right-wing

• ARGENTINA: ‘Milei’s victory expresses the rejection of the previous governments’

  CIVICUS speaks with Yanina Welp, researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, about the results of Argentina’s runoff presidential election, won by a far-right outsider.

  How do you explain the victory of Javier Milei, an outsider with no party structure?

  Milei’s victory, like that of any other candidate, cannot be explained by a single reason. There are at least three main explanations for his victory.

  First, there’s the economic situation. On top of a high level of poverty – 40 per cent and growing – Argentina has very high inflation, and the economy hasn’t grown for many years. And the same goes for formal employment. There are a lot of informal workers and many people experience high levels of uncertainty.

  Second is the inability of the political class to respond to these demands. Most recently, those in power have acted arrogantly. Insecurity, corruption scandals and the passivity of the authorities in the face of all these have increased. Milei’s leadership came to embody people’s rejection of the situation. Many people voted for him because he expresses well the rejection of recent administrations, and not necessarily because they approve of or adhere to the policies he has proposed to implement.

  Third, there’s the role of political leadership, and specifically of the incumbent, for doing nothing in the face of this threat and even encouraging Milei’s candidacy with the aim of dividing the opposition’s vote and therefore having a better chance at winning. This was done first by Peronists, in the run-up to the first round, and by former president Mauricio Macri ahead of the runoff, which put his Together for Change coalition in crisis.

  Do you think the electorate has leaned to the right?

  Unlike almost all the other candidates, who only had vague and general proposals, Milei ran on a strongly ideological platform, which he kept putting forward throughout the campaign.

  However, when analysing people’s attitudes, there are contradictions, first and foremost because there is no universal notion of what is supposed to be ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’. For instance, polls show growing concern about rising insecurity, and it would be very elitist to think that having this concern makes you right-wing. The rise in crime shows that it is a real concern.

  It is true that in this election campaign positive perceptions of the private sector have increased compared to perceptions of the public administration, possibly as a result of Milei’s discourse but also because the image of the state has deteriorated considerably under recent administrations. In this sense, it could be said that voters have indeed moved towards the right. But Milei’s victory with almost 56 per cent of the vote shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that more than half of the electorate have ideologically leaned rightwards, or even embraced the radical right, because many voted for him because he embodies the reaction to the status quo rather than because of his ideological proposals.

  During the campaign it was argued that democracy was at stake. Is Argentina’s democracy in danger?

  Democracy is not in imminent danger, as was the case with military coups, which wiped democracy away overnight. There are signs of democratic erosion – but these have been there for years. There has been both progress and setbacks, including attempts to co-opt the judiciary, the misuse of state resources and clientelistic practices.

  Generally speaking, Argentina’s democratic institutions work. Despite the opposition’s complaints about the electoral system, the elections took place normally and the results were out very quickly.

  However, we have seen a huge setback in terms of public debate. Intolerance and verbal violence have increased. Supporters of different parties can hardly talk to each other. There is a lot of aggression on social media. These are all medium-intensity warning signs that, if not addressed, will only pave the way for more violence and authoritarianism.

  How will Argentina’s political scene change following this election?

  Since 2003, with Néstor Kirchner’s election to the presidency, a system of two broad coalitions formed, which since 2007, under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, has been maintained by the introduction of open, simultaneous and compulsory primary elections. These served to avoid party fragmentation but had the negative effect of eroding programmatic or ideological differences. The two coalitions that formed as a result included their own right and left wings, blurring the ideological debate and replacing it with a divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism. This ended up encouraging affective polarisation with very watertight alignments where it is increasingly difficult to find common ground.

  The fact that the presidential elections were won by a party that until a couple of years ago did not exist will force the two big coalitions of recent decades, the Peronist ruling party and the opposition Together for Change, to profoundly reconfigure themselves.

  Within Peronism, former president and current vice-president Cristina Kirchner was the big loser of this election. In recent times she has been absent from the political scene, leaving Peronism without clear leadership. Peronism has strong roots in trade unions and social organisations that are highly dependent on the state. These organisations have incentives to negotiate, should the new government open up that space. However, Milei’s initial discourse has pointed in a completely different direction, insisting that he will take shock measures.

  What are the main challenges the new government will face?

  The new government should tackle three major challenges. The first is to stabilise the economy by stopping inflation and putting the exchange rate in order. The second is to introduce reforms to increase productivity and solve the crisis in formal employment. And the third is governance. Argentina has very strong social organisations, which has both positive and negative aspects, but in any case, it is a strongly organised society that is very predisposed to conflict.

  These three challenges must be tackled in a coordinated and consistent way, which is quite difficult.

  Do you think Milei’s government will be able to tackle them?

  I have serious doubts that the new government will be able to meet these challenges, not only in the area of stabilisation and structural reforms, but also and above all in the area of governance. Many of the proposed measures, such as adopting the US dollar as the currency, could be found unconstitutional. Other measures require legislative majorities that the new government won’t have. Its only prospect of obtaining substantial legislative support was through Together for Change, but the division of the opposition coalition leaves Milei without even a congressional quorum.

  Milei has not one provincial governorship and almost no mayorships. However, Argentina’s sub-national powerholders have always been accommodating and pragmatic. Still, some key measures would go directly against the interests of the provinces, such as the elimination of co-participation, the system through which the federal state distributes public resources from national taxes to the provinces. And then there is the potential confrontation with the province of Buenos Aires.

  Milei could try to rule by decree, but this would cause an instant crisis, and in case of an impeachment trial the vice-president, Victoria Villarruel, would take over. This would not ensure any positive change but would rather imply some additional negative elements.

  Milei was elected with a very large majority, so he has great popular legitimacy. But this majority could be inflated, as is often the case in runoffs, and is compounded by the volatility and impatience of a large part of Argentina’s electorate. If he succeeds in implementing his ultra-liberal programme, a global rarity, the social costs will be extremely high. And if he fails to do so, people’s disenchantment with politics could increase and their support for democracy could be called into question.

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   Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Yanina Welp via herwebsite and follow@Welpita on Twitter.

• CHILE: ‘The proposed constitution reflects the country’s division rather than being an instrument for its union’

  CIVICUS speaks with Patricia Reyes, director of Fundación Multitudes, about the process to develop a new constitution in Chile since a previous draft was rejected in a referendum in September 2022.

  Fundación Multitudes is a civil society organisation dedicated to generating spaces and building capacity for civil society to participate effectively in decision-making processes.

  Why does Chile need a new constitution?

  The constitution-making process in which Chile has been immersed since 2022 was a response to a longstanding social and political crisis that erupted in October 2019. Faced with the eruption of social demands for greater protection, equity and guarantees of basic social rights such as education, health and social security, which in some cases were expressed with unusual violence, all political sectors agreed to initiate a constitution-making process.

  Initially, an inclusive process unfolded that produced a draft constitution that incorporated adequate standards of rights protection for a democratic and social state. But the proposal failed to win the support of the more conservative parts of society and was rejected in a referendum, largely because of mistakes made in the process. These were mainly due to the political inexperience of the members of the constituent commission, who were mostly independents with no links to political parties. They overlooked the need to reach broad agreements encompassing all parts of society, and particularly traditional political players. Other factors were the incorporation of some drastic changes in political institutions and the inability to communicate the benefits of the new constitutional text adequately to the public as a whole.

  After the proposal was rejected, the social demands that had triggered the process were still there, and the existing constitution continued to be as ineffective in resolving them as it was when the social outburst occurred. To solve our problems of democratic coexistence, we need a new social pact that can unite us around a shared institutional project. That is why the constitution-making process was resumed, this time in a more traditional format, which has produced a new draft that will again have to be submitted to a popular vote.

  How different is the new draft from the one that emerged from the 2021 Constitutional Convention?

  The new draft is a lot more similar to the current constitution. It introduces more modest changes. Compared to the previous one, I think it rolls back some rights that had already been won, particularly for historically excluded groups such as women. Nor does it introduce recognition of other vulnerable population groups , such as Indigenous peoples and children and adolescents. But it does share with the previous draft the reaffirmation of freedom of enterprise and the concept of a subsidiary state.

  The two processes have been quite different because in the first case the constituent body included many citizens elected by popular vote and independent of political parties, while the second involved a Council of Experts appointed by the two chambers of Congress and a Constitutional Council elected by popular vote but made up mostly of members proposed by political parties ranging from the centre to the far right.

  However, there is one thing that the proposals resulting from both processes share: both have been considered partisan in nature, viewed as aligned with the interests of a specific political camp. They reflect the division of Chile rather than being an instrument for its union.

  What changes would the new draft make to the existing constitution?

  Overall, the text reproduces the current institutional framework, except for the fact that it reduces the number of members of parliament. It also enshrines the same rights as the current constitution. It shares many of its strengths but also suffers from many of the same weaknesses.

  The draft contains several articles that have caused controversy because of the regressive way in which they could be interpreted. For example, in the area of reproductive rights, constitutional provisions could mean that the rule that currently allows abortion in cases of rape, danger to the life of the mother and non-viability of the foetus could be declared unconstitutional.

  The incorporation of a special anti-corruption body could enter into conflicts of competence with the current Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Additionally, some populist tools would be introduced to allow the immediate expulsion of undocumented migrants, along with some tax exemptions – a matter that generally does not belong in a constitutional text – and a number of highly sensitive provisions, such as the possibility of allowing terminally ill convicts to serve their sentences at home, which could benefit people convicted of crimes against humanity committed during the period of dictatorship.

  On the plus side, a Victims’ Ombudsman’s Office would be established and progress would be made on decentralisation, granting greater powers to local governments.

  What’s the position of different groups towards the referendum to be held on the latest draft?

  Most right-wing parties approve of the project, while those on the left reject it and those in the centre have a great diversity of opinions, with some campaigning for approval and others for rejection.

  But the last word will be up to voters, who are going through what has been defined as a moment of constitutional exhaustion. Because of the lengthy and controversial process and the lack of cross-cutting agreements, there is a lot of apathy and indecision, as well as conflicting positions. Right now polls show a majority of people would reject the new constitution, but the vote is on 17 December, so there is still a long way to go, and there are many people who have not yet decided how they will vote.

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  Civic space in Chile is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fundación Multitudes through itswebsite orFacebook account, subscribe to itsYouTube channel and follow @FMultitudes onInstagram andTwitter.

• USA: ‘The framers of the constitution envisioned an accountable president, not a king above the law’

  CIVICUS discusses the recent US Supreme Court ruling on presidential immunity and its potential impact on the 5 November presidential election with Praveen Fernandes, Vice President at the Constitutional Accountability Center, a US think tank and public interest litigation organisation dedicated to studying and applying the constitution’s text, history and values.

  On 1 July, the US Supreme Courtruled that presidents have absolute immunity for the exercise of their core constitutional powers and are entitled to a presumption of immunity for other official acts, although they don’t enjoy immunity for unofficial acts. The decision comes as Donald Trump faces criminal charges for trying to overturn his 2020 election loss to Joe Biden. The question now is whether Trump’s actions will be considered official or unofficial. But it’s unlikely he’ll be tried before the election, and if he returns as president he could pardon himself. Critics claim the Supreme Court ruling violates the spirit of the US Constitution by placing the president above the law.

  What has the Supreme Court said about presidential immunity?

  In Trump v. United States, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority ruled that a former president can be granted a measure of immunity from criminal prosecution for acts committed while in office.

  The majority opinion held that there is absolute immunity from prosecution for acts within the president’s ‘exclusive and preclusive authority’ – powers the constitution specifically assigns to the president and no other branch of government. There is a presumption of immunity for official acts that are part of a president’s duties, although this can be rebutted if the government can show that prosecution would not threaten the powers and functions of the executive branch. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.

  As the dissenting opinions make clear, the court’s doctrine of presidential immunity departs not only from the text and history of the constitution, but also from the court’s own precedent.

  How does this ruling affect the criminal charges against Trump?

  While it’s impossible to know with certainty how this Supreme Court decision will affect all of the pending criminal cases against Trump, what we do know is that it will cause additional delays in prosecutions that have already been delayed far too long.

  For instance, the federal criminal case related to the 6 January 2021 attempted overturning of the 2020 election was paused for over 200 days until the Supreme Court issued its decision. Now the district court has to deal with issues such as which alleged crimes involve unofficial acts and can therefore be prosecuted.

  However, it is highly unlikely that the federal trial will reach a verdict before the presidential election in November. As a result, voters will likely be forced to cast their ballots without knowing whether one of the candidates is criminally responsible for attempting to overturn the results of the last election.

  Do you think this ruling could allow for an unfettered second Trump presidency?

  The danger seems great in a possible future Trump presidency where the fear of prosecution has been largely removed. But this goes far beyond Trump – it’s a danger that extends to anyone who holds such a powerful role without being held accountable to the same criminal laws that bind all other individuals.

  But there are still safeguards. Prosecutors can still pursue crimes related to unofficial acts, and there are still political accountability mechanisms, such as the ability to impeach a president for high crimes and misdemeanours by a vote in the House of Representatives and conviction in a trial in the Senate.

  What are the broader implications of this ruling for US democracy?

  The conservative majority opinion in Trump v. United States challenges the accountability envisioned by the framers of the constitution and moves the nation closer to the monarchical systems they sought to avoid. The framers envisioned a president accountable to the governed, not a king above the law.

  Immunising such a powerful position in the federal government from criminal accountability poses a significant risk and should be sobering to all Americans.

  This ruling is the latest reminder that even when the constitution is clear, we depend on judges to interpret it fairly. Judicial nominations matter. Electing presidents who will nominate fair and principled judges is important. Electing senators who will rigorously scrutinise those nominations is important. Let’s not forget that.

  Civic space in the USA is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Constitutional Accountability Center through itswebsite and follow@MyConstitution on Twitter.