inflation

• ARGENTINA: ‘Milei’s victory expresses the rejection of the previous governments’

  CIVICUS speaks with Yanina Welp, researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, about the results of Argentina’s runoff presidential election, won by a far-right outsider.

  How do you explain the victory of Javier Milei, an outsider with no party structure?

  Milei’s victory, like that of any other candidate, cannot be explained by a single reason. There are at least three main explanations for his victory.

  First, there’s the economic situation. On top of a high level of poverty – 40 per cent and growing – Argentina has very high inflation, and the economy hasn’t grown for many years. And the same goes for formal employment. There are a lot of informal workers and many people experience high levels of uncertainty.

  Second is the inability of the political class to respond to these demands. Most recently, those in power have acted arrogantly. Insecurity, corruption scandals and the passivity of the authorities in the face of all these have increased. Milei’s leadership came to embody people’s rejection of the situation. Many people voted for him because he expresses well the rejection of recent administrations, and not necessarily because they approve of or adhere to the policies he has proposed to implement.

  Third, there’s the role of political leadership, and specifically of the incumbent, for doing nothing in the face of this threat and even encouraging Milei’s candidacy with the aim of dividing the opposition’s vote and therefore having a better chance at winning. This was done first by Peronists, in the run-up to the first round, and by former president Mauricio Macri ahead of the runoff, which put his Together for Change coalition in crisis.

  Do you think the electorate has leaned to the right?

  Unlike almost all the other candidates, who only had vague and general proposals, Milei ran on a strongly ideological platform, which he kept putting forward throughout the campaign.

  However, when analysing people’s attitudes, there are contradictions, first and foremost because there is no universal notion of what is supposed to be ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’. For instance, polls show growing concern about rising insecurity, and it would be very elitist to think that having this concern makes you right-wing. The rise in crime shows that it is a real concern.

  It is true that in this election campaign positive perceptions of the private sector have increased compared to perceptions of the public administration, possibly as a result of Milei’s discourse but also because the image of the state has deteriorated considerably under recent administrations. In this sense, it could be said that voters have indeed moved towards the right. But Milei’s victory with almost 56 per cent of the vote shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that more than half of the electorate have ideologically leaned rightwards, or even embraced the radical right, because many voted for him because he embodies the reaction to the status quo rather than because of his ideological proposals.

  During the campaign it was argued that democracy was at stake. Is Argentina’s democracy in danger?

  Democracy is not in imminent danger, as was the case with military coups, which wiped democracy away overnight. There are signs of democratic erosion – but these have been there for years. There has been both progress and setbacks, including attempts to co-opt the judiciary, the misuse of state resources and clientelistic practices.

  Generally speaking, Argentina’s democratic institutions work. Despite the opposition’s complaints about the electoral system, the elections took place normally and the results were out very quickly.

  However, we have seen a huge setback in terms of public debate. Intolerance and verbal violence have increased. Supporters of different parties can hardly talk to each other. There is a lot of aggression on social media. These are all medium-intensity warning signs that, if not addressed, will only pave the way for more violence and authoritarianism.

  How will Argentina’s political scene change following this election?

  Since 2003, with Néstor Kirchner’s election to the presidency, a system of two broad coalitions formed, which since 2007, under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, has been maintained by the introduction of open, simultaneous and compulsory primary elections. These served to avoid party fragmentation but had the negative effect of eroding programmatic or ideological differences. The two coalitions that formed as a result included their own right and left wings, blurring the ideological debate and replacing it with a divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism. This ended up encouraging affective polarisation with very watertight alignments where it is increasingly difficult to find common ground.

  The fact that the presidential elections were won by a party that until a couple of years ago did not exist will force the two big coalitions of recent decades, the Peronist ruling party and the opposition Together for Change, to profoundly reconfigure themselves.

  Within Peronism, former president and current vice-president Cristina Kirchner was the big loser of this election. In recent times she has been absent from the political scene, leaving Peronism without clear leadership. Peronism has strong roots in trade unions and social organisations that are highly dependent on the state. These organisations have incentives to negotiate, should the new government open up that space. However, Milei’s initial discourse has pointed in a completely different direction, insisting that he will take shock measures.

  What are the main challenges the new government will face?

  The new government should tackle three major challenges. The first is to stabilise the economy by stopping inflation and putting the exchange rate in order. The second is to introduce reforms to increase productivity and solve the crisis in formal employment. And the third is governance. Argentina has very strong social organisations, which has both positive and negative aspects, but in any case, it is a strongly organised society that is very predisposed to conflict.

  These three challenges must be tackled in a coordinated and consistent way, which is quite difficult.

  Do you think Milei’s government will be able to tackle them?

  I have serious doubts that the new government will be able to meet these challenges, not only in the area of stabilisation and structural reforms, but also and above all in the area of governance. Many of the proposed measures, such as adopting the US dollar as the currency, could be found unconstitutional. Other measures require legislative majorities that the new government won’t have. Its only prospect of obtaining substantial legislative support was through Together for Change, but the division of the opposition coalition leaves Milei without even a congressional quorum.

  Milei has not one provincial governorship and almost no mayorships. However, Argentina’s sub-national powerholders have always been accommodating and pragmatic. Still, some key measures would go directly against the interests of the provinces, such as the elimination of co-participation, the system through which the federal state distributes public resources from national taxes to the provinces. And then there is the potential confrontation with the province of Buenos Aires.

  Milei could try to rule by decree, but this would cause an instant crisis, and in case of an impeachment trial the vice-president, Victoria Villarruel, would take over. This would not ensure any positive change but would rather imply some additional negative elements.

  Milei was elected with a very large majority, so he has great popular legitimacy. But this majority could be inflated, as is often the case in runoffs, and is compounded by the volatility and impatience of a large part of Argentina’s electorate. If he succeeds in implementing his ultra-liberal programme, a global rarity, the social costs will be extremely high. And if he fails to do so, people’s disenchantment with politics could increase and their support for democracy could be called into question.

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   Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Yanina Welp via herwebsite and follow@Welpita on Twitter.

• ARGENTINA: ‘The state is abandoning its role as guarantor of access to rights’

  CIVICUS discusses the deterioration of civic space and human rights under Argentina’s current government with Vanina Escales and Manuel Tufró of the Centre for Legal and Social Studies (CELS). Founded under dictatorship in 1979, CELS promotes the protection and effective exercise of human rights, justice and social inclusion, nationally and internationally.

  Since its inauguration in December 2023, thegovernment of Javier Milei, a self-proclaimed ‘anarcho-capitalist’ who allied with culturally conservative groups, has promoted policies of economic deregulation, the reduction of the state and social spending cuts, resulting in increased unemployment and poverty. It has adopted a restrictive and repressive approach towards protests against these policies, denigrating journalism and anyone who expresses critical opinions. In the face of these restrictions on civic space and human rights, civil society is seeking international visibility and solidarity and pursuing strategic litigation.

  How would you describe Milei´s government?

  This is the first libertarian -- or anarcho-capitalist, as Milei describes it – government we’ve had in Argentina. Its rise is part of an international trend towards the erosion of democracies as a result of policies of market extremism and the advance of the far right. Like other expressions of the far right in Europe or the USA, it is characterised by brutalism and a recourse to authoritarianism to deal with social conflict. At times it also shows features such as historical denialism and regressive values about gender roles and the rights of sexual, gender and racial minorities. But it also has some peculiar aspects: unlike its counterparts in the global north, its xenophobic nationalism hasn’t targeted immigrants but Indigenous peoples instead.

  In the economic sphere, the libertarian agenda has manifested itself in the liberalisation of prices, leading to high levels of inflation and thus to a brutal transfer of income from the middle and poorer classes to the richest.

  As far as social policy is concerned, the government has tended to leave in place only policies of direct income transfers to individuals, meagre subsidies or social aid such as the Universal Child Allowance, which alone cannot mitigate the effects of the recession or counteract the impacts of the withdrawal of the state. This withdrawal can be seen in the lack of food and medical supplies and the closure of and disinvestment from community spaces and social policies. The state has withdrawn from its role as guarantor of access to basic services.

  The stated aim is to weaken controls on businesses, particularly foreign ones, in order to attract investment. Deregulation has a direct impact on the environment, as it ignores the rights of Indigenous peoples and peasant communities over the territories where companies want to set up. Companies receive privileges while the country is deprived of its natural resources.

  Some reforms were imposed by decree and others by an omnibus bill called the Basic Law, which was passed by Congress after much debate and amendment.

  How is the government reconciling libertarianism with cultural conservatism?

  There is a tension within the government between neo-liberalists who promote market deregulation, economic liberalisation and changes in labour policies, and the equally authoritarian but conservative voices that defend the last military dictatorship, state terrorism and state violence, and attack emancipatory movements such as feminism and its egalitarian gains.

  On this terrain, the government is fighting a cultural as well as a material battle. Verbal attacks go hand in hand with the dismantling of gender policies. For example, the government dissolved the Ministry of Women, Gender and Diversity and then dismantled all policies against gender violence. Officials have also spoken out strongly against abortion and sexual and reproductive rights in general.

  As part of the dismantling of state structures, programmes aimed at preventing teenage pregnancy and care, health and early childhood policies are being dismantled. Our monitoring of care policies has shown that only seven out of 43 are still in force. The state is abandoning its role as mediator and guarantor of access to rights.

  In addition, at the international level, the government is challenging commitments made by the state through international treaties, which in Argentina have constitutional priority, enshrined in legislation. At the recent General Assembly of the Organisation of American States (OAS), for example, the government demanded that any mention of climate change, gender and LGBTQI+ people be removed from the final documents. We believe that the OAS, the United Nations and their human rights mechanisms should closely monitor the Argentine government’s actions.

  How have these processes affected civic space?

  The quality of civic space has been severely compromised. Protests are now treated as crimes. These basic practices in any democracy are presented as, at best, obstacles to traffic and, at worst, seditious activities aimed at overthrowing the government.

  This is reflected in blatantly unconstitutional norms such as Resolution 943/2023 of the Ministry of Security, known as the ‘anti-picketing protocol’, which states that any assembly that disrupts traffic in cities or on roads is a flagrant crime and authorises direct police intervention, without the need for a court order, to disperse it and investigate protesters.

  This resolution authorises the deployment of large numbers of security forces at every protest, often using abusive and indiscriminate ‘less lethal’ weapons such as rubber bullets and teargas, as well as physical violence and arbitrary arrests. We have documented at least 80 such arrests in recent months. Protesters have been released because the government has no evidence to prosecute them. But as a result of these tactics, many demonstrations are broken up or do not take place at all.

  In the past six months, at least 47 journalists have been injured in protests. Many more have been harassed on social media and criminally prosecuted for anti-government statements.

  The government has dismantled the public media to the point where we have no way of knowing what is happening in different parts of the country, unless something comes to the attention of private media and international correspondents and they decide to cover it. In Argentina today, the right to generate information and be informed by a plurality of voices is being violated.

  How is civil society organising to resist these restrictions?

  Civil society organisations have filed several precautionary measures ahead of protests to protect the right to peaceful assembly. But the judiciary has not accepted them, arguing that there is no a priori risk, but rather that it is necessary to assess how a demonstration unfolds. The judiciary also has a very weak role in controlling arbitrary arrests and assessing excessive police violence.

  Since the judicial route is not bearing fruit, it’s time to resort to international mechanisms for the protection of human rights, something CELS has done many times throughout its history, since it was born under the dictatorship. We are working to provide information on the human rights violations taking place in Argentina.

  On 11 July we took part in a hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The state was present, but only reaffirmed its position in favour of the criminalisation of social protest, justifying it as a mechanism to deal with sedition and attempts at destabilisation. The government was evasive and did not answer questions such as what protocols were in place to control the use of less lethal weapons, or why a regulation to control police action in public demonstrations had been repealed.

  We are also compiling a register of physical and digital attacks from non-state sources, particularly from parts of the radicalised right. Thanks to our work with the political research team at Crisis magazine, we have already registered around 280 cases of offline harassment on the Radar portal, and we are beginning to register online attacks, including the leaking of personal data that could lead to physical attacks.

  Today, more than ever, it is necessary to organise in national and international networks to carry out information and denunciation campaigns with a collective voice. If we wait for the total destruction of rights to raise our voices, it will be too late.

  Civic space in Argentina is rated as ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CELS through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@CELS_Argentina and@vaninaescales on Twitter.

• GERMANY: ‘The rise of the far right will make things more difficult, but the EU will remain functional – for now’

  CIVICUS speaks with Andreas Müller, Executive Director of Democracy International, about the European Parliament elections and his expectations for the results in Germany.

  Democracy International is a German civil society organisation working to strengthen civic participation and direct democracy. Its goals are to give people a direct say in political decision-making and to make governments more accountable.

  What’s at stake in the European Parliament elections? 

  In 2024, more people around the world will participate in elections than ever before, setting the political course for years to come. At the same time, we are experiencing the biggest global crisis of security and democracy in decades. The number of democracies worldwide has reached a new low since 1985 and authoritarian regimes are on the rise. The human rights situation in many countries is appalling. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and China’s threats against Taiwan also threaten global peace and security.

  In this context, the 2024 European Parliamentelections are of particular importance. The European Union (EU) is facing immense challenges as a peace project. The security challenge of Russia’s war on Ukraine influences the thematic focus of the elections. The rise of nationalist, right-wing parties in many European countries and accusations that the EU is too bureaucratic, undemocratic and out of touch with people are putting the EU under great pressure.

  Right-wing nationalist parties are exploiting these challenges by offering populist, seemingly simple solutions to these complex crises and fuelling the narrative that the EU is the cause of these problems. Debates aboutrising inflation and economic insecurity, globalisation, immigration and asylum policy are deliberately confused through disinformation in all channels, leading to uncertainty about the EU’s ability to act. As a result, right-wing parties that are critical and hostile of the EU are likely to secure close to a quarter of European Parliament seats.

  This is paradoxical, given that these challenges can only be met with a functioning EU. Strong, progressive legislation is needed to address climate, security and democracy crises. However, the expected rise of right-wing, nationalist parties is likely to lead to more blockages and delays, threatening the functioning of European democracy and the rule of law.

  The main task of all democratic parties in the European Parliament in the next legislative period will be to counter this development. Large civil society alliances and parties are urging people to vote against this trend. Following the reversal of the negative trend in voter turnout in 2019, efforts are being made to achieve at least 50 per cent turnout across the EU.

  What are the likely outcomes in Germany?

  In Germany, voter turnout has risen from a low of just 43 per cent in 2004 to 61.4 per cent in 2019, back to 1994 levels. This trend is expected to continue, particularly given that, for the first time, people between 16 and 18 will be able to vote, and two-thirds of them have said they intend to do so.

  However, higher turnout alone will not prevent the rise of right-wing parties. Predictions are that the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) could come second or third in Germany. Only the conservative Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria are far ahead in the polls. The governing parties of thetraffic-light coalition – the Social Democratic Party, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party – are expected to lose votes compared to the previous European Parliament election in 2019.

  Still, there is reason for hope: since the beginning of the year, the AfD has lost significant support in the polls. While it received 23 per cent in January 2024, it is now getting only 15 per cent. The reasons for this include a series ofscandals involving the party’s top candidate and other officials, which led to the party’sexclusion from the right-wing Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament.

  Overall, the democratic centre in Germany remains clearly in the majority in this EU election, albeit with a loss of votes compared to the AfD.

  What are the main issues likely to influence the outcome?

  The main issues in this election are Germany’s role in relation to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the question of arms supplies. The threat to security and peace is at the centre of most political debates. The second most important issue is social and economic security, often discussed in connection with immigration and asylum policy, a theme particularly fuelled by the AfD. These two issues regularly alternate in first and second place in the polls. Climate and environmental issues have lost prominence compared to 2019.

  The expected increase in voter turnout suggests a growing interest among German voters. Overall, voters’ understanding of global issues and crises and of the role of the EU has increased. However, domestic issues and opinions on national government policies remain the decisive factors accounting for voting decisions. In Germany, the outcome of the EU election is a mood indicator for national politics. Specific European issues tend to play a subordinate role.

  Are there significant differences between young and older voters, and between men and women?

  Like German society as a whole, the younger generation is not homogeneous. However, young people tend to be more supportive of the EU than older generations. Around 78 per cent of young people support the continuation of the European project, compared with 65 per cent of older people. But, according to the latest polls, young people are not expected to vote in higher numbers than older people.

  Young voters differ from older ones on several issues. While both age groups share concerns about peace and security and the impact of Russian aggression, young people are more likely to be concerned about human and civil rights and climate change. On social and economic issues, young people are particularly concerned about affordable housing, equal opportunities and protection against poverty in old age. Migration and asylum issues are less important to them.

  When it comes to gender, there is a noticeable gap in voting decisions. In Germany, women generally vote more left-progressive, while men tend to vote more conservative. This trend has intensified in recent years. The gender gap is most significant among young people. According topolls, 18 per cent of young men intend to vote for the AfD, compared to eight per cent of young women.

  What would be the consequences of the rise of the far right in the European Parliament?

  A rise of right-wing, nationalist parties in the European Parliament means the legislative body would have to deal with obstructionism and anti-EU behaviour. However, all polls predict a continued strong democratic majority for the political centre. So while the growth of the right wing will make political work more difficult and uncomfortable, the EU will remain functional, at least for the time being. Whether mainstream parties can counter the nationalist narrative remains to be seen. It will be crucial to tackle the security crises of coming years and ensure social and economic security.

  For Germany, the election is a bellwether for upcoming national elections, particularly next year’s parliamentary election. The AfD’s decline in the polls is also noticeable at the national and state levels, although less so than in the EU elections, and the reasons for this are mainly attributable to the AfD itself. At the moment, all democratic parties have ruled out cooperation with the AfD, so the risk of right-wing populists entering government remains low.

  Examples fromHungary,Italy andthe Netherlands show this is a European trend that’s been going on for a long time. All these examples have already had consequences for the rule of law, democratic freedoms, human rights and overall societal interaction.

  Germany is not immune to this, and the pressure from right-wing populist and nationalist parties and opinions is very real here as well. Political discourse is increasingly shifting towards the right. If the AfD keeps gaining ground, it will get worse.

  Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Democracy International through itswebsite orFacebook andYouTube pages, and follow@democracy_intl and@AndreasM_CGN on Twitter.

• PAKISTAN: ‘The government must hold accountable those responsible for excessive force against protesters’

  CIVICUS discusses recent protests in Pakistan with Asad Iqbal Butt, chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, a civil society organisation that works for the realisation of the full range of human rights for all of Pakistan’s citizens and residents.

  Protests erupted in response to the rising cost of food, fuel and utilities in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The situation quickly escalated into violence. Several protesters and a police officer were killed and many protesters were injured and arrested. As tensions flared, traders closed their shops, exacerbating economic disruption. The Kashmiri prime ministeracknowledged the protesters’ grievances but stressed the need to maintain peace and stability, while Pakistan’s president called a high-level meeting to devise a response. Having narrowly avoided defaulting on its foreign debt last year, Pakistan is now seeking a new bailout package from the International Monetary Fund.

  What triggered the protests, and how did the government respond?

  Since March 2023, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) has witnessed several large-scale protests, with people taking to the streets to demand subsidised electricity and flour. Led by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a civil society group, these protests have also called for the removal of unnecessary perks and privileges enjoyed by politicians and bureaucrats.

  The movement gained momentum in May 2024. On 11 May, thousands of people responded to the JAAC’s call and began marching towards the capital, Muzaffarabad. The entire region came to a standstill as reports of violent clashes and casualties emerged, first on social media and then in mainstream media.

  Shortly after the first verified reports of violence, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan launched a fact-finding mission, on 16 and 17 May. We found that ahead of the protests, the AJK government had sent a request to the Pakistani government for paramilitary and civilian forces. This signalled its intention to use force against protesters. Deployment of additional forces began on 3 May, almost a week before the call for protests and the long march. But it was the involvement of the Pakistan Rangers, a federal paramilitary force, that marked a significant escalation. Their entry into Muzaffarabad and alleged unauthorised use of force contributed to the violence.

  Key incidents during the protests included a police raid on 10 May on the residence of Shaukat Nawaz Mir, an elected traders’ leader, which resulted in arrests and clashes. On 8 May, an assistant commissioner reportedly assaulted an older person in Dodyal, Mirpur. A crackdown on the JAAC leadership in Kotli, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad further inflamed public anger, leading to retaliatory attacks on government officials and property.

  On 10 May, a crippling shutdown and wheel-jam strike took place, followed by violent clashes between police and protesters. Police arrested scores of activists and clashes resulted in injuries on both sides. The long march from Mirpur to Muzaffarabad on 11 May was marred by violent clashes. A police sub-inspector was killed and many police officers and protesters were injured.

  The entry of the Rangers, their lack of coordination with local authorities and the perception they were being deployed to violently suppress the protests fuelled violence. Clashes in Muzaffarabad left three protesters dead and many others injured. The situation escalated when the Rangers resorted to teargas shelling and firing.

  Who organised and led the protests?

  These protests were unprecedented because they were leaderless, not driven by a political agenda or led by a political party. A cross-section of civil society took part in or documented the protests, including journalists, lawyers, students, traders and young people.

  There were other demands apart from those put forward by JAAC. Civil society lawyers emphasised that the people of AJK are highly sensitive about their identity, particularly following India’s revocation of the special constitutional status of Indian-occupied Kashmir. This explained their concern about any perceived attempts to undermine AJK’s special status or deny recognition of Kashmiris’ rights over their natural resources.

  Although not directly involved in the protests, many women from civil society expressed their solidarity with the movement. One woman said that even though she knew the government would use violence against protesters, she hadn’t stopped her young son going to the march because the protest was necessary to make people’s voices heard.

  What are civil society’s demands to the government?

  Civil society groups, including the HRCP, have primarily called on the AJK government to listen to people’s legitimate demands for economic rights and better governance, and to show restraint and engage with protesters through peaceful dialogue and negotiation.

  The government must also hold those responsible for excessive force against protesters accountable, following an independent investigation, including to help prevent future abuses. The use of paramilitary forces against AJK citizens is also cause for serious concern and should not recur.

  The AJK government must respect human rights, including the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression and the right to life. It must also implement sustainable economic relief measures, including subsidies and price controls, to address immediate public needs.

  Additionally, the Pakistani federal government should ensure that legislative powers in AJK lie with the elected AJK Assembly. Finally, AJK should be given control over its natural resources, while Pakistan’s earnings from its use of AJK’s water and electricity must be shared more equitably.

  How can the international community help?

  The international community should monitor potential human rights abuses in AJK and, where possible, press the Pakistani government to ensure they do not recur. It is important to exert moral pressure on the government to respect, protect and fulfil the democratic and fundamental freedoms of the people of AJK.

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  Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan through itswebsite and follow@HRCP87 on Twitter.