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• GLOBAL ARMS TRADE: ‘By halting the supply of weapons, states can help prevent human rights violations’

  CIVICUS discusses civil society efforts to control arms proliferation with Hine-Wai Loose, Director of Control Arms, a global civil society coalition with over 300 partners in all regions of the world.

  Despite the extensive international effort that led to the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty, challenges remain in regulating the international arms trade and ensuring compliance with international law. Rising tensions only encourage increases in military spending, which is evidenced in the arms industry’s ongoing expansion. Civil society advocates such as Control Arms are pushing for disarmament, stronger arms controls and greater compliance and accountability.

  Why’s disarmament important, and why’s it so difficult to achieve?

  Disarmament can make a significant contribution to building global peace and security. When countries such as Russia and the USA agree to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals through treaties such as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, it fosters trust and cooperation between nations.

  Disarmament and arms control measures also play a crucial role in protecting civilians caught in the crossfire of armed conflict or subjected to serious human rights abuses committed with guns, for instance. A good example of an instrument with the potential to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure during armed conflicts is the Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, the first international instrument to explicitly recognise that the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has serious humanitarian consequences.

  Weapons are also an expensive business. Disarmament can free up resources that can be redirected to economic and social wellbeing.

  However, when tensions between countries are as high as they are today, it is particularly challenging to advance disarmament and arms control treaties and norms. In these moments of elevated tensions there can be an increased risk of miscalculations or mistakes that could result in the threat or use of a nuclear weapon.

  Another major challenge is that states invest heavily in arms, using them as an insurance policy against uncertainty. As a result, the ever-expanding arms industry undermines efforts to create a more stable environment. Once tensions eventually subside, it will be difficult to reverse the arms industry’s increased capacity.

  What’s the role of the arms industry in fuelling conflicts?

  In the wake of the events of 7 October, the Wall Street Journal reported a six per cent increase in the value of US arms industry stocks, highlighting the inextricable link between the arms industry and the war machine.

  According to the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the arms industry has clear human rights obligations. But the industry is reluctant to accept responsibility for the impact of its products on human rights.

  In western countries, the arms industry often claims to defend democracy, borders and human rights. If these claims were sincere, the arms industry would ensure its operations comply with human rights standards. This would be crucial to reducing the negative impact of arms production and distribution on global conflicts.

  How does Control Arms work for effective arms control?

  Control Arms was established to build an international coalition to support the negotiation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This treaty aims to regulate the international arms trade, prevent the transfer of arms that could facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law and reduce the human suffering caused by irresponsible arms transfers.

  Our first objective is amplifying the voices of civil society in the arms control dialogue. We aim to ensure that those affected by irresponsible arms transfers and those working on the ground are heard and included in deliberations on the international arms trade.

  Our second objective focuses on strengthening the rules governing international conventional arms transfers. We seek to strengthen the ATT’s norms and rules by engaging directly with states and advocating for stronger regulations.

  The third objective is to promote transparency and accountability in the global arms trade. An independent project of Control Arms is the ATT Monitor, through which an annual report assessing reports submitted under the ATT and providing valuable insights into the implementation of the treaty is produced.

  We participate in multilateral forums, from the ATT Conferences of States Parties to the Human Rights Council, to raise awareness how real-world cases of arms transfers that are not in compliance with international law impact on civilians. We explain how arms transfers affect human rights and international humanitarian law in places such as Gaza, Myanmar and Yemen. We identify states involved in questionable arms transfers and seek to hold them accountable for their actions. Engaging in such advocacy is not always easy, and nor is it necessarily welcome, but it is essential to ensuring that multilateral deliberations are informed by reality and states are called to account for their actions.

  What are the ATT’s key provisions?

  The ATT places international humanitarian law and international human rights law at the centre of arms transfers decisions. Article 6 prohibits transfers contrary to a state’s obligations under international law, or in cases where a state party has knowledge at the time of the authorisation that the weapons would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

  If the provisions of Article 6 do not apply, then before a state can transfer weapons it must undertake an assessment under Article 7. Under this assessment, an exporting state party is required without discrimination to ‘assess the potential’ that the weapons ‘would contribute to or undermine international peace and security’ or could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law. I am oversimplifying the risk assessment, but this is it in a nutshell.

  Even states that have not joined the ATT still have obligations under international customary law, which includes countries such as the USA. The four Geneva Conventions and customary international law obligate all states to ensure respect for international humanitarian law. By ending their supply of items at risk of being used in conflict, major arms exporting states can help bring an end to serious violations of international humanitarian law and most importantly to the suffering being witnessed in places such as Gaza, Haiti, Myanmar and Sudan.

  What are the challenges to the ATT’s effectiveness?

  There are a range of challenges, and these largely concern compliance with the ATT. For example, some national courts refuse to deal with legal challenges to government decisions to transfer weapons, considering them a matter of government policy rather than law. This limits the ability of the judiciary to hold governments accountable for arms transfers that may violate international law. Another problem being encountered is that some states announce a suspension of arms transfers but continue to transfer weapons, ammunition and parts and components under contracts established before suspension was announced. A third example is when companies originally established in countries that have strict regulations set up offshore entities in countries with less stringent controls so they can continue to transfer weapons to questionable contexts.

  What further agreements or regulations are needed?

  A key area of focus in disarmament and arms control right now is the regulation of new and emerging technologies such as lethal autonomous weapons systems. Given the rapid development of new technologies, this focus on autonomy is entirely understandable.

  Guns, however, remain the primary weapon of choice in everyday violence, organised crime and gender-based violence. Despite their impact, they are subject to limited international regulation, such as the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. While this has helped states implement gun control legislation, a more systematic and rigorous approach is needed.

  Unfortunately, the prevailing view, which has spread from the USA to other parts of the world, is that people have a right to bear arms. To prevent human rights abuses and violations committed with guns, states must enact robust legislation on gun ownership and control, and ensure it is backed by strong criminal penalties.

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  Get in touch with the Control Arms through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram page, and follow@controlarms on Twitter.

• HORN OF AFRICA: ‘De-escalation must be the primary objective’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mengistu Assefa, Program Manager at the Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), about a port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the possibility of it escalating into an armed conflict with Somalia.

  CARD is an Ethiopian civil society organisation that advocates for democracy and human rights through citizen empowerment.

  What’s the relevance of the recent port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland?

  Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia became a landlocked nation, placed in a challenging position for international trade. Since then, Djibouti has emerged as its primary access point to the sea, handling over 95 per cent of its trade volume. This dependence comes at a cost, with Ethiopia paying more than US$1 billion annually in fees to Djibouti’s ports and infrastructure. With its estimated population of 126 million, the second largest in Africa, Ethiopia views sea access as critical for its economic, political and demographic future.

  To achieve this, on 1 January 2024 the Ethiopian federal government signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on commercial port access with Somaliland, a self-proclaimed autonomous territory that is internationally recognised as part of Somalia.

  While this MoU is not a legally binding agreement, it carries significant implications for the region because it walks a tightrope between cooperation and recognition. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a potential step towards international recognition of its de facto autonomy. Although the agreement’s full details remain undisclosed, it also reportedly grants Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast, potentially including a military base. Ethiopian authorities have not been explicit about Somaliland’s recognition, saying the MoU allows for an ‘in-depth assessment’ of Somaliland’s quest for recognition.

  Somalia vehemently rejects the MoU, viewing it as a violation of its territorial integrity and political sovereignty. It is actively mobilising diplomatic pressure against the deal. Somali president Hassan Sheik Mohamed has visited Egypt and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s long-standing competitors, seeking support. Additionally, the Arab League, of which Somalia is a member, has denounced the MoU. Egypt’s leader, already locked in negotiations with Ethiopia over a Nile dam project, has assured Somalia of potential support if requested, further escalating regional tensions.

  What’s the political status of Somaliland?

  Somaliland, with an estimated population of five million, broke away from Somalia and declared its independence in 1991 after 30 years of civil war. It fought for its independence based on the argument that it had a distinct historical heritage. Somaliland was a UK protectorate, while Somalia was under Italian control. For Somalilanders, this is enough argument to prove they are different territories. Moreover, in June 1960 Somaliland was briefly recognised as an independent state by around 35 nations for a span of five days, before it relinquished its sovereignty to reunite with the Somali Republic.

  Somaliland declared its independence more than three decades ago but Somalia has never recognised it. Neither has any international organisation. Even so, Somaliland has managed to become a stable, functional state. It established its own army and democratic institutions and has held six elections with peaceful transitions of power.

  In late 2022 and early 2023, a local armed movement, the Dhulbahante militias, rose against Somaliland’s government, declaring its intention to rejoin Somalia. This uprising posed significant political and security challenges to the Somaliland government, partly contributing to the postponement of 2023 elections. It cast a shadow of instability over Somaliland’s bid for international recognition, which hinges on its ability to demonstrate long-term stability and democratic institutions.

  Could the port deal lead to international recognition of Somaliland’s independence?

  Somaliland has made clear that a binding legal agreement could only be signed once it is officially recognised as an independent nation state. But the Ethiopian side of the story is quite different. Ethiopia hasn’t ruled out the possibility of that happening but hasn’t explicitly said it would take a stance on the recognition of Somaliland. The signing of a binding legal international agreement with Somaliland would however result in Ethiopia’s de facto recognition of its independence.

  Looking at the bigger picture, this deal could affect the regional security architecture, particularly when it comes to fighting Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group based in Somalia and allied with Al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is perceived as a global security threat and has explicitly targeted Ethiopia. Consequently, Ethiopia is engaged in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia alongside the Somali army. If Ethiopia recognises Somaliland, Somalia will likely force Ethiopia to pull out its troops. However, as Somalia cannot take charge of its security on its own, Ethiopia could use it as leverage to force Somalia to back down from a strong reaction.

  Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland carries significant implications. Located in a strategically crucial area along the Gulf of Eden, where Houthis and pirates constantly attack international ships, Somaliland’s 850-kilometre coastline attracts interest from various countries seeking a potential military base. Ethiopia’s explicit recognition of Somaliland could trigger a domino effect, with other countries following suit, although recognition would likely face significant hurdles at the African Union (AU).

  The AU adheres to the principle of respecting colonial borders and has expressed concerns about setting a precedent for secessionist movements in other African states, including Morocco and Nigeria. Ethiopia will likely weigh this carefully before explicitly recognising Somaliland’s independence. However, the rapidly shifting landscape of international interests suggests that it’s not an impossibility. This possibility is further amplified by the growing involvement of great and emerging powers in the Red Sea region, driven by economic and security interests.

  Could tensions escalate into a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia?

  Ethiopia and Somalia have had difficult relations in the past. In 1964, they clashed in a three-month border conflict. This initial skirmish foreshadowed a larger and bloodier conflict that erupted between 1977 and 1978. During this period, Somalia invaded Ethiopia with the intent of annexing the Ogaden region, inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The conflict quickly became a proxy war for the contenders of the Cold War, with the western bloc supporting Somalia and the Soviet Union backing Ethiopia. Ultimately, Ethiopia repelled the Somali army.

  In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group aiming to unite all Somalis across Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland under Islamic rule, gained control of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. This development raised concerns in Ethiopia, which perceived it as a threat to its national security and regional stability. Supported by the USA in the context of the ‘war on terror’, Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia and removed the ICU from power.

  Several years later, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a bilateral agreement aimed at stabilising the region. This agreement facilitated the deployment of Ethiopian security forces to assist the Somali National Army in its fight against Al-Shabaab and support the ongoing Somali transition process. It’s important to note that these Ethiopian troops are currently integrated into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia, a peacekeeping mission.

  Since October 2023, Ethiopia has declared its intention to gain access to the sea by peaceful means. In exchange for access Ethiopia has offered Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia land-swaps and stakes in a successful state-owned business such as Ethiopian Airlines, Africa’s biggest and most successful airline, and even in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. But none of these countries accepted Ethiopia’s offer, leaving Somaliland as a seemingly more amenable option.

  Somalia viewed Ethiopia’s signing of the port deal with Somaliland as betrayal. It reacted strongly and aggressively because it considers it an encroachment on its territory and an act against its sovereignty.

  Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence could open a Pandora’s box. In fear that it could lead to regional and global recognition, Somalia said that if Ethiopia moved forward in implementing the agreement, consequences would follow.

  This all brings us to the final and crucial point: where will this take the region? While the possibility of conflict cannot be entirely dismissed, it’s important to consider various factors and perspectives to assess its likelihood.

  First, military capabilities and intentions play a role. While Somalia’s military power is not comparable to Ethiopia’s, the potential for escalation and regional instability cannot be ignored. Additionally, Ethiopia’s stated commitment to peaceful resolutions needs to be weighed against its historical engagements and potential strategic calculations.

  Second, the international community’s role matters. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region are already grappling with complex conflicts and any further instability would have significant repercussions. International pressure and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions and promote dialogue will be crucial in preventing conflict.

  Further, Somalia’s response to the MoU adds another layer of complexity. Its seeking of support from Ethiopia’s historical competitors, such as Egypt and Eritrea, as well as regional entities such as the Arab League, could potentially lead to increased diplomatic pressure against Ethiopia. This, in turn, could further strain relations between the two countries for the foreseeable future.

  Finally, the MoU is likely to ignite discussions about the status of Somaliland, both within the AU and at the United Nations Security Council.

  What should the international community do to address this potential crisis?

  The international community plays a crucial role in navigating the complex situation surrounding Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access and its MoU with Somaliland. It is essential to engage with all stakeholders, particularly the Somali government and Somaliland’s authorities. It should be a top priority to facilitate negotiations to find a lasting solution that ensures both peaceful coexistence and normalised relations, as people in the Horn of Africa are ultimately bearing the brunt of this disagreement.

  Regardless of the outcome, be it Somaliland’s reunification with Somalia or its international recognition as a separate state, the two countries must establish a mutually agreeable arrangement for peaceful coexistence. The international community can play the role of facilitating a genuine conversation between the two. This is of course easier said than done, given the historical complexities of their relationship and the vested interests of various states and organisations, including western nations and other international players, who prioritise their security and economic interests in the region.

  International involvement should also aim to support Ethiopia and Somalia in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. This requires careful diplomacy to avoid exacerbating existing tensions or creating new problems. It’s also essential to urge those with vested interests in the region to avoid exploiting this situation for their agendas. De-escalation must be the primary objective.

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  Civic space in bothEthiopia andSomalia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CARD through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram pages, and follow@CARDEthiopia and@mengistu_dadi on Twitter.

• KENYA: ‘Protests against femicides encouraged survivors to seek justice’

  CIVICUS speaks with Wangechi Wachira, Executive Director of the Centre for Rights, Education and Awareness (CREAW), about recent protests demanding justice for femicide victims and policy changes to combat gender-based violence (GBV) in Kenya.

  Founded in 1999, CREAW is a national feminist women’s rights civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to protecting and promoting women’s and girls’ rights and addressing systemic gender inequalities, oppression, exploitation and discrimination.

  Why did protest recently erupt in Kenya?

  On 27 January, thousands of women and men took the streets to protest against femicides. The protests were triggered by 14 cases in January alone, and their primary objective was to demand accountability from state agencies, particularly law enforcement and the judiciary, in prosecuting perpetrators of femicide and ensuring justice for the victims. The case of John Matara, accused of killing Starlet Wahu, highlighted the failures of the legal and judicial systems, because he had been previously reported for GBV multiple times but had remained free.

  Femicide Count reported 48 cases in January and February 2024, compared to 152 cases during 2023, which itself was the highest number in the past five years. Data from Africa Data Hub indicates that over 500 women were killed in acts of femicide from January 2016 to December 2023. It also acknowledges the number is likely much higher, with many killings of women not properly categorised as femicide.

  The protest also aimed to raise awareness about the issue, as many people, including those in public office, do not fully understand the severity of femicide as the most extreme form of GBV. A 2021 report by the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime revealed that 56 per cent of all female homicides globally are committed by intimate partners or family members.

  Protesters sought to educate the public on victim-blaming, which empowers perpetrators and deters survivors from reporting abuse. By addressing the victim-blaming and shaming associated with GBV, the protests challenged societal norms and encouraged survivors to seek support and justice.

  What were protesters’ demands to the government?

  We urged the president to issue a declaration recognising GBV and femicides as a national crisis requiring an emergency response. Such a declaration must be accompanied by annual reports provided during the State of the Nation address, outlining measures taken to combat the problem.

  We also urge the government to establish a national public inquiry and official review of events or actions ordered by a government body for all femicide cases to track and ensure accountability.

  Given the lack of integrated official data, we also demand the government improves data collection on femicides and GBV, aligning it with international frameworks. This data is crucial for evidence-based policymaking and effective criminal justice responses.

  Additionally, we call for increased funding for GBV prevention programmes and demand an inclusive appointment process for all public positions, ensuring representation from grassroots feminist organisations and youth groups.

  How big a problem is GBV in Kenya, and what are its root causes?

  GBV is pervasive in Kenya, mirroring global trends. It exists in several forms, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse. According to the 2022 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, over 40 per cent of women have experienced physical or sexual violence from an intimate partner at some point in their lives. GBV also manifests in harmful practices such as female genital mutilation and child marriages. Femicides are a frequent occurrence and appear to be on the rise.

  The roots of GBV are found in patriarchal underpinnings of our society, which promote harmful social and cultural practices often reinforced by religious beliefs. Power is concentrated in men’s hands and women have little to none. Such unequal dynamics cannot but foster violence.

  Economic factors such as poverty help perpetuate GBV by pushing women to stay in abusive relationships due to lack of financial independence. They also push families in famine-hit areas to marry off young girls for economic gain, and specifically to be able to acquire livestock in return.

  Conflict, crises and displacement leave women and girls especially vulnerable to violence. A recent example is the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw an 80 per cent increase in intimate partner violence in 2020.

  How does civil society work to address GBV in Kenya?

  Civil society plays key roles in addressing GBV. CREAW specifically has a workstream focused on ending violence against women and girls. Over the years, we have provided free legal aid and psychosocial support to over 20,857 GBV survivors. We are among the few CSOs that offer these services. We collaborate closely with state-sponsored legal aid programmes, such as the National Legal Aid Service, to ensure integrated, efficient and timely GBV service delivery. Our work is enhanced by strategic partnerships with various GBV working groups, Court User Committees, relevant health institutions, parts of criminal justice system and community dispute resolution mechanisms.

  CREAW actively engages with legislators and policymakers at both national and county levels to advocate for the development and implementation of regulatory frameworks on GBV. Our advocacy contributed to the passage of the 2006 Sexual Offences Act, 2013 Matrimonial Property Act, 2014 Marriage Act and the 2015 Protection Against Domestic Violence Act.

  The aim of the Sexual Offences Act is to set out what constitute sexual offences, provide ways to prevent illegal sexual acts and protect all people from them. The Matrimonial Property Act sought to provide clear rules for what belongs in a marriage’s matrimonial estate and provide a legal framework for the ownership, management and distribution of matrimonial property that would apply to all types of unions. This was a monumental achievement because it recognised rights women didn’t previously have, such as owning and buying land.

  The Marriage Act consolidated various laws on marriage, provided procedures for separation and divorce and regulated the custody and maintenance of children in the event of separation or divorce. The Protection Against Domestic Violence Act provides avenues for victims and survivors of violence to report their circumstances to relevant authorities, seek legal redress and receive justice.

  CREAW also supports the county governments of Kilifi and Meru, the Kenya Police Service and the Kenyan judiciary in strengthening their mechanisms for implementing existing GBV laws and policies.

  CREAW’s commitment to supporting survivors extends to financial inclusion. Since 2020, we have implemented a programme, the Jasiri Fund (‘bold’ in Swahili) that provides GBV survivors with quality financial services to mitigate the effects of GBV and enable economic empowerment. To date, the project has supported around 1,000 survivors with a total of US$400,000, leading to the establishment of at least 878 women-owned enterprises. The Jasiri Fund offers complementary support, including access to justice, psychosocial support, shelters, business grants and case management grants, accompanied by financial training and business development support. Its success led to its scaling up to cover more counties and support more survivors.

  We are also part of the National Gender Based Violence working group, coordinated by the National Gender and Equality Commission and the National Women’s Steering Committee, and of the National Council on the Administration of Justice Working Committee on GBV.

  CREAW served as a co-convener of the Kenya Chapter of the Africa Unite campaign against GBV. We are also members of the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals Group. We contribute to various campaigns such as Gender is My Agenda and globally contribute to the Generation Equality Forum commitments.

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  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CREAW through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram pages, and follow@CREAWKenya and@Wwangechi_leah on Twitter.

• NIGER: ‘France and the USA have displayed imperial attitudes towards poor countries in Africa’

  CIVICUS speaks about Niger’s recent decision to suspend military cooperation with the USA with Dr Boubacar N’Diaye, Emeritus Professor of Pan-African Studies and Political Science at the College of Wooster, international consultant on security sector governance and former chair of the African Security Sector Network, a pan-African think tank focused on security governance issues in the continent, and particularly in West Africa.

  How would you describe Niger’s security situation?

  Niger is located in a very strategic position in the continent – it’s at the heart of West Africa and the Sahel, and shares borders with Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali and Nigeria. This makes it an ideal location for geopolitical powers to have a presence.

  Until recently, Niger was a key security partner of France and the USA. There were French troops in the country, and in 2012, the government signed an agreement with the USA to establish a drone base to conduct surveillance and military operations against terrorism. Between 1,000 to 1,500 US soldiers were deployed under this agreement.

  But despite promises to assist Niger in fighting terrorism, little was done in this regard. Instead, the USA utilised this alliance to carry out surveillance operations in the region in support of its global geopolitical strategy.

  On 26 July 2023, Niger experienced a military coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, with the junta claiming the president’s response to the dire security situation was inadequate. The country has confronted terrorist attacks on military and civilians for quite some time. Yet the crisis extends beyond security to encompass political and social dimensions.

  Following the coup, the junta demanded France and its soldiers leave the country. France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed sanctions on Niger, resulting in power cuts and border closures. No goods or medical supplies were allowed in or out across ECOWAS borders, while terrorist attacks persisted, claiming the lives of Nigerien military personnel. Sanctions were subsequently lifted, but the crisis persisted.

  Why did Niger suspend military cooperation with the USA?

  While France maintained a firm stance against military coups in the region, the USA took a more conciliatory approach. For that, one would have expected General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the junta’s leader, to be more accommodating with the USA.

  While the military leaders were quite grateful for this, they were also irked by the arrival of a US delegation of high-ranking State Department officials who, with a typical imperial attitude, lectured them on democracy and demanded they cut all links with the Russian government. They also accused them of having secret deals with Iran to sell uranium.

  The fact that the USA belittled and showed no respect to Niger led the military junta to revoke the 2012 agreement, which it highlighted was a secret document not endorsed by the public that granted the USA carte blanche to operate in Niger as they pleased.

  In requesting the USA lo leave the country, Niger asserted its rights as a free and sovereign nation. As such, Niger is free to make deals with whichever country it chooses, with neither the USA nor France having the authority to dictate any decision.

  This decision significantly affects the USA’s geostrategic position, as Niger is the only country in West Africa where it has a military presence. If compelled to withdraw entirely, the USA would lose its surveillance capabilities and ability to project power. If the USA wants to stay and seek a new agreement with the junta, it will need to tone down its demands. But if it keeps pressing Niger to cut ties with Russia, it is unlikely to be able to reach a deal.

  Do you see Niger’s decision as part of a broader regional trend?

  Over the past few years, people in other countries in the region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, have shown a desire to reaffirm sovereignty and reject the influence of imperial powers.

  France, as the former colonial power and on behalf of the European Union (EU) and the west, has particularly had a lot of influence in the region. It has conducted military operations, done business and even imposed the CFA franc, the regional currency and a relic of French colonialism in Africa.

  France, and to a lesser extent the USA, have displayed imperial attitudes towards poor countries in Africa. They have completely disregarded their national sovereignty and ignored their need for dignity. They aim to dictate to their people the type of government they should have, the decisions they should make and who they should partner with. This imperial mentality must stop.

  The public, guided by a very active civil society, is happy to see France and the USA being told to leave. They are happy to see Niger behave as a sovereign country that rejects foreign influence, particularly when both countries have done little to nothing to help resolve the insecurity dilemma Niger has faced for a decade.

  How do you understand the growing power of Russia in this context?

  Russia, and to a lesser extent China, are the default partners in the region. Despite their substantial presence and technological capabilities, France, the USA and even the United Nations have not achieved the same level of success as Russia in nations such as the Central African Republic (CAR) or Mali. Russia has been able to stabilise the security situation in the CAR, at least to some extent, and recapture major strategic cities in Mali that have been under rebel control for the last 10 years.

  Countries in the region see an alternative in Russia. This is not rooted in a Cold War mentality but rather in Russia’s longstanding presence in the region, its support for many nations during the early years of independence and its demonstrated effectiveness in combating terrorism.

  What international support does Niger’s civil society need?

  Nigerien civil society needs the solidarity of civil society across the world. Civil society organisations have suffered a lot. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world and has faced months of a severe embargo, sanctions, electricity cuts and medicine shortages. While these measures have been lifted, so has financial assistance from the EU and France, which has exacerbated socioeconomic hardships and security issues.

  The country hasn’t collapsed – as some had hoped – but is undergoing serious socioeconomic hardship and security challenges. The military coup is not to be applauded – it’s a clear sign of political failure. But considering the context, it can be understood. People have accepted that the military are in charge, and now they need all the help and solidarity they can receive.

  The international community should adopt a more empathetic stance towards Niger, supporting the country and its authorities. They should avoid punitive measures such as sanctions, which only harm the public, and refrain from imposing decisions and norms upon the nation.

  Instead, the international community should find a formula to help Nigerien authorities navigate through this complicated context and transition back to a constitutional order, with the active involvement of local civil society.

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  Civic space in Niger is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the African Security Sector Network through itswebsite orFacebook andLinkedIn pages, and follow@ASSN_Africa on Twitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.