sovereignty
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HAITI: ‘Gangs control the country instead of the authorities’
CIVICUS speaks with freelance journalist Nancy Roc about the increase in gang violence and the political situation in Haiti.With 38 years of experience, Nancy is a Haitian-born journalist renowned for her work for press freedom. She is the recipient of numerous awards, including UNESCO’s Jean Dominique Prize for Press Freedom.
What’s the current security situation in Haiti?
The situation is untenable, to use the exact words of Volker Türk, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights. Despite a state of emergency and a succession of curfews the government has declared since 4 March to try to regain control of the capital, Port-au-Prince, not a week goes by without kidnappings. Violence is a daily occurrence.
People are holed up in their homes, most schools are closed and economic activity is severely affected. The same goes for roads, where gangs have been imposing their law for more than three months and many drivers are out of work. Virtually all the capital’s infrastructure has been destroyed or seriously affected by gang attacks.
An attack on the National Penitentiary on 2 March came as a great shock to Haitians, even though they are used to living under the constant threat of violence. More than 4,500 inmates are believed to have escaped, including prominent gang members and people arrested in connection with the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. There have been widespread looting and attacks, particularly against the National Library, which was stormed on 3 April.
On the evening of 2 April, heavily armed bandits looted dozens of homes and seized private vehicles in the villages of Tecina and Théodat, in Tabarre municipality, northeast of Port-au-Prince. The vast majority of the population, already living in extreme poverty, have now been plunged into hell and left to fend for themselves.
As for the police, despite some efforts, they are neither equipped nor numerous enough to deal with such a situation of urban guerrilla warfare against heavily armed gangs. There are currently around 23 gangs operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, divided into two major coalitions: G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as Ti Gabriel, and G9 Family and Allies, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. However, UN experts estimate there are between 150 and 200 gangs throughout Haiti.
According to the UN, since the start of the year, 1,193 people have been killed and 692 injured as a result of gang violence. The health system is on the verge of collapse, and hospitals often lack the capacity to treat the injured. The economy is suffocating as the gangs impose restrictions on people’s movements. The main supplier of drinking water has stopped deliveries. The situation has led to a major food crisis: almost half of Haiti’s 11 million inhabitants need some form of food assistance.
How did the gangs become so powerful?
The gangs have powerful backers in government and the private sector. Under former de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who resigned in March, the government funded 30 per cent of the members of the G9. It wouldn’t be surprising if some people, both in the private sector and former senior government officials, have continued to fund them, particularly those who have been sanctioned by the international community.
A UN expert report published in 2023 also singled out former president Michel Martelly, in power between 2011 and 2016, as well as several prominent business leaders and legislators, as providing resources to armed gangs, whether in kind or in cash.
The proliferation of gangs began under Martelly and intensified after Moïse’s assassination. By 2019, some 162 armed groups had been identified, more than half of them operating in the metropolitan area. In total, they are said to potentially have over 3,000 soldiers armed with firearms, including adolescents and children.
Under Moïse, numerous massacres took place, such as the La Saline massacre in 2018, the Bel Air massacre in 2019 and the Cité Soleil massacre in 2020. All took place in neighbourhoods with significant electoral power where members of the opposition lived, and these crimes all went unpunished.
In 2020, the situation worsened when Chérizier, a former police officer, federated the gangs with the G9 Family, allied to the nine most powerful gangs in the region. This enabled him to control a large part of Port-au-Prince – all while being covertly financed by high-ranking government officials.
The federation of gangs was even hailed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti, who claimed that federating the gangs had reduced the number of homicides by 12 per cent in three months. This caused such a scandal that she was forced to retract her statement, describing it as a ‘misinterpretation‘.
A year after the assassination of Moïse, as the situation worsened, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution establishing a sanctions regime that targeted gang leaders and those who financed them. Chérizier was the only gang leader named in an annex to the resolution, but to date no action has been taken against him.
On 29 February 2024, the situation in the capital took a decisive turn for the worse when Chérizier announced, in a video posted on social media, the reconstitution of the coalition of armed groups known as Viv Ansanm (Living Together). In the video, he claimed responsibility for the tensions that have shaken Port-au-Prince and declared that the gangs’ primary objective was to overthrow the government. He also stated that a hunt was now on for ministers and the Director General of the National Police. He wanted to arrest them and prevent Henry, who was in Puerto Rico, returning to the country. Police officers were killed, police stations were attacked and several flights were cancelled following an assault by gangs at Toussaint Louverture international airport, which has since been closed.
Chérizier claims to be launching a revolution to liberate the Haitian people from the authorities and the oligarchs. But the gangs have targeted every stratum of society, as well as the poor districts of Port-au-Prince and many state structures that serve the poor, such as the main public hospital. The destruction is such that the UN refers to Haiti as ‘a state on the brink of collapse’.
By December 2023, more than 310,000 people had been displaced within Haiti. According to the International Organization for Migration, more than 50,000 people left Port-au-Prince in three weeks in March 2024. The scale of the disaster is staggering, and all the countries that had promised police or military aid are absent. Haiti has been abandoned to its sad fate and gangs are controlling the country instead of the authorities.
Why hasn’t the government reacted to the growing gang threat?
Four years ago, the Haitian National Police officially had a force of 15,498 police officers, among them only 1,711 women, although the actual number of officers was estimated to be much lower. Moreover, the humanitarian programme put in place by the Biden-Harris administration to make it easier for Haitians to live in the USA has put the police at risk of losing up to a third of its workforce to emigration.
Against this backdrop, chaos and violence have reached unprecedented levels. Since Moïse’s assassination, the government has been unable to establish order with the police, and the army has only had around 2,000 soldiers. No legislative or general elections have been held since 2016. As a result, there are no longer any elected representatives, as the terms in office of the previously elected ones have expired. Critics of Henry, who was very unpopular, considered his government illegitimate.
In October 2022, Henry appealed to the international community, requesting the intervention of a foreign force. Given his unpopularity, this aroused public mistrust, as people feared this intervention would strengthen an illegitimate government accused of colluding with gangs. What’s more, the composition of this mission turned into a headache.
Almost a year later, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the use of force by an international security assistance mission in Haiti. Neither Canada nor the USA wanted to intervene directly, stressing that the solution had to come from Haitians themselves. But Haitians have been unable to reach agreement, and what’s more, they fear foreign intervention, given the catastrophic interventions led by the UN since 2004. Canada, which had been asked by the USA to take the lead in the intervention, withdrew in March 2023, passing the leadership on to Kenya.
Deployment of a multinational intervention force was due to begin on 1 January 2024. Last July, Kenya offered to lead the mission with a thousand police officers. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas and Jamaica had pledged to send security personnel, and more recently Belize and Guyana did as well. Canada has also pledged to participate in the mission. For its part, the US government pledged to fund the mission to the tune of at least US$100 million.
As the gangs extended their hold over Port-au-Prince and formed an alliance with the declared aim of overthrowing Henry, he planned to travel to Kenya to sign a reciprocity agreement. While he was away, Chérizier’s criminal gangs launched their attacks on police stations, the airport and prisons. They threatened civil war if Henry returned to Haiti. He resigned on 11 March 2024. The next day, Kenya suspended the dispatch of police to Haiti.
Who is in charge today, and what are the chances of democracy being restored?
In the wake of Henry’s resignation, the government declared a state of emergency. On the same day, it was announced that a Presidential Transitional Council (PTC) had been formed to restore order. The Council is made up of nine members: seven voting members and two observers. It includes representatives of the main political parties, civil society and the private sector. Its 22-month mandate is due to end on 7 February 2026 after it has organised ‘democratic, free and credible elections’.
There are already a number of obstacles to achieving this goal. First, how can security be re-established when the gangs are still receiving weapons from the USA? The latest twist is that when Henry issued the decree announcing the formation of the PTC, it didn’t include any of the members’ names. Since then, the organisations of the PTC’s appointed representatives have expressed their disagreement with the government decree published in the official gazette on 12 April 2024. Finally, the decree formalising the appointment of PTC members was published on 16 April.
In addition, the Council wishes to be sworn in at the National Palace before the nation, even though the Palace has been targeted by gangs on several occasions. Who will provide security? How can peace be restored to Haiti in a context of such political uncertainty and economic fragility? Will the members of the Council, some of whom are frenemies, be able to look beyond their own interests for the benefit of the nation? And who will rebuild the country after so many young people have left? Will the diaspora finally be called upon?
Further, the possibility of famine looms on the horizon and the World Food Programme fears that its food stocks will run out by the end of April.
Finally, how can gangs be persuaded to lay down their arms when they are making millions from kidnappings and arms sales? Crime is a very lucrative business for gangs and for citizens facing great poverty.
How can we restore justice and punish those who have committed so many crimes against humanity? As the saying goes, no justice, no peace. Finally, what about the gangs’ political ambitions? On 11 March, Chérizier declared that it would be ‘the Viv Ansanm alliance, along with the Haitian people, who will elect the person who will lead the country’. Will the PTC have to negotiate with the gangs?
The challenges facing the PTC are therefore significant, and one of the most arduous will be to find a way of articulating a request for external aid without losing Haiti’s sovereignty.
Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Nancy Roc on herFacebook page and follow@TheNancyRoc on Twitter.
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HAITI: ‘If the mission succeeds, the authorities won’t have to turn again to the international community to maintain peace’
CIVICUS speaks with Haitian lawyer Rosy Auguste Ducéna about the situation in Haiti and the prospects for a newly deployed international mission.Rosy is Head of Programmes at the National Human Rights Defence Network (RNDDH), a civil society organisation working to support the establishment of the rule of law in Haiti.
Following the resignation of de facto prime minister Ariel Henry in April, a Transitional Presidential Council was appointed to try to start the process of restoring peace in gang-besieged Haiti. Riven by internal divisions, it took until June for the council to appoint a new prime minister, academic and development practitioner Garry Conille. In the same month, the first contingent of a long-delayed Kenya-led United Nations Multinational Security Support Mission began to arrive. Given the long history of failed international interventions in Haiti, civil society is sceptical, and demands that the mission has a strong human rights focus.
What has changed since the resignation of de facto prime minister Ariel Henry?
After supporting him throughout his government, the international community finally withdrew its support for Henry, who resigned in disgrace. He was a human rights predator, so we are glad to see him go, even if it wasn’t in the way we would have liked.
A Transitional Presidential Council was set up with the involvement of the international community through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the regional organisation. It’s made up of people who don’t inspire confidence among Haitian people. The only woman on the Council has an observer role, and all the candidates for prime minister it interviewed were men.
A month after the council was established, with Haitian people ravaged by insecurity and armed gangs, a prime minister was finally chosen: Garry Conille, backed by the international community. The next logical step is to set up a transitional government.
What does civil society expect from the new prime minister?
We expect the new prime minister to keep his first promise: to form a government where women don’t play a symbolic role but are in positions of power. And we hope women will be chosen with an agenda to fight for women’s rights in the context of the transition. It’s important to respect the minimum 30 per cent quota of women in decision-making bodies – without this being the ceiling, since over half of Haiti’s population is female – but it’s also important that the women who occupy these positions be involved in the fight against sexual and gender-based violence, discrimination and the social injustices suffered by women.
We hope the new government’s decisions will take people’s priorities into account’: fighting against insecurity and against the impunity that benefits armed bandits, putting the victims of insecurity at the centre of decision-making and organising elections.
And since this transition must produce results, everything must be done to ensure the roadmap drawn up by the Council and prime minister is implemented.
What’s the security and human rights situation like?
The human rights situation on the ground is very concerning: robberies, murders, rapes, gang rapes, massacres, armed attacks, kidnappings for ransom and the burning of people’s homes and vehicles are commonplace.
Two large coalitions of armed gangs, formerly at war with each other – G-9 an Fanmi e Alye, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, alias Ti Gabriel or Gabo – have joined forces and are attacking civilians as they seek to consolidate their power.
The consequences for the lives and security of Haitian people are enormous: armed bandits control the movement of goods and services, including fuel and medical supplies, and sow terror. Some areas have been completely emptied of their population. The victims of insecurity are living in overcrowded camps, in promiscuity, exposed to all kinds of abuse and contagious diseases.
Not all schools are functioning. Thousands of school-age children and young people who should be attending university have lost an academic year. Hospitals and health centres have been forced to close due to insecurity. Warnings of an acute food crisis have been issued. Haiti is facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. And if nothing is done about it, it will only get worse.
In an impoverished country where the education system was already not inclusive and social rights have always been seen as commodities to be bought, the gap in access to education and quality healthcare is widening. Women, children and people with physical, sensory or cognitive disabilities have been the first to suffer the harmful consequences of the chaos created by armed bandits, with the complicity of the police and Henry’s government.
Against this backdrop of massive and continuing human rights violations, the Transitional Presidential Council has yet to demonstrate that it understands the need to act quickly.
How was the new international mission set up and how does it differ from its predecessors?
On 6 October 2022, Henry called for a ‘robust force’ to be sent, in his words, ‘to combat insecurity, restore peace and conduct elections’. Almost a year later, on 2 October 2023, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the deployment of a force called the Multinational Security Support Mission, after Kenya agreed to take the lead.
Setting up the mission has taken a long time. It is now up and running, but we remain sceptical.
This will be the 11th mission since 1993. All its predecessors have been implicated in human rights violations against the Haitian people, including summary executions, beatings and attacks on physical and mental integrity, sexual trafficking and rape of minors and women. The only punishment for these violations has been repatriation.
The United Nations brought cholera, the spread of which caused the deaths of over 10,000 people, and paid only lip service to its responsibility. Promises of reparations have never been fulfilled.
The results of the various missions to Haiti, which have cost millions of dollars, have been meagre. The police and judicial institutions, and the electoral body they were supposed to strengthen, have never been more dysfunctional. The cost-benefit calculation of these missions and their involvement in human rights abuses suggest they are counterproductive.
However, it must be acknowledged that many people, tired of the insecurity that robs them of their lives and their humanity, and having lost confidence in the Haitian criminal justice system, are pinning their hopes on this international force. At present, the police don’t pursue notorious bandits and the courts don’t try them, even in absentia, despite the fact that several hundred victims of massacres, supported by RNDDH, have filed complaints against their attackers. On the rare occasions they are arrested, they escape or spend years in prison without charges against them ever being cleared up and without their victims receiving justice.
How can the international mission contribute to sustainable peace?
Alongside six other Haitian civil society organisations, we have reflected on this question and come up with several recommendations. These include defining the mission’s objectives and ensuring the concerns of human rights organisations are taken into account in the development of the mission’s legal framework and strategic security plan.
As the United Nations’ resolution is silent or says little on some important issues, we stress the need to address the obligations of security agents in relation to water management, ethical standards and transparency, as well as mechanisms for monitoring and following up on their conduct.
We also recommend the establishment of mechanisms to prevent human rights abuses and a means for victims to have complaints heard. It is essential that countries that provide those coming to Haiti commit themselves to doing everything possible to ensure abuses are punished and the legal guarantees of victims are protected and respected.
Above all, we hope the mission will carry out its operations on the ground with the participation of Haitian police officers, who will benefit from training in tactics to fight armed gangs, so when the mission leaves, Haitian authorities won’t have to turn again to the international community to maintain peace and security.
Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with RNDDH through itswebsite orFacebook page, follow@RnddhAyiti and@AugusteRosy on Twitter, and contact Rosy Auguste Ducéna on herInstagram account orFacebook page.
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NEW CALEDONIA: ‘The French parliamentary elections will have an impact on our future’
CIVICUS speaks with Nathalie Tehio, president of the Human Rights League, aboutrecent protests against electoral changes imposed by the French government in New Caledonia.In May 2024, protests broke out in New Caledonia after the French parliament passed a law that would have allowed more non-Indigenous people to vote. The French government presented the measure as a democratic reform, but many Indigenous Kanaks, who make up around 40 per cent of the population, saw the prospects of independence receding. When clashes between pro-independence protesters and police led to riots, the French authorities declared a state of emergency, deployed troops and banned TikTok. The French government suspended the electoral changes, but has recently detained some pro-independence leaders, and the situation remains tense.
What is New Caledonia’s political status and what how does this mean for its governance?
The 1988 Matignon-Oudinot Accords, the 1998 Nouméa Accords and the 1999 Organic Law gave New Caledonia special status within the French Republic, transferring many powers other than those of sovereignty – the army, the police, the judiciary and the currency – as part of a scheme of ‘shared sovereignty’. A title on ‘transitional provisions for New Caledonia’ was added to the French Constitution.
This title provided for the freezing of the electorate for three planned referendums on self-determination and provincial elections, which determine the composition of the Congress that elects the government of New Caledonia. To vote in provincial elections, you have to be born before 1998 and have lived in New Caledonia for 10 years. Other elections follow French national rules.
What led to recent protests?
The Nouméa Accord provided for a gradual transfer of sovereignty, with three referendums on self-determination to be held in 2018, 2020 and 2021. The pro-independence Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) had called for the third referendum but then rejected the proposed date because of the pandemic that hit New Caledonia late. In 2021, many families were in mourning and a campaign could not be properly conducted due to restrictions.
The French government maintained the date of the referendum, and the FLNKS called for a boycott. This call was widely followed by Kanak people, resulting in a turnout of only 43.90 per cent, compared to 85.64 per cent for the second referendum in 2020. In the Loyalty Islands, 95.46 per cent of voters, mainly Kanak people, abstained, and in the Northern Province 83.38 per cent did so. Despite this, the French government recognised the results and declared the Nouméa Accord null and void, urging local politicians to reach a new agreement, specifically on the composition of the electoral body.
In the absence of an agreement, the government decided to change the make-up of the electorate by amending the constitution, allowing anyone who has lived in New Caledonia for 10 years to vote in provincial elections. This caused tensions as Kanak people, already in a minority as a result of colonisation and the nickel boom of the 1970s, saw this as a threat to their representation in institutions and the conclusion of the decolonisation process.
After the 2021 referendum, the Caledonian Union, a FLNKS member, set up a mobilisation group, the Field Action Coordinating Cell (CCAT), which has organised protests against the electoral change. The French government ignored our warnings about the dangers of forcefully passing the amendment, and protests degenerated into blockades and fires in and around the capital, Nouméa, leading to the imposition of a curfew, a state of emergency and the blocking of TikTok. The army was deployed. There are reports of police abuse and people forming anti-Kanak militias.
How did Kanak leaders react?
Kanak leaders called for calm but were not listened to, nor were traditional leaders or the president of the government.
The FLNKS refused to talk to the three senior officials who accompanied French president Emmanuel Macron on a whirlwind visit and called for a political solution to the conflict.
The president of the Southern Province and a former deputy made fiery statements on the question of links with France. Another current in the loyalist – anti-independence – camp, represented by another ex-deputy and the mayor of Nouméa, is in favour of dialogue and the search for a new institutional agreement. Some independence supporters back dialogue with this faction of the Loyalist Party. The Oceanian Awakening party, which represents people from the Wallis and Futuna islands, considers the 2021 referendum to be ‘political nonsense’ and could play a role in dialogue if the French government adopts a position of neutrality, as promised in the preamble to the Nouméa Agreement.
How is civil society promoting peace in New Caledonia?
The Human Rights League was instrumental in the signing of the Matignon Accords at a time when civil war had claimed over 90 lives. But recently the Minister of the Interior criticised us and ignored our warnings. We hope the next government will listen to voices for peace.
The unrest has so far mostly been confined to Nouméa and the surrounding communes, leaving the islands and northern provinces largely untouched. This shows that the peace process has forged links between communities. In 2022, a statue symbolising the handshake between loyalist politician Jacques Lafleur and pro-independence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou was unveiled in the Place de la Paix (Koo We Joka). Women called for a peace rally on that square.
New Caledonian civil society, which is deeply attached to this country, can still work towards a common destiny if France respects its commitment to the decolonisation process as set out in the Nouméa Accord.
France must carry out impartial investigations to restore peace through legal channels. Both pro-independence and loyalist politicians must commit themselves to rebuilding a common destiny and fighting the social inequalities at the root of the revolt of young Kanaks.
Civil society must influence elected representatives to work towards this goal and demand impartial justice. The decision to transfer CCAT leaders to provisional detention in France, more than 17,000 km away, to the detriment of their private and family lives and their rights to defence, was followed by new riots, this time in the north and on one of the Loyalty Islands.
The French parliamentary elections will have an impact on the future of New Caledonia, and it’s vital to encourage and seek dialogue and agreement on a common destiny.
Get in touch with the Human Rights League through itswebsite and follow@LDH_Fr and@nathalietehio on Twitter.
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NIGER: ‘France and the USA have displayed imperial attitudes towards poor countries in Africa’
CIVICUS speaks about Niger’s recent decision to suspend military cooperation with the USA with Dr Boubacar N’Diaye, Emeritus Professor of Pan-African Studies and Political Science at the College of Wooster, international consultant on security sector governance and former chair of the African Security Sector Network, a pan-African think tank focused on security governance issues in the continent, and particularly in West Africa.How would you describe Niger’s security situation?
Niger is located in a very strategic position in the continent – it’s at the heart of West Africa and the Sahel, and shares borders with Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali and Nigeria. This makes it an ideal location for geopolitical powers to have a presence.
Until recently, Niger was a key security partner of France and the USA. There were French troops in the country, and in 2012, the government signed an agreement with the USA to establish a drone base to conduct surveillance and military operations against terrorism. Between 1,000 to 1,500 US soldiers were deployed under this agreement.
But despite promises to assist Niger in fighting terrorism, little was done in this regard. Instead, the USA utilised this alliance to carry out surveillance operations in the region in support of its global geopolitical strategy.
On 26 July 2023, Niger experienced a military coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, with the junta claiming the president’s response to the dire security situation was inadequate. The country has confronted terrorist attacks on military and civilians for quite some time. Yet the crisis extends beyond security to encompass political and social dimensions.
Following the coup, the junta demanded France and its soldiers leave the country. France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed sanctions on Niger, resulting in power cuts and border closures. No goods or medical supplies were allowed in or out across ECOWAS borders, while terrorist attacks persisted, claiming the lives of Nigerien military personnel. Sanctions were subsequently lifted, but the crisis persisted.
Why did Niger suspend military cooperation with the USA?
While France maintained a firm stance against military coups in the region, the USA took a more conciliatory approach. For that, one would have expected General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the junta’s leader, to be more accommodating with the USA.
While the military leaders were quite grateful for this, they were also irked by the arrival of a US delegation of high-ranking State Department officials who, with a typical imperial attitude, lectured them on democracy and demanded they cut all links with the Russian government. They also accused them of having secret deals with Iran to sell uranium.
The fact that the USA belittled and showed no respect to Niger led the military junta to revoke the 2012 agreement, which it highlighted was a secret document not endorsed by the public that granted the USA carte blanche to operate in Niger as they pleased.
In requesting the USA lo leave the country, Niger asserted its rights as a free and sovereign nation. As such, Niger is free to make deals with whichever country it chooses, with neither the USA nor France having the authority to dictate any decision.
This decision significantly affects the USA’s geostrategic position, as Niger is the only country in West Africa where it has a military presence. If compelled to withdraw entirely, the USA would lose its surveillance capabilities and ability to project power. If the USA wants to stay and seek a new agreement with the junta, it will need to tone down its demands. But if it keeps pressing Niger to cut ties with Russia, it is unlikely to be able to reach a deal.
Do you see Niger’s decision as part of a broader regional trend?
Over the past few years, people in other countries in the region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, have shown a desire to reaffirm sovereignty and reject the influence of imperial powers.
France, as the former colonial power and on behalf of the European Union (EU) and the west, has particularly had a lot of influence in the region. It has conducted military operations, done business and even imposed the CFA franc, the regional currency and a relic of French colonialism in Africa.
France, and to a lesser extent the USA, have displayed imperial attitudes towards poor countries in Africa. They have completely disregarded their national sovereignty and ignored their need for dignity. They aim to dictate to their people the type of government they should have, the decisions they should make and who they should partner with. This imperial mentality must stop.
The public, guided by a very active civil society, is happy to see France and the USA being told to leave. They are happy to see Niger behave as a sovereign country that rejects foreign influence, particularly when both countries have done little to nothing to help resolve the insecurity dilemma Niger has faced for a decade.
How do you understand the growing power of Russia in this context?
Russia, and to a lesser extent China, are the default partners in the region. Despite their substantial presence and technological capabilities, France, the USA and even the United Nations have not achieved the same level of success as Russia in nations such as the Central African Republic (CAR) or Mali. Russia has been able to stabilise the security situation in the CAR, at least to some extent, and recapture major strategic cities in Mali that have been under rebel control for the last 10 years.
Countries in the region see an alternative in Russia. This is not rooted in a Cold War mentality but rather in Russia’s longstanding presence in the region, its support for many nations during the early years of independence and its demonstrated effectiveness in combating terrorism.
What international support does Niger’s civil society need?
Nigerien civil society needs the solidarity of civil society across the world. Civil society organisations have suffered a lot. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world and has faced months of a severe embargo, sanctions, electricity cuts and medicine shortages. While these measures have been lifted, so has financial assistance from the EU and France, which has exacerbated socioeconomic hardships and security issues.
The country hasn’t collapsed – as some had hoped – but is undergoing serious socioeconomic hardship and security challenges. The military coup is not to be applauded – it’s a clear sign of political failure. But considering the context, it can be understood. People have accepted that the military are in charge, and now they need all the help and solidarity they can receive.
The international community should adopt a more empathetic stance towards Niger, supporting the country and its authorities. They should avoid punitive measures such as sanctions, which only harm the public, and refrain from imposing decisions and norms upon the nation.
Instead, the international community should find a formula to help Nigerien authorities navigate through this complicated context and transition back to a constitutional order, with the active involvement of local civil society.
Civic space in Niger is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the African Security Sector Network through itswebsite orFacebook andLinkedIn pages, and follow@ASSN_Africa on Twitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
