnecessary administrative burden even for those lacking financial resources.
The anti-NGO law is part of a long-standing strategy of repression that includes human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial executions. It’s another cog in a repressive machine that includes measures such as revoking the passports of human rights defenders and activists, illegal surveillance of phones and social media and censorship of platforms such as WhatsApp and Twitter/X. Senior government officials have already labelled us terrorists, encouraging and justifying the intensification of repression.
The anti-NGO law can also be seen as a response to international pressure questioning the legitimacy of the 28 July election. With it, the government is doubling down on its willingness to punish anyone who questions its legitimacy.
What impact could this law have?
We are very concerned that the new law is very similar to Nicaragua’s, which in just one year has led to more than 3,000 CSOs being made illegal.
In the medium term, the new law could have a serious impact on the humanitarian situation. The new restrictions could lead to a reduction in the number of CSOs, while those that still operate may be forced to reduce their capacity to implement projects. Many CSOs may end up opting to become informal groups. While this would reduce costs, it would also limit their ability to receive funding, as donors often prefer to work with formal legal entities.
The damage this could cause is not limited to CSOs – it also affects the people who depend on their services. For political reasons, the Venezuelan government adopts contradictory positions: it forces bankrupt companies to keep operating, allegedly to ‘protect jobs’, but it dissolves CSOs for failing to pay a fine. It claims to protect jobs, but dissolves organisations that create jobs in the humanitarian field.
The anti-NGO law is designed to limit the independence of civil society, allowing only likeminded CSOs to operate. The government wants a civil society that’s aligned with its interests, tamed and silent.
How is civil society working for a democratic transition in Venezuela?
In a context marked by censorship of political expression and press freedom, Venezuelan civil society is playing a crucial role in the struggle for a democratic transition. In the face of restrictions on political parties and government control of the media, CSOs have become reliable sources of information, providing an alternative analysis to the official narrative. We provide data the government would rather hide, such as the rise in child malnutrition. We show reality as it is, and that’s why they want to suppress us.
CSOs act as monitors and whistleblowers, offering critical analysis and proposing alternatives for Venezuela’s future. We advocate for dialogue and a negotiated transition, but we also set clear ethical and legal boundaries to ensure those responsible for crimes against humanity are brought to justice.
How can the international community support civil society in Venezuela?
The international community can help us keep what is happening in Venezuela in the global debate by echoing our condemnation of human rights violations and crimes against humanity. This is extremely important so those more ideologically reticent can recognise that human rights violations have no ideology and torture is unacceptable and must be condemned and punished no matter who commits it.
It’s important that states with influence over the Venezuelan government, such as Brazil and Colombia, use their position to encourage dialogue. Diplomatic pressure and mediation by friendly countries could facilitate a process of negotiation and peaceful resolution. We have been facing a complex humanitarian emergency for more than two decades; any support to alleviate the crisis is greatly appreciated and will continue to give us hope and strength to face the very serious situation we are in.
Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Acceso a la Justicia through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@AccesoaJusticia and@alijdaniels on Twitter.
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ZIMBABWE: ‘Election violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes’
CIVICUS speaks about the general election in Zimbabwe and the role of civil society with Wellington Mbofana, former director ofthe Civic Education Network Trust (CIVNET), a civil society organisation (CSO) that recently shut down due to lack of funding, and a former board member of several Zimbabwean CSOs.What was at stake in this election?
It’s difficult to pinpoint a single crucial issue that was at stake. Over a considerable period, Zimbabwean elections, much like those in other parts of Africa, have ceased to revolve around substantive issues and have instead become centred on political parties and personalities. This trend is evident in this election, in which major political parties failed to present their manifestos in a timely manner. The main opposition party, Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), unveiled its programme merely two weeks prior to voting, while the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) didn’t even bother.
Given the crumbling state of the economy, reflected in record-breaking unemployment, pervasive economic informality, escalating poverty, the world’s second-highest inflation rate and a sense of hopelessness, economic strife remained the most prominent concern for voters. Ideally, the competition should have revolved around two or three contrasting strategies for addressing these economic woes. However, what we observed was a cloud of obfuscation. The ruling party advanced a narrative that conditions are improving and investors are flocking to the country, but progress would be even greater if it weren’t for sanctions imposed by Western states. The opposition pledged to outperform ZANU-PF across all fronts. But neither specified how they would fund their proposed initiatives.
To deal with Zimbabwe’s predicament effectively the government would need to confront a range of issues, including land reform and productivity, water shortages, electricity generation, infrastructure development and urbanisation and, most importantly, guarantee the required funding.
It should have been important to ensure the meaningfulness of this election because when elections fail, civil unrest and coups ensue, a truth that Africa has repeatedly witnessed.
Was there any election-related violence?
The prevalence of violence in all its manifestations – physical, structural and cultural – remains an unfortunate hallmark of Zimbabwean elections. Lives have been lost, injuries endured and property destroyed as a result.
It is also important to note that because of its fractured politics, the country is in a perpetual election mode. Over the past five years, we have had multiple recalls from parliament and local authorities, leading to by-elections. Instances of intra-party violence have also occurred during parliamentary and primary elections. The culture upholding the idea that wielding the strongest fist is the key to ascending to power must change. Violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes. Who needs a manifesto when you can use force?
What tactics did the government use to stifle dissent in the run-up to the election?
The ruling party stands accused of engaging in lawfare, a tactic that uses laws to constrain the opposition and human rights defenders. These efforts are facilitated by an allegedly captured judiciary. A prominent CCC legislator, Job Sikhala, along with other political activists and human rights defenders, languish in remand prisons on spurious allegations after being denied bail.
The government introduced controversial laws aimed at silencing dissent. The Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Amendment Act, commonly called the Patriotic Bill, are clearly designed to deal with critics of the government.
The Patriotic Bill came into force on 14 July 2023. With this bill, the government created a new crime of ‘wilfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe’. The scope and definition of this offence is vague. There are valid concerns that law enforcement agencies will interpret the law broadly and use it to stifle and penalise the work of independent civil society.
Citizens and permanent residents of Zimbabwe will be found guilty if they participate in meetings aimed at discussing or plotting armed intervention in Zimbabwe, subverting or overthrowing its government and implementing or extending sanctions or trade boycotts against Zimbabwe. A meeting encompasses any form of communication involving two or more people, regardless of whether it takes place offline or online.
Participating in discussions about armed intervention can result in life imprisonment or the death penalty if the meeting involves planning such an intervention. Discussing subversion or overthrow of the government is punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Taking part in meetings discussing sanctions or trade boycotts can lead to a fine of up to US$12,000 or up to 10 years in prison, or both. Aggravated offences may lead to consequences such as the termination of citizenship for those who are not citizens by birth or descent, cancellation of residence permits for non-citizens and disqualification from voting or holding public office for five to 15 years.
In the hands of overzealous and partisan law enforcement agents, this punitive law is very dangerous. It seems to target not only the opposition and civil society but also factions within the fractured ruling party and the military. It likely seeks to prevent a recurrence of a military-assisted transition, which brought the current government to power in 2017. That coup was willingly accepted by powerful global players, including the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which inadvertently endorsed the idea of military change of power.
How did Zimbabwean civil society engage with the electoral process?
Civil society was actively involved in electoral activities throughout the electoral cycle. CSOs play a pivotal role in providing voter education, observing elections, advocating for electoral reforms, safeguarding human rights and offering legal, medical and psycho-social assistance to victims of human rights violations.
Both local and international observers were generally allowed and accredited. However, there were isolated cases, such as the denial of accreditation to Musa Kika, allegedly due to security risks, while some local citizens encountered intimidation, harassment and threats from unidentified people after engaging with international observers.
But unfortunately, the last couple of years have been very difficult for Zimbabwean. Several CSOs have shut down. CIVNET, a major organisation providing civic education, closed its doors this year due to lack of funding.
The Zimbabwean economy is too fragile to support a strong civil society, which heavily relies on international donors and solidarity. Further international support should be rendered to all groups promoting development, good governance, human rights, justice and the rule of law. The international community should also amplify local voices and exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to act in accordance with international human rights and democratic standards.
What did CIVNET work on?
CIVNET operated through three main programmes: the Citizen Participation Programme, including two projects on constitutionalism and voter education, the Leadership Development Programme and the Peace Building Programme.
The Citizen Participation Programme encouraged citizen engagement in governance and development, fostering collaboration between communities and local authorities through participatory workshops and development projects. The Constitution and Constitutionalism Project aimed to raise awareness about the significance of the new constitution and share information on how to use it to exercise human rights and honour obligations as citizens.
The Leadership Development Programme enhanced leadership skills of people engaged in community projects. Our graduates now lead various Zimbabwean CSOs and work in local authorities and parliament. CIVNET contributed to the formation and development of CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, the Zimbabwe Peace Project and the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe. It was also a key member of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGOs Forum.
The Peace Building Programme helped people and communities divided by conflict to reach out to each other and mend broken relations. This was done through creatively designed workshops that provided security and safety to both victims and perpetrators of violent conflicts. Mediators were also trained to address local disputes, resulting in transformed relationships and improved dialogue within previously divided communities.
To what extent could the election be called free and fair?
The concept of free and fair elections involves political freedoms and fair processes prior to elections, culminating in the casting of votes by well-informed eligible voters able to vote freely for candidates and parties of their choice. A transparent tally of all valid votes, accurate result announcements and universal acceptance of the election outcomes by all parties are integral components of this concept.
Past elections in Zimbabwe have been contested at courts and other institutions. For Zimbabwe to uphold its position within the international community, this election would have to gain universal recognition as credible, legitimate and conducted in a free and fair manner. It would be key to ensure the acceptance of its outcome and secure peace and stability to attract investors.
The 2023 election was disputed in the legal arena even before a single ballot was cast. This may be a harbinger of future developments. On 12 July, the Electoral Court disqualified a presidential candidate, Savior Kasukuwere, whose participation had been previously permitted by the Nomination Court. Then the High Court disqualified 12 CCC parliamentary candidates, ostensibly for late filings, although the Nomination Court had accepted their submissions. Both decisions favoured the ruling party. However, following an appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s verdict on the 12 CCC candidates, leading to their reinstatement on the ballot. On 19 July the electoral court ruled in favour of a leader of the opposition United Zimbabwe Alliance party, Elizabeth Valerio, whose candidacy had been initially rejected by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), also for alleged untimely filing.
Declaring the election to be free and fair would be unreasonable given the political environment characterised by violence, intimidation and voter suppression, non-transparent processes with the electoral roll and ballot paper printing, pre-voting by security personnel, biased media coverage, opposition rallies barred by the police, vote buying through handouts, influence from traditional and religious leaders on voters, misuse of government resources for party campaigns and indications that some parties will reject any outcome other than their own victory, implying that the ruling party wouldn’t have handed over power if it had lost. Indeed, SADC decided to abandon the term ‘free and fair’ regarding Zimbabwean elections, instead referring to them as ‘legitimate’.
What electoral reforms are needed?
Adherence to rule of law and impartial management of elections is essential. The ZEC should enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct, safeguarding the right for all to express their political views and campaign freely. It must also ensure fairness by curbing the misuse of state resources, preventing intimidation, harassment and destruction of campaign materials and improving voter education.
The police should fulfil their constitutional duties impartially, without bias, fear, or favour. Political parties should adhere to the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates. This entails refraining from violence, misuse of public resources for partisan ends, coercion and intimidation of the electorate and inciting violence through hate speech and derogatory language.
Were there any issues with people being prevented from voting, and what do you expect to happen next?
A high turnout was to be expected given the high stakes. The economy has done its own campaign, motivating people to participate. The ruling party also mobilised people, especially in rural areas, by any means necessary.
However, many voters might not have been able to locate their names on the register. The polling station-based system is such that people living in a specific neighbourhood can only vote at a certain polling station. In the 2018 election, a lot of people found their names had been removed from their usual stations without a change having been requested, while others who requested changes after moving to other districts saw those changes unimplemented. Following the election, many constituencies and councils had elected representatives recalled by political parties in power. Since there are no guarantees that this won’t happen again, some people may have been discouraged from voting.
Based on experience, disputes around results and their resolution by the courts are to be expected. Given that the judiciary is perceived to be captured and judges were given significant ‘housing loans’ before the election, judgements against the opposition are also rightly likely to be perceived as unfair.
Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
