xenophobia
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: ‘We are part of a global anti-racist movement’
CIVICUS speaks with Elena Lorac, coordinator of Reconoci.do, an independent and plural civic network made up mainly of young Dominicans of Haitian descent. Reconoci.do defends human rights and promotes the real, full and effective integration of Dominican people of Haitian descent into Dominican society. With a presence throughout the Dominican Republic, Reconoci.do upholds the vision of a multicultural country where diverse people coexist with dignity, without stigma or discrimination, and their fundamental rights are respected by society and protected by the state.
When and why was Reconoci.do founded, and what are the organisation's goals?
Reconoci.do is a movement of Dominicans of Haitian descent, mostly young, fighting for our right to nationality and for access to all the rights that derive from this belonging: civil, political and social rights, and rights as basic as the right to work, to housing, to education and health, which are systematically denied to us.
Our movement was formed in late November 2011, in reaction to a resolution by the Central Electoral Board that suspended “temporarily” the validity of our birth certificates and identity papers, that is, in a context in which, instead of seeing progress in the recognition of our rights, setbacks were taking place and historical exclusion was being institutionalised
Until 2010, the Constitution of the Dominican Republic recognised as nationals all persons born in the country’s territory, with the exception of diplomats and persons considered to be ‘in transit’, an expression that in principle referred only to those who had been in the country for a few days. For eight decades, under these definitions, the state provided a Dominican birth certificate, identity card and passport to the children of Haitians born in the country. However, in the 1990s nationalist groups began to promote a restrictive interpretation that was eventually translated into a new Migration Law. Under this law, passed in 2004, temporary foreign workers and undocumented migrant workers were classed as foreigners ‘in transit’, meaning that their children would no longer have access to Dominican nationality because of having been born in the country. The Central Electoral Board, the body that manages the civil registry, began to apply this law retroactively, and in 2007 it institutionalised this practice through two administrative decisions that prevented the issuance or renewal of identity documents to children born in the Dominican Republic of Haitian immigrants who were in an irregular migratory situation. In 2010, the new constitution denied the automatic right to nationality to children born in the country to immigrant parents in an irregular situation. Finally, in September 2013, ruling 168-13 of the Constitutional Court established that people born in the country whose parents had been undocumented had never had the right to Dominican nationality. The ruling was applied retroactively to all people born between 1929 and 2007, effectively stripping four generations of their Dominican nationality, mostly people of Haitian descent, who for eight decades had been registered as Dominican.
These legal changes institutionalised a historical exclusion that was perpetuated by policies of hatred, racism and xenophobia promoted by nationalist groups. From the dominant perspective, everything that comes from Haiti is foreign, alien and impossible to assimilate. Thus, people like me, born in the Dominican Republic to Haitian parents, are treated as foreigners. Because we were born in the Dominican Republic, the Haitian state does not consider us Haitians either. And in any case, we are talking about people who may have never been to Haiti, who have grown up here and speak Spanish; many younger people in fact don’t speak any Creole at all. Lack of recognition is excruciatingly painful.
To resolve the situation created by the Constitutional Court, and in response to domestic and international advocacy efforts, in 2014 Law 169-14, the Special Naturalisation Law, was passed. This law established a special regime for people considered “descendants of foreigners in irregular migratory status,” based on the distinction between two groups. For members of ‘Group A’, which included those who in the past had been registered in the Dominican civil registry, the law recognised their Dominican nationality and ordered the Central Electoral Board to hand over or return their identity documents. On the other hand, those in ‘Group B’, who, although having been born in the country, having always lived there and maintaining no link with their parents’ country of origin, had never been registered, were given a period of 90 days to register as foreigners, with the possibility of obtaining Dominican nationality through naturalisation within a period of two years. This distinction is completely arbitrary, and it is common to find families with siblings belonging to either group, as well as families that, having registered their children, lost their papers as a result of some natural disaster and could not initiate the naturalisation process due to economic hardship, being located far away from administrative offices and unable to pay the fees that the process involved. Only a few thousand people in Group B have managed to achieve nationality in this way. There are currently some 133,000 young people who are stateless.
I have obtained my identity card as a result of Law 169-14; it was given to me when I was 27 years old. My years of personal development and education and the early years of my productive life were cut short because I did not have an ID and therefore could not attend university. Several of my fellow activists are in the same situation. Some have been able to advance through college and even graduate, while others were not so lucky.
Have you brought the issue of Dominicans of Haitian descent to the attention of regional or international human rights forums?
For decades the international community and domestic civil society have been advocating at both the national and international levels, to denounce abuse, discrimination and structural racism in the Dominican Republic.
Jointly with other civil society organisations (CSOs), we work assiduously within the inter-American system, for example participating in hearings of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). In 2014, the IACHR granted precautionary measures to members of our movement who had been threatened or attacked. Also in 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a ruling that forced the state to give us our nationality back. But the Constitutional Court did not recognse this ruling. The Dominican state does not abide by the decisions of the Court.
The state does not recognise that there is a problem to be solved. Today our struggle is much more complex than it was at the beginning because now there is a feeling that the situation has been resolved, but it has not. The vast majority of young people in this situation come from bateyes, which are ghettos or communities that were established during the time of sugarcane production around the end of the 19th century, when the Dominican Republic and Haiti reached an agreement to bring Haitian braceros to work in the country. These people, sometimes by deception and even by force, were taken directly to the bateyes, small villages located in the vicinity of sugarcane plantations. Young people who come from these places, which are located far from the cities, are in a very vulnerable situation. The vast majority have nothing; we are talking about families who have not had legal documents for generations, and without papers they cannot study or work. Those of us who manage to finish high school and intend to go to university usually encounter what I experienced: it was when I decided that I would go to university that I found out that, although I did have my birth certificate, I did not qualify because I was the daughter of Haitian parents. This was a huge blow for me, and it is just the same for tens of thousands of young people. You are suddenly told that you do not exist, and this entails enormous psychological trauma. The state blames our parents or grandparents, when in fact it was the state that brought them to work in sugar production – but given that the industry no longer exists, they want us to disappear as well.
These injustices block our prospects. They leave us without a future. That is why our movement arose from places like this.
What were the implications of this situation in the context of the health crisis caused by COVID-19?
The lack of recognition of something as basic as nationality creates enormous difficulties in accessing other basic rights such as health and social aid. The pandemic has magnified the difficulties faced by these vulnerable populations, confined in bateyes where there is no production or work. Many of these young people are chiriperos, that is, day workers, employed sporadically to do whatever is available, and the pandemic left them with nothing. They do not have access to any of the social aid programmes developed to alleviate the effects of the pandemic because they do not have IDs and do not appear in government records.
To what extent is the situation faced by people of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic the result of racism?
This situation is the result of structural racism from beginning to end. The problem of access to nationality in the Dominican Republic has exclusively affected people whose parents or grandparents came from Haiti; this is not a general problem for foreigners. It is a reflection of structural racism because it is the Dominican people of Haitian descent, or those who are perceived as such due to the colour of their skin, who experience this violation of their human rights. This was recognised by the IACHR after a visit to the country, when it confirmed that it had not received any complaint from a descendant of non-Haitian foreigners who had experienced difficulties in being recognised as nationals, getting registered in the civil registry or receiving identity papers.
In the Dominican Republic it is believed that all blacks are Haitians. If I am black and have curly hair I am constantly questioned even if I have identity papers, and if I am unable to produce an ID, I can be deported because I am assumed to be Haitian. There have been cases of black Dominicans who have been deported because of their skin colour. Dominican women of Haitian descent who do not have papers and go to a hospital to give birth are treated as foreigners, fuelling the myth that Haitian women are occupying all beds in our hospitals, when most of these women are not Haitians but Dominican black women of Haitian descent.
Dominicans are a black population that does not see itself as such. There is obviously a problem of systemic, state-sanctioned, and unrecognised racism.
Thus, with the passing of time, as a movement we realised that the problem of nationality that mobilised us in the first place was not just a problem of papers, IDs and registry records, but also and more deeply a problem of identity and racial discrimination that goes back to the historical context of our ancestors.
We are therefore a movement that not only fights for the recognition of nationality and the rights of Dominicans of Haitian descent, but also shares the struggles of all anti-racist movements and mobilises against all forms of discrimination. This is why we stand in solidarity and support all kinds of expressions seeking to guarantee the rights of women, of sexual minorities and of all minorities who are stigmatised and discriminated against.
How did the US Black Lives Matter protests following the murder of George Floyd resonate in the Dominican Republic?
In reaction to events in the USA, we joined other CSOs to organise a commemoration. It was not strictly a protest demonstration, as restrictions on public gatherings had been imposed in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and we respected the mandated quarantine. And it was not only a demonstration of solidarity either, as George Floyd’s death had resonated in our context, where we have experienced similar situations of police abuse.
Along with other CSOs we organised an activity in memory of George Floyd. The idea was to make a ritual gesture, a collective wreath. Our convening slogan was ‘A Flower for Floyd’, and it was a call for each person to bring, whenever possible, a flower and place it as part of the offering. Our account of Floyd’s death also made reference to police and institutional violence many black people, both migrants and Dominicans, experience in the Dominican Republic, so as to highlight that this is a situation we are also going through.
Have you received threats or experience aggression from anti-rights movements?
There are several ultra-nationalist groups that are mobilising in reaction to our demonstrations and events, basically to intimidate us and boycott our activities. Ever since the Constitutional Court ruling was issued, the climate has become more favourable for hate speech and numerous acts of hostility against us have taken place. Many members of our movement and other organisations that fight for the rights of Dominicans of Haitian descent have been subjected to attacks, both verbal and physical, which have been reflected in numerous human rights reports. As a result, in some cases we have had to request IACHR protective measures for some colleagues. Even Dominican people who are not of Haitian descent but express solidarity with us are treated as traitors to the homeland. These expressions have become more common because they have not been firmly condemned by the authorities.
Every time we demonstrate on the issue of nationality and racism, there are always counter-demonstrations, and since the police never protect us, these groups generally prevail and we are forced to suspend or terminate our activities. This was the case with the event we planned to honour George Floyd.
Since the moment we announced the Flower for Floyd event, several ultra-nationalist groups threatened us through our Facebook page. They accused us of wanting to generate violence and of boycotting the country by bringing up issues that are not of its concern. We received such levels of threats that many people thought that we would not be able to carry out the activity. Days before the event, the leader of one of these anti-rights groups, Antigua Orden Dominicana, threatened us through a video in which he warned that if we carried it out there would be bloodshed, since the event would take place in Independence Park, dedicated to the Fathers of the Nation, which they would not allow.
On the day of commemoration, 9 June, these groups were present. It was not the first time that this happened. In 2017, during an activity that we carry out every year to mark the anniversary of ruling 168-13, they also showed up and a similar situation ensued.
On 9 June, these groups came to attack the activists that were taking part in the event, and when the police finally intervened it was to detain our fellow activists Ana María Belique and Maribel Núñez, along with another person who was participating in the event. Every time we hold a protest related to the issue of nationality and racism, the state comes in and represses us.
What kind of support would you need from international civil society and the global anti-racist movement?
We consider ourselves part of a global movement. Many times we have been told that the Black Lives Matter movement was caused by something that happened in the USA and that it was not our concern; however, as vulnerable and stigmatised people we understand that this is an issue that directly affects us and that we must address.
What we need is more support to disseminate information about the current situation in our country. The state has been consistently telling the world that there are no stateless people here, that there is no racism or xenophobia, that everything we say is a lie and that we are on the payroll of international CSOs who want to harm the country. What we seek is visibility and help to denounce the terrible realities experienced by Dominicans of Haitian descent. We do not have enough resources to publicise our cause, and international solidarity is what allows us to carry out our struggles and make them known worldwide.
International support is one of the things that has helped us get ahead. We have had support from groups of the Dominican diaspora in New York. One of them, We Are All Dominican, has supported us since 2013. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, they helped us ensure food and other basic needs for more than 250 families for three months. All support is welcome, whether it be expressions of solidarity, contributions to dissemination or protection for human rights defenders.
Civic space in the Dominican Republic is rated as ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Reconoci.do through theirwebsite orFacebook page, and follow@reconoci_do and@juagemis on Twitter. -
Five human rights trends in South Africa
Photo by Sharon Seretlo/Gallo Images via Getty Images
By Mawethu Nkosana, LGBTQI+ Advocacy and Campaigns Lead at CIVICUS & Safia Khan, Innovation and Communications Officer at CIVICUS
From the rise in student activism to the rise in levels of xenophobia in South Africa, Mawethu and Safia list five human rights trends since COVID-19 took over.
Read on The Daily Vox
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PORTUGAL: ‘The rise of the populist right only further weakens trust in the political system’
CIVICUS speaks about early elections taking place in Portugal on 10 March with Ana Carmo from Akto, a Portuguese civil society organisation that promotes human rights and democratic values through advocacy, campaigning and education.
What are the main issues the new government will have to deal with, and how are candidates proposing to address them?
The most pressing issues that should be addressed by the new government and have been central to election debates are housing, health, pensions, education, immigration and the climate crisis. There are several other issues that are also on the agenda and should be addressed, including some related to the police and the justice system.
These are issues that allow for very different answers depending on where you are on the ideological spectrum. The more left-wing parties propose measures that require greater state intervention and public investment, while those towards the right present proposals that benefit the private sector and investors, and require less state intervention, arguing this will lead to economic growth and subsequently greater wellbeing.
Portuguese politics tend to revolve around two parties, the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), both close to the centre. In this campaign, Pedro Nuno Santos, head of the PS ticket, has put forward proposals that are further to the left than usual for the PS, while Luís Montenegro, who leads the ticket of the Democratic Alliance (AD), a coalition led by the PSD, has followed his party’s usual ideological line.
What’s more, the PS is wearing out, perhaps due to its eight consecutive years in power, while the PSD, instead of preparing to succeed it, is also getting weaker. Instead, more radical right-wing parties are growing, notably Chega, identified as a ‘catch-all’ party, ideologically amorphous, populist and opportunistic, which adapts its discourse to whatever allows it to win the most votes.
A climate of discontent, frustration and perhaps revolt has led more and more people to vote for Chega as a form of protest. However, the growth of a party like Chega only further weakens trust in the political system.
Have disinformation or hate speech been a problem during the campaign?
There have been problems with disinformation, particularly spread by Chega, whose discourse is not based on facts. That’s why we often hear false statements or fallacious ideas coming from its leader and members of parliament. Chega has been running an anti-immigration campaign that appears to have instigated hate speech and expressions of xenophobia within society. On 3 February, a far-right march against the ‘Islamisation of Europe‘ took place in Lisbon’s Martim Moniz neighbourhood, an area known for its multicultural diversity. The march was banned by Lisbon City Council and the courts for its content and the danger it posed to citizens. Nevertheless, people still took to the streets.
Some media and the other political parties are making an effort to challenge fallacies about immigration, emphasising that the truth is that Portugal is a country of emigrants. They also highlight positive facts about immigrants, such as their great contribution to Portuguese social security, which allows pensions to be paid. It is a very strong argument in favour of immigration.
During its campaign, Chega also made the absurd and impactful proposal to ‘end support for gender equality’. This statement once again needed a deconstruction and fact-checking effort by the media and forced the other political parties to take a stand.
With the increasing spread of ‘fake news’, Portuguese media have set up fact-checking programmes to help counter the trend and maintain journalistic rigour. However, disinformation campaigns are more difficult to combat on social media, where Chega has succeeded in meddling. Because of this, polls point to a significant percentage of young people potentially voting for this populist party that jeopardises our fundamental rights.
To encourage debate about ideas, Portuguese media joined forces to organise political debates between the leaders of all parties represented in parliament, as they did in 2015. In the version implemented this year, candidates debate each other for around 25 minutes and these debates are broadcast and commented on in various news channels. This allows civil society to be better informed about their choices and people have shown interest, because debates have received top ratings.
What do you think the result of the elections could be?
Since the resignation of Prime Minister António Costa in November 2023 due to a corruption investigation that implicated him in influence peddling, corruption and malfeasance in energy projects, the political landscape has become increasingly unpredictable.
First, as he was elected PS leader, Nuno Santos was viewed as Costa’s unequivocal successor as prime minister, due to his charisma as well as the fact that his party had an absolute majority. Montenegro, in comparison, is not a charismatic leader and has had a career of setbacks. The PSD has been losing strength to more radical and populist parties such as Chega and Liberal Initiative, which is not seen so much as a populist party and still has space on the spectrum of the political right. The PSD doesn’t want to ally itself with Chega, and Liberal Initiative rejected a coalition with the PSD, causing it to ally with the CDS-Popular Party and the Monarchist Party.
By entering a coalition with two parties without parliamentary seats, the PSD resurrected a 1979 solution in an attempt to confront the PS’s absolute majority. But even so, it didn’t initially gain the ground it wanted.
The left has also lost relevance: the Left Bloc currently has five parliamentary seats, the Portuguese Communist Party has six and Livre has one.
In the presence of a left that some commentators describe as ‘asleep’, a one-party centre bloc and a right without an assertive leader, Chega is the only party flourishing.
In late 2023, opinion polls pointed to a new PS majority, but since the formation of the AD coalition, some polls suggest a potential AD victory. At the moment, there is great uncertainty and the large number of undecided voters will potentially decide the country’s direction. Every time there is a new electoral debate, new trends emerge. In the last debates he took part in, Nuno Santos called for a ‘useful vote’ in fear of a victory for AD and the right.
What are your expectations for the post-election period?
Depending on which party wins, the majority it gets, the coalitions that are formed and the number of seats that the opposing parties manage to obtain, there are various possible scenarios.
These legislative elections could lead to Portugal joining the trend we’ve been seeing across Europe with far-right and populist parties entering government, or they could lead to Portugal standing out with a more socialist and left-wing government. And even these two scenarios are reductive, because the outcome will also depend on the composition of the parliamentary opposition, which is so important for the proper functioning of our democracy.
Civic space in Portugal is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Akto through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Akto_org on Twitter.
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PORTUGAL: ‘These elections have reminded us that democracies are fragile and imperfect’
CIVICUS speaks about the results of Portugal’s 10 Marchelectionwith Ana Carmo ofAkto, a Portuguese civil society organisation that promotes human rightsand democratic values through advocacy,campaigning and education.
What were the key election campaign themes and the main parties’ proposals?
Parties’ campaigns for the 10 March election focused on issues such as housing, health, economic growth, education, social protection – particularly pensions – and the fight against corruption. During debates, other issues were also addressed, such as negotiations with the police – who held some protests and covertly threatened to boycott the election, the formation of coalitions, an issue that arose based on polling data, and the country’s governability.
This election campaign was very atypical and perhaps because of this, equal attention was given to all parties with parliamentary representation, something unusual in Portugal, where competition has been mostly bipartisan, between the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Discussion of political coalitions forced us to think about politics in ideological terms, with major contenders placed on the left, right and far right.
The contest for the prime minister position was between Pedro Nuno Santos of the PS and Luís Montenegro of the PSD as part of the Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition. Nuno Santos’ main proposals placed him as the continuation of the incumbent government with a focus on strengthening public investment on all of the campaign’s focus areas. His strategies to deal with the key issues included negotiation, strengthening institutions and greater public investment in public policy. Luís Montenegro, in comparison, centred his campaign on strengthening and stimulating the private sector, establishing public-private partnerships and reducing personal income tax and corporate income tax rates to encourage investment.
It’s important to note that the campaign saw little discussion of proposals or in-depth analysis of political programmes. The pitch-style debates didn’t take us beyond the headlines, creating some confusion as it was hard to tell the political programmes of the different parties apart. Following the debates, the over-abundance of commentary on all TV channels, each with its own bias, also contributed to the confusion of ideas. Even so, and contrary to what was expected due to the presence of a populist party, the debates and the other parties’ campaigns managed to maintain a good level of cordiality and political seriousness.
What led to the AD and PS winning almost the same number of seats?
The wear and tear of the PS government became very apparent during the campaign. Despite Nuno Santos’ great effort to disassociate from former Prime Minister António Costa and present himself as the party’s new face, many people were unhappy and didn’t trust the PS.
According to polls, the number of undecided voters increased as election day approached. The media’s excessive and sensationalised coverage may have contributed to this. With so many people undecided, confused and saturated, an expression of a desire for change was to be expected.
However, it’s important to remember thattwo years ago the PS won an absolute majority in an election that came about because the Left Bloc rejected the state budget. But it subsequently failed to satisfy people’s major needs, and for the second time its government fell, leading to elections. Nuno Santos’ political ability and perceptions of him, the other parties’ campaigns, leaning mainly towards the right, the influence of mainstream and social media and the European and international context all contributed to a paradigm shift. The fact that, as a result, the PS went from 120 parliamentary seats to around 76 has far-reaching implications.
What are the consequences of this tie?
As a result of the technical tie between the AD and PS, the climate of uncertainty that dominated the campaign continues. If parties are faithful and uncompromising with their positions and their word, it’s very likely that there will be another election in November because the state budget won’t get approved. If this happens, another highly likely scenario is that the far-right Chega party will continue to gain ground and further strengthen its position in parliament.
So this is a critical moment and a window of opportunity for Portuguese democracy to prove its strength – or weakness. Will political parties be able to engage in dialogue for the sake of political stability? What will their approach be to dealing with a populist party that has become a solid third political force? Will the centre bloc be maintained?
If these elections have reminded us of anything, it is that democracies are fragile and imperfect. We’ll see what capacity we have to adapt to democracy’s new contours.
How worrying do you find Chega’s performance?
Chega’s performance has been similar to that of its counterparts in other countries: Donald Trump’s Republican Party, Jair Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and Matteo Salvini’s Northern League. Its growth is not surprising – it’s even predictable. This is a party that feeds on fear, disinformation and revolt, and follows thegrowth of similar parties across Europe. Its tactics are no different from those used by other far-right parties.
Chega attracts historical revanchists, xenophobes and racists, the angry and the disaffected. The Algarve region, a district won by Chega, is an example of a region that resents the way it’s been treated by successive governments. This is a region that’s very much affected by seasonal changes and experiences constant failures in dam management, leading to water shortages. Its feeling of being abandoned may explain the election result.
The growth of a populist party is always worrying, as history can attest. It’s all the more concerning given that Portuguese democracy is still young. Just as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the 25 April Carnation Revolution when our democracy was born, we are faced with narratives and behaviours that go against the principles of our democracy and our rights and freedoms. The growth of a far-right party is particularly concerning when it comes to the most excluded people: women, the lower and lower-middle classes and young people. That’s why the majority of its voters are male.
How did civil society engage with the elections and how has it reacted to the results?
Despite the high percentage of undecided voters, abstention appeared to decrease. Abstention has always been a concern, hovering around 40 per cent, but historic figures are not accurate due to the unusual number of non-habitual residents and newly registered voters. In these parliamentary elections, abstention was around 34 per cent, but turnout wasn’t up significantly from previous years.
Until the new government takes office, it’s difficult to gauge civil society’s reaction to the election results. There is indeed great concern about the growth of the far right, but if these were protest votes, to what extent can we deduce that voters are satisfied with the result? There is a desire for change, but we don’t know if the desired change will materialise.
When will a new government be formed, and what role might Chega play in it?
It’s not certain there will be a coalition government. Montenegro repeated several times during and after the campaign that he will not enter into a coalition with Chega, and for the PS it doesn’t pay to form a coalition with left-wing parties, as the number of right-wing MPs remains higher or the same. Chega has said on a number of occasions that it would never enter into a coalition, but we are talking about a party that says everything and its opposite, and after the elections it has been pushing for a coalition with AD and says it’s willing to govern together.
Chega’s role will depend more on how the other parties deal with its existence than on its own actions. The other parties have created a firewall around Chega, which has ended up strengthening its presence, and they have shown there’s no desire for this party to be part of a political solution. The PS is focused on being the leader of the opposition. Whether it succeeds in doing so and how effectively will determine the Portuguese political scene.
Would a government that includes the far right pose a real danger to fundamental rights and freedoms?
It depends on how it is included and with what intentions. If AD coalesced with Chega and adopted its ideological line, there would be a real risk.
It’s not desirable for there to be a reactionary force with racist, xenophobic, sexist and revanchist discourse in parliament, but there are ways to mitigate this. Portugal lived through 41 years of dictatorship and has been a democracy for 50 years. It is because of the nature of our past dictatorship experience that our constitution forbids fascist parties and recalls the overthrow of the fascist regime in its preamble.
Portuguese political history shows that there has been more progress in guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms with left-wing socialist governments in power than with right-wing social democratic governments.
When we consider the speeches and proposals of the far right, fundamental rights and freedoms are called into question. However, as a democratic country, there is room for a party like this to exist, just as there are many other parties in opposition that are fiercely in favour of extending these fundamental rights and freedoms. It is up to democracy to demonstrate that it defends these rights and freedoms.
Civic space in Portugal is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Akto through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Akto_org on Twitter.
